Libya: the dead accumulate, the UN thinks, NATO procrastinates, the EU plans

(BRUSSELS2) “ We have 10.000 dead, 20.000 prisoners or missing, 30.000 wounded, 7.000 of whom are seriously injured. "... In Luxembourg, at the EU Foreign Affairs Council, last Tuesday, the international representatives of the CNT, Ali El Assaoui (former ambassador to the United Nations) and Mahmoud Jibril had delivered a bleak picture of the situation in Libya. This figure now seems outdated if we are to believe the report taken up today (April 19) in Rome by the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Franco Frattini, who cites 50.000 wounded in total. El Assaoui had also delivered a vigorous plea to the European ministers. And the meeting planned for a "coffee" (1) had finally extended to almost lunch... An hour and a half of discussions on the situation on the ground but also to find out how to get out of the situation, what avenues of political negotiation existed in particular... Did the Europeans come out of it convinced that it was time to act a little stronger and a little more united? Is NATO in a position of strength? Is OCHA effective? We can doubt it.
Where is the soft power of the European Union?
Today, we feel a sense of unease in light of the reaction of the international community, which seems very slow compared to the situation in Misrata, or even non-existent compared to what prevails in the Berber villages, which are outside the media field of vision but just as dramatic (2).
And the European Union does not seem to be in its best shape... It has, to date, not proposed any path of dialogue nor taken any notable political initiative. Whether through a negotiation table, a contact group, negotiators, a special envoy, observers… All the usual channels in such a conflict. The EU thus appears to be trailing other initiatives: that of the African Union (which it could or should have joined, even if it did not share all of its presuppositions), that of the Contact Group, etc. The only response, unequivocal and rapid, was the adoption of economic sanctions. And the planning of a mission (EUFOR Libya) which one might wonder if it would not have been better fulfilled by robust means of civil protection.
We can therefore also wonder whether the lesson of the Balkans has paid off. 20 years and 4 treaties later (Maastricht, Amsterdam, Nice, Lisbon), while the EU is now equipped with much more substantial instruments, the European response still seems as timid and haphazardly weak as at the time while its interests and security are directly affected.
Where is NATO's strength?
NATO's wait-and-see attitude during its first fifteen days of monitoring the operation has already been widely commented on B2 (3). While it is understandable, it is nonetheless irresponsible, given the obligation to "protect civilians" set out in UN Resolution 1973. But above all, it is dangerous for the Atlantic Alliance and its constituent states; it leaves the impression of a weakness of commitment that reflects on its reputation. What is NATO worth today if it remains incapable of conducting an operation that is, after all, very limited (without land engagement) in a neighbouring country? Today, despite all the reforms and strategic discussions, it is less capable of acting than it was yesterday. Since deterrence is the primary weapon of an alliance, what is happening in Libya is even more of a "crash test" for NATO than for the EU.
Is the UN Office of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) up to the task?
Finally, when we learn the lessons of this crisis, we will also have to determine the exact role of the United Nations Office for Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). And draw responsibilities from it. Have we not asked too much of this organization, which has not been present on Libyan territory directly since last week (and even then in Benghazi)? Was it really able to fulfill its mission? By delaying the arrival of a European humanitarian support force (4) as long as possible, did it not take long to sound the alarm. The UN Secretary-General, Ban Ki Moon, visiting Budapest yesterday (April 18), acknowledged that the " humanitarian situation is particularly serious. There are tens of thousands of people whose basic needs are not being met. So we have a serious problem". Was a very restrictive analysis of the condition of "last resort" to allow the use of military means at the humanitarian level justified in this case, as OCHA maintains? To the great delight of several European Member States who were clearly not too keen on being stakeholders in this conflict and engaging their troops (even in a neutral manner)...
Read also: