European defence, just an illusion? Why I (totally) disagree with JD Merchet

(BRUSSELS2) The book by JD Merchet (JDM) on the “ European defence, a great illusion is brilliant, lively, interesting, willingly provocative. And I would gladly subscribe to it. But the readers of this blog will perhaps have guessed it, I could not entirely agree on certain basic elements. In particular the assumptions on which Jean-Dominique bases his reasoning.

First postulate: defense or European defences?

First of all, we have to agree on what European defense is and how it is defined. From a general point of view, it seems to me mainly shared between two organisations: NATO and the EU. I have the impression that, in his demonstration, JDM aims for the second but not the first. Pity. Because if these two organizations sometimes seem to want to compete with each other, to step on each other's toes, each has a well-defined role, through history and… their statutes. In fact, they are complementary.

One, essentially a military organization, has the function of guaranteeing the security of its member states, if necessary by going beyond borders (Kosovo, Afghanistan, etc.), if the security risk is felt. In the second, essentially civil organization, the task of developing a common foreign policy, of which the defense policy is one of the tools and instruments, to stabilize and intervene in external regional areas. One is 50 years old, the other 10 years old… We cannot blame the youngest for not having done what its elder was unable to do (industrial cooperation, the European army. ..).

Behind these two organizations two conceptions of the “military” stand out. In one, it is an end in itself, obviously under political control. In the other, it is an instrument – ​​among others – at the service of a foreign policy. One is largely driven by the United States, and dominated, the other stems from the Europeans' own will, with a historical Franco-German impulse, broader and more diversified today.

But both have certain identical problems today: how to involve the Member States in the collective responsibility for security? how to have a truly operational rapid reaction force?

Another distorted assumption: the European army

« She is not for tomorrow ". Obviously. Quite simply because it is not a European program or project, nor even a priority. Just an idea, born in the years 1940-50, which hangs around here and there, defended by certain individuals - pro-European activists, soldiers, and even certain political personalities (cf. kaczynski). But it is not shared by all at EU level (far from it). And the path is very very long - just the harmonization of ranks and epaulets is already a problem! If NATO hasn't managed to do it completely, I don't see the EU doing it in the blink of an eye.

Going towards a “common defence” does not mean a common army. Europe has a common agricultural policy, with a correspondingly endowed budget; however, it does not have an army of farmers. Europe has a precise air safety policy; nor does it have an airline. Etc… The European construction is often confusing indeed or laughing. But it is clear. The European structure consists, in fact, above all in offering the Member States a framework for the development of certain policies, using regulatory, financial or political means. This framework can be more or less loose. But it is generally not intended to replace existing operators.

Europe is the common home, the walls, the foundations. It is up to the tenants to inhabit it and bring it to life. In other words, Europe has a “federative nature”, consisting in taking differences into account, bringing them closer together, without always erasing them. Indeed for French people accustomed to seeing everyone marching with one voice, to the sound of their Head of State, also Chief of the Armies, it is quite surprising. But it is so. Not all European states are built on the same model. And therefore the army cannot be truly common.

Moreover, no state has ventured down this path with its neighbours. Even Luxembourg, which has a small population and a very clear proximity with the Belgians in particular. A sign…

Third point on which I do not agree: power is war

« Can we imagine that Europe manages, finally as its supporters say, to equip itself with the instruments of power and therefore of war? ? " It's wrong. The sign of power is no longer war. I will take two recent examples. The USSR and the war in Afghanistan, the United States and the war in Iraq. Both powers have used war as an instrument. And this caused them more of a decline than an increase in power.

The fact that Europe cannot start the war is indeed a weakness. But also a strength. When Europe negotiates, it is not perceived as systematically hostile, as a desire to monopolize, to invade. The example of Kosovo (in its independent phase), Georgia (in its conflict with Russia) recently is there to remind us. The fact that the EU exists without having destroyed its Member States is also a guarantee for many States in the world of a mark of respect towards them. Too often, and I made the mistake of this at the start of my presence in Brussels, we look at Europe with our eyes, Europeans, without perceiving its external image. And this image is very real.

The first weapon of European power is not war… it is the Euro. The modern battle is fought in the markets. And this battle, Europe is in the process of winning it. Quite simply because today the Euro is on par with the Dollar. In 5 years, Europe has regained 80 years of lost years. Without death!

Last point, European industrial projects

We can indeed regret the lack of appetite and industrial efficiency of Europeans. I do not share the pessimism on the Airbus A400M. If the delay is proven, the failure is not consummated. And the A400M, like all industrial projects, has so far been organized nationally, bilaterally or multilaterally. There are only national interests at stake with the advantage and the disadvantage of intergovernmental cooperation. With the key, very often, delay and financial slippage (example of the type 45 destroyer). The European Union is not directly involved in these programs (Eurofighter or JSF type, Airbus, etc.), except in one: Galileo (whose military implications may be significant). And this is a first. Even if the device is not yet in place.

Indeed, as JDM points out, defense policy cannot be a sectoral policy. Putting it in the rank of environmental or transport policies is a “dumbness”. But I would like to distinguish the past from the present. Two facts seem inevitable in the more or less near future. On the one hand, the economic crisis will force drastic budgetary choices. And quickly (cf. l'belgian army). The temptation to carry out solo projects will be challenged. On the other hand, the European defense market which was for the moment an “area reserved” for States will no longer be so tomorrow. The adoption of two directives (which must still be transposed in the Member States) on public procurement and export licenses (arms transfers) will shape another vision of things tomorrow. It was not without difficulty. But there is here the framework of a common defense market. The European Commission, like the Court of Justice, will be able to put its nose in the affairs of States. Which sounds the death knell of a certain nationalism.

Europe and its failings

On the rest, we can indeed be critical of a certain European sluggishness. For example, that it does not yet have an operation headquarters and therefore cannot carry out high-intensity operations today (cf. General Bentegeat's remarks recently). But whose fault or responsibility? The propensity of Europeans to rely on American industry or American reaction to ensure their own security is also worrying.

We can remember the three recent Yugoslav wars (Croatia, Bosnia, Kosovo). I find that JD Merchet could even have been more severe on this point. In the 90s, Europe, in my view, surrendered accomplice of war crimes and/or against humanity. Unfortunately, there are no other words. By having remained passive, by not using all the necessary instruments, by refusing to intervene, by refusing to arm the attacked, by refusing to welcome Bosnian, Croat or Serb refugees. I say Europe – not France, Germany or the United Kingdom – because there Europe has not piled up successes, it has piled up errors and resentments… And it is the United States, again once, who saved his face! At the time.

The truth test

In fact, the real "test-truth" of Defense Europe is precisely the Balkans. And if what happened yesterday happened again today, would Europe be in the process of reacting? There is the question. From an operational point of view, it seems possible, quite easily. With battlegroups and common political instruments (Policy and Security Committee, military staff, etc.), it is in a position to predict tensions, plan an operation and react quickly. Will the politicians have the will to press the button to send the forces, I also believe that. Or at least we can believe it. So there is a very clear evolution here.

If we look at the latest operations launched in 2008, we can clearly see that there is an evolution. Honestly, who could have foreseen that the EU would one day be in a position to send a corps of observers to the Russian border line in conflict with a neighbor (the very role of NATO)? Who would have thought that the EU would be in a central position in the fight against piracy in the Gulf (US zone par excellence)? Who bet a kopek on the intervention operation in Chad? Or on the police-justice-customs mission in Kosovo? ... There is a gear change. We are no longer with "small operations" to exist. In the space of a little over a year, more than 10.000 men have been deployed in this way.

Finally, everyone knows that if we maintain the "Berlin+" system (which allows the EU to take advantage of NATO's command resources), in Bosnia-Herzegovina, it is more for political reasons (to please to a few Member States and justify the good cooperation with NATO) than for the needs of the operation. The EU can now do without NATO on several aspects (not all) of its defense policy. What she couldn't do before. It's like that ! Defense Europe exists. She's not perfect. She is not always very "bling-bling". But it works...

Just a few disappointments...?

In the end, I would say that there is no illusion, just a few disappointments and a little more realism in European defence. Fewer utopias or mirages, and more, more realistic projects. It's not crazy love anymore. But lasting love… (to use a very fashionable term). Come on... Thank you Jean-Dominique for allowing us to (re)launch the debate.