The last straight line for the French White Paper. A golden rule...
(BRUXELLES2) The most pessimistic forecasts are circulating briskly in the press on the contours of the future White Paper which should be published in mid-April (but the final decisions on which are about to be made in the coming days). According to my colleague J. Guisnel (Le Point/Le Telegramme) a budgetary apocalypse for armies,is preparing, the defense budget being able to increase, according to one track, from 1,5% of GDP to 1,1% of GDP. I''Apocalypse is not for next week... replies JD Merchet (Marianne) estimating that the range would be more between 31,5 billion (the option of rue St Dominique, the Ministry of Defense, i.e. a frozen budget) and 28 billion euros (the option of Bercy, the Ministry of the Budget). In an article titled Defense: the dark scenarios of
MPs step up
Several French deputies - members of the Defense Committee - have recently expressed concern about this turn in the White Paper. One of the first to speak was the PS deputy from Morbihan, Gwendal Rouillard, a fine connoisseur of defense issues but above all a faithful and close friend of Jean-Yves Le Drian - he was his parliamentary attaché, before taking over the deputy seat after the death of his deputy (read: Le Drian, F. Hollande's “Defense” gentleman. Portrait of a European). He " appeal to the President of the Republic (in an open letter published on his site read here).
A strategic weakening and consequences for employment
« Our country must imperatively keep its strategic ambition, which is expressed in particular by its right of veto at the UN, and confer on it the appropriate and operational means. he explains, saying, totally inconsistent " to want " cut the tool of National Defense in relation to the decision to intervene militarily in Mali and our new strategy in Africa”. The Bercy scenarios would have unacceptable repercussions for our Defense Industry, its 320 jobs, its 000 SMEs and its innovation and export capacity of several billion euros “He then alerts, recalling the” strong lever for growth and essential investment that she represents. Argument that bears in times of crisis.
The intervention in Mali would not have taken place
On the other side of the political spectrum, we do not really feel any divergence of approach. Christophe Guilloteau (UMP), also a member of the Defense commission, has just sent an open letter to the government, expressing his concern. " If these proposals were to be adopted, it would not be a question of a simple additional reduction in appropriations, but indeed of the abandonment by our country of its rank of great power, of its capacity to intervene wherever democracy is threatened, as our army did in Afghanistan, in Libya, and today in Mali” explains the deputy from Rhone. « With a defense budget set at 1,2% of GDP, our intervention would certainly have stopped on the evening of January 11. »
Comment: a scheduled hard landing
A usual game of dramatization...
First of all, let's beware of lovemaking. We are in the usual game of the necessary dramatization of the exercise. Bercy makes several projections, displaying a drastic objective. The Ministry of Defense plays the black plan to mobilize all its forces indirectly in the battle (deputies, industrialists, lobbies, journalists...). This allows the forces to be measured. Then we will cut according to the displayed resistances and the defined objectives. In a media way, announcing a drastic reduction in the means of defense then allows the government to justify that, ultimately, the effort was limited and that the ministry fought hard to safeguard its means. But to see in this battle of figures only a politico-media exercise would be a mistake.
A lure on the nature of the exercise
Until recently, there was an optical illusion about the nature of exercise. The White Paper would content itself with an update of the threats. It was a geopolitical exercise, and the essentials would be preserved. A decoy, all the better maintained that with the engagement in Libya, then in Mali, one could say that France had a defense tool which deserved to be preserved. Certainly. But there are also economic realities, which do not date from January or December, but existed long before (the elections for that matter). The French debt is significant. It does not decrease. It even increases. And the bar of 100% of GDP debt is approaching...
The golden rule has imperatives
France - like other Europeans - has pledged to put a stop to the increase in this debt. This is the famous "golden rule" which is not a theoretical rule. It does not content itself with constitutionally anchoring a limitation on deficits, it also legally reinforces a drastic, implacable rule: the differential between the level of debt and the acceptable limit of 60% of GDP must be reduced each year by a 1/20th for 20 years! In a way, the golden rule requires casting bronze!
Take a calculator!
If the projections that B2 are correct, we arrive at a reduction of the order of 30 billion euros per year for the entire public budget (State, local authorities, social insurance), all over 20 years, provided that there is no budget deficit. Which is already difficult. A simple calculation of proportionality gives for the defense budget an (arithmetic) contribution of at least 1 billion euros each year. By including the effort on reaching the 0 deficit, knowing that certain expenses cannot be reduced in this proportion, and that it is better to give a boost immediately, rather than to the renewal of the legislative elections /presidential, it should certainly be more, between 1 and 2 billion at the very least. The landing will be brutal! But it was completely predictable.
Save the essential: the OPEX. Reflect on the accessory: nuclear power?
Crying wolf today is therefore a bit late and even contradictory. The challenge today is therefore no longer to say "no, no, no" to any budget cut. But to know how to make a quick, proportionate cut that does not harm the format of the armies, its operational and defense capacity. In this spirit, it is, in my opinion, the ability to enter first that must be preserved (A400Ms, helicopters, intelligence, infantryman protection, military training, frigates, etc.) . And, willy-nilly, we have to start thinking about the sacrosanct nuclear deterrence which is a strain on resources that have now become rare and more necessary elsewhere (read: The ability to enter first...)