A non paper on the Althea mission

(BRUSSELS2) What future for the European military operation in Bosnia-Herzegovina? COPS ambassadors are due to talk about it in July. Already, three countries — Austria, Bulgaria and Hungary — presented the results of their reflections in mid-June. A “non paper”, which I was able to browse, which points out the weak points of the operation and militates for its extension. The current situation is not unsatisfactory" they write. There is a " wide gap between Eufor Althea's military tasks and available resources ". You don't have to " not wait for unilateral troop reductions (…) to develop a realistic scenario for (the mission) in the future ". The alert level is reached according to the three countries authors of the non paper. The mission is currently one-third below the required military minimum. “Instead of 2000 announced, we are indeed moving towards a workforce of less than 1500 men. " Forces are lacking for anything other than an isolated, low-intensity incident. Further withdrawals would compromise the current configuration ". The authors consider five options from the status quo (option 1) to the non-executive training mission (option 5). Two extreme options that they don't value " realistic ».

Option 2 “adaptation” (1200 men) would thus see the mandate of the mission adapted to the current and foreseeable size. It would make it possible to maintain surveillance and a limited intervention capacity, such as the possibility of receiving and accommodating out-of-area forces (Over The Horizon Forces or OTHF). Option 3 “proactive adaptation” would be of a slightly smaller format (800-1000 men). Its capacity for immediate intervention would be reduced. The objective would be more to ensure surveillance in order to have a timely reaction from external forces. Option 4 "Training plus" would keep a limited workforce (400 men). Which leads, de facto, to the transformation into a training mission by just keeping the executive mandate for form. A small Command and Control (C2) capability, a small surveillance element would be retained. But the implementation of the executive mandate will depend on the deployment of forces outside the area.

Comment: The risk in Bosnia and Herzegovina should not be underestimated. Nevertheless, we find ourselves today in a configuration that yesterday. Croatia's forthcoming membership and Serbia's entry into negotiations are changing the regional situation. The political situation remains tense indeed. But this is also the case in Macedonia or Albania (with one difference: the recent history of Bosnia and the civil war). In Kosovo too, Kfor is in an advanced rate of decline. Because the situation no longer justifies such a large military presence. It is therefore easy to conceive in the short or medium term that a stabilization force will remain in the region, which could be redeployed if necessary in Bosnia and Herzegovina.