North Africa LibyaBlog Analysis

Libyan crisis. All military options are on the table. Which?

training of the Austrian elements of the European battlegroup in medical evacuations (credit: Austrian Army)

(BRUSSELS2 / Analysis) Three main options are currently planned by the military personnel of the European and Atlantic General Staffs. The work has already started but it is far from finished. And this is the whole meaning of the "prudent planning" decision adopted by the EU as well as by NATO, and the "detailed planning" decision taken by NATO.

As one expert told me, so far we have options, but quite vague, that is, a general view of “what we can or plan to do », a few lines per option, describing the objectives, the advantages and disadvantages, and the main political and military conditions. " It is now a question of going further, of specifying in detail ". That is to say, to give in front of each option, the necessary means, the required staff, the cost, the implementation time, the risks... In terms of "paper", we go from a few paragraphs by option to a few dozen pages.

It should be noted that, according to our information, the two organizations are continuing a “separate” planning. The two processes are “independent and autonomous”. These are different political organizations (which, moreover, do not bring together quite the same Member States). Political formula to be weighted by a phenomenon: there are many bridges, structural and human, in particular via the representatives on the military committee (everyone speaks to each other). If there is no exclusivity or specialization of tasks, we can however draw a border. The EU focuses more on humanitarian issues, NATO is exclusively on air, the maritime being tackled by the two organizations but with objectives that may be different (migration in one case, arms embargo in the other). The only difference between the two organizations: if NATO has decided to push forward the planning, no decision seems to have been taken in this direction by the EU. " There is no political impetus in this direction explains a connoisseur of these files.

 

1. Thehumanitarian : assistance to refugees, humanitarian corridors, "safe area"...

This involves preparing military support to welcome a large wave of refugees in neighboring countries (Tunisia, Egypt, or even Niger or Algeria - if the latter so wishes). Classic logistical (transport, communication, etc.) but also medical (field hospital, etc.) support. A support which could also be exerted towards the territory "liberated" from the Libyan opponents. Ships like the British Cumberland and the Italian Libra have already practiced this. There may also be securing of WFP "civilian" ships or ferries responsible for the evacuation.

Specialists recall that there were between 1,5 and 2 million foreigners in Libya, many of whom come from Bangladesh and Pakistan. Only a little over 200.000 crossed the border (at least were counted like that), mainly Egyptians.

It is also a question of preparing stronger actions such as the imposition of humanitarian corridors or "safe areas" (as in Bosnia-Herzegovina) to regroup civilians, if the civilian population is caught in a vice (a model that does not has not always proven its effectiveness). This is the meaning of the Franco-British letter in particular.

 

2. The maritime

Maritime surveillance can be in international waters or territorial waters, loose or tight. In addition to surveillance, there may be control of ships: right of visit exercised within the framework of the law of the sea, or on special authorization from the United Nations Security Council, with, if necessary, seizure of the cargo, the ship or arrest of its occupants (in this case there arises, as for the pirates, the question of the competent jurisdiction, since we are within the framework of the exercise of universal jurisdiction). In the ultimate case, it will be assimilated to a blockade which will have to be authorized by the United Nations.

It should not be forgotten either that action at sea is also justified for reasons of surveillance of illegal migration (Operation Hermès launched by the Europeans under cover of Operation Frontex).

3. the air

There are several options. Aerial surveillance of Libyan territory, or the surrounding area, which has already begun, with the Awacs. A " surveillance which also aims to monitor possible migrations (illegal), confirmed Gérard Longuet, the French Minister of Defense. A surveillance supplemented by the satellites which are currently machine-gunning the Libyan territory (the satellite center of the European Union has in particular been mobilized for this purpose).

This surveillance can be supplemented by aerial action, more or less strong, more or less extensive. At the geographical level, one can choose to protect certain sites (partial no fly zone): the "safe area" grouping together civilians or oil sites, to protect all inhabited areas, to intervene throughout the territory (total no fly zone ). At the action level, it is possible to decide to intercept planes or helicopters that leave certain trajectories or are heading towards certain places, by "diverting them from their place of action" and if necessary by shooting them down.

We can also carry out two or three targeted strikes, to destroy Libyan fighters, helicopters, airstrips, arms depots if the use of these forces by Gaddafi becomes more intensive. Or aim more extensively at all anti-aircraft defenses, which requires more resources. Finally, it is possible to use electronic neutralization means.

NB: in all cases, discrete intelligence resources are needed, remotely but also on the ground, on the spot, in Tripoli, Benghazi and in the desert...

Impossible, complex?

A 'No fly zone' therefore does not necessarily require prior and systematic destruction of ground installations. That wasn't really the case when Northern Watch was monitoring over Iraq or over Yugoslavia in the first phase.

The arguments of complexity or difficulty of a military operation in Libya now mentioned by the Americans and also put forward by the Germans (the German Foreign Minister highlighted Gaddafi's firepower "and his considerable air resources "may or may not be justified depending on what the objective of the operation is set for. In fact, the harshness of the European and Western response will be " depending on the evolution of the situation as J. Martonyi, the Hungarian Foreign Minister, explains. " If there is massive bloodshed, action will have to be taken”.

Difficult or easy? Agreement or disagreement?

If we want to send a signal,
which means 'don't piss off', it can be easy.

Technically, as French Defense Minister Gérard Longuet points out; "Depending on what we decide, we need more or less important means. If we do something limited in the territory, that's fine. If we want to cover the entire Libyan territory, 24/24, this requires major resources (NB: 30 devices = 3 x 8 + additional reinforcement). « If we want to send a signal, which means 'don't piss off', that can be easy. A neutralization of the tracks is a warning shot, it is not final. » So it all depends "of the degree of excellence set in the mission" and its duration.

Whether the French and British can carry out a military action on their own, it all depends. But in a low option, it is possible according to G. Longuet. " The French and the British can do it on their own. They don't want it. Our role is not to replace what exists, it is to train, to bring to life what exists ».

Politically, as summed up the Hungarian Foreign Minister, János Martonyi, "iThere is agreement on the general objectives but not on the technical aspects. We have a consensus on the conditions: authorization from the Security Council, agreement from the Arab League, and evaluation according to the evolution of the situation.not. But there is no consensus on the need to act on the situation. You must first "exhaust all other possibilities" before moving on to the military.

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Nicolas Gros Verheyde

Chief editor of the B2 site. Graduated in European law from the University of Paris I Pantheon Sorbonne and listener to the 65th session of the IHEDN (Institut des Hautes Etudes de la Défense Nationale. Journalist since 1989, founded B2 - Bruxelles2 in 2008. EU/NATO correspondent in Brussels for Sud-Ouest (previously West-France and France-Soir).

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