insurrectionary techniques. Hats off to bloggers in Misrata

(BRUXELLES2) We can consider that they are not journalists because they are just "bloggers", met on the benches of the university in Rennes, and do not live from the profession of journalist "(official definition). I leave that I remember all too well the little smirk of some colleagues, who welcomed the birth of this blog, or the slightly disdainful comment of a NATO spokesperson on the "french blogger" , for not having, a priori, sympathy for them.

In any case, the testimonials/reports they published on their blog En route! (published in several languages, English, Italian, German, Arabic) are well worth the detour, just like the one published by Rue89 At the beginning of April. They have a freshness and a quality that would undoubtedly deserve to be found more in the "classic" press. They testify to the battle of Misrata or Ajdebia, with facts, analyzed and above all contextualized. So I can only wish Baptiste, hit in Misrata by a stray bullet, and who has just been repatriated to Benghazi, after much expectation, to come out of it as well as possible. And to all the other bloggers to continue their work.

Two or three articles caught my interest. This will be my weekend read... 

When NATO stopped cutting supply lines

We can thus read the paper on Libyan armaments and oil, "It's liquid and it's black". It gives an idea of ​​the atmosphere in Benghazi, of the temptation to cut Libya in two which exists more in certain capitals, of the rebellion's equipment in large katioushas BM-21 or in recovery equipment on Mi-24 , and especially the tactics of Gaddafi. Already described in these columns by a European expert (*), he adopted the "Tuareg" tactic, large fast 4X4s allowing him to bring supplies (petrol, weapons...), without going through the main road from the coast, thus avoiding being bombarded. " The day before yesterday, the 10th, Gaddafi's troops, equipped with brand new 4X4s, raided across the desert and entered the town of Ajdebia, shooting at anything that moves in the deserted streets of its population. In this, these troops have benefited from the experience acquired in Chad and in particular from the commitment of Tuaregs capable of finding passable roads in the desert.. "By abandoning the French tactics of the first days -" France had, in its first raids, bombarded some of these supplies, which had conferred an enormous advantage on the revolution when it found itself confronted with armament comparable to its own — and by confining itself only to combat zones, in the first weeks NATO gave an objective advantage to Gaddafi's forces....

Read also:

• Return from Benghazi for the European mission
• What is NATO missing in Libya? More planes, hitting better and faster

Insurrectionary Techniques

We can also read, with interest, the post, dating from April 12, which describes in detail the insurgent techniques. I retain a few elements that are still current, fifteen days later, which outline the strengths and weaknesses of the forces involved: firepower and "professionalism", without concern for the population, for some; knowledge of the field, resourcefulness and voluntarism for others.

• "Thetown planning, which seems to assume a heritage that is both Haussmanian and postmodern, reveals all its effectiveness. The width of the artery lends itself more easily to the movement of armor than to its barricading by the insurgents. It offers a gigantic straight line for tanks, from the support positions in retreat outside the city to the combat zones of the hypercenter. Few corners, few dead angles, the progression is done in the open. (...) But, of this large boulevard which crosses the city, the loyalists do not draw only advantages. The possibilities of movement it offers also mean exposure to the daily harassment of Shebabs. (...) The demolition of the surroundings hinders their progress more than that of the insurgents, and the use of armored vehicles and heavy artillery is now difficult with the alleys that enclose it.

• “The Gaddafi forces have every interest in ensuring their position as a lock at the city gates and in renewing the offensives in the port area”.

• “the knowledge of the terrain and the use made of it by the Shebab (*) defeat the military superiority of the enemy. »

• “Despite its organization, superior firepower and recruiting capacity, the Gaddafi army suffers from another weakness. Even if it has many supporters, it is also made up of foreign mercenaries, attracted by the lure of profit, or types – sometimes very young – enlisted by force. The name of loyalist army is quite usurped at times: some of these troops have no intimate affection either for power or for this war. This is felt at times in their low capacity for initiative once cut off from their command, or in their remission at critical moments. » ...

Finally, a last article - happier - Misrata: meeting with a scoop and a gunsmith

(*) Not to be taken in the usual sense of Islamists but of fighters, resistance fighters.