The Airbus A400M: the cause… the causes of the delay (dossier)

(BRUSSELS2) Three types of delay

The delays of the Airbus do not concern a single module but several.

1° The engine and its computer control system, the Fadec. It is not only the system that is behind, but its certification to civil standards. This certification should have taken place at the end of October 2007, according to the contract signed between Airbus military and the engine manufacturers. They promised delivery for June 2009. But according to EADS, quoted by the report of the French Senate, the foreseeable delay would therefore be more of the order of two years.

2° Navigation systems. Two are essential to the operational capabilities of the aircraft: the Flight Management System (FMS manufactured by Thales) and the GPS Air Data Inertial Reference System (GADIRS manufactured by Sagem). The other two systems are assets specific to the A400M: the Terrain-Reference Navigation System (TRN – Eads) and the Terrain masking low level flight (TM-LLF – Eads).

3° The position of the horizontal stabilizer, the internal definition of the wing and its dimensioning must be reviewed, the estimated weight of the aircraft being (this is 12 tonnes higher when empty than that which was initially planned).

The cause, the causes of the delay?

To discern the causes of the delay, it is necessary to go back to the beginning of the contract and analyze all the causes. As the French senators explain in their report, the States have made a “risky bet”: requesting an entirely new aircraft, in a very short time, at low prices and without taking responsibility for the technological risks.

1° When defining the contract, the objectives of the European states diverged. For the British, the imperative was delivery on time, needing a new fleet from 2004. They thus put pressure on the schedule. For the Germans, the need was less glaring, but on the other hand they insisted on a “very controlled” budget. They sought to lower the price. The Spaniards wanted grow their aerospace industry ". As for the French, they were somewhat attached to the three imperatives, with an additional ideological aspect, “ advance defense Europe and European industrial independence, by having a maximum of country on board ».

2° A technology made of innovations. Wanted as a versatile tool, long distance (strategic transport), able to land on all terrains (tactical transport) and able to carry a large volume, its sponsors have, perhaps " loaded the boat a little ". Then, it is a technological gem, including many innovations, but equipped with complex avionics. This has a cost, in terms of time. Every little delay on a new item adds up. A risk increased by the absence of a technological risk assessment program; the States would have refused to finance it, according to EADS.

3° The tight schedule seems quite unrealistic. While a military transport aircraft program is designed between 10 and 15 years, between the start of development and the first delivery, for the A400M this period was 6,5 years! The delay is neither more nor less than a return to normal.

4° The price was squeezed to the max. When the contract was concluded, the price of an A400M was estimated to be half that of a Boeing C-17 Globemaster, and only slightly more expensive than the older Lockheed C130J design and half the size. A real challenge, says David Gould, deputy head of Britain's Defense Procurement Agency. We are trying to get something between the Hercules and the C17 at a price that is closest to the Hercules »

5° The departure of two founding states. The departure of Italy first, then Portugal, even if they did not compromise the program, dealt it a bad blow both economically, forcing a slight increase in the cost of the planes, and in terms of images, giving a bad signal at export.

6° The industrial mistakes. Airbus sought – on the model of Boeing – to balance its production of civil aircraft. So he has " underestimated the magnitude of the challenge ". He thought that a tactical military transport aircraft was equivalent to a civilian transport aircraft " painted green ". The lack of experience of Airbus engineers in
military - despite the presence of Alenia and Casa - seems to have weighed in this bad perception. EADS did not put all the chances on its side either”. Airbus Military responsible for the program did not really have hierarchical authority over all the players. And most of the capacities had been mobilized by the A380 program. " EADS undertook to make a type of aircraft that it had never done, without having the best organization to do it and while doing something else. underlines the report of the French Senate.

7° Thelack of dialog between the States and the industrialist is also singled out. No state has been designated as the leader of the program. "This deprived the industrialist of a reactive interlocutor and strained the difficult to govern consortium" explains the report of the French Senate. As for OCCAR, its role is not in question. But it has no decision-making autonomy and must turn to the States for each problem. This further slows down the decision-making process.

8° The civil certification was wanted by the sponsors because it is made compulsory by the new European standards for circulation in the air corridors. But it is cumbersome because it involves providing complete system documentation, which must be traceable. No primary military transport aircraft are currently certified except for the C130J – which has a partial certificate from the Federal Aviation Administration.

 

High tech, too high tech?

The Airbus is an innovative aircraft. Too much perhaps. Its sponsors and designers have undoubtedly seen a bit big, incorporating many technological innovations.

Le engine first of all, specially developed for the aircraft – 4 high-power turboprops (11.000 horsepower each). Initially, it was the North American engine manufacturer, Pratt and Whitney, who had been approached. But by common agreement, especially Franco-British, the Member States have shown a preference for a European solution, in "a perspective of sovereignty".

The propellers, then, with a direction of rotation of the two motors reversed, a reduced drift, which allows a heavier payload or a greater distance covered for the same quantity of fuel.

Le FADEC extension – computer system that controls the engines, propellers – is particularly complex. It includes 275.000 instructions where a civilian A380 aircraft or a fighter aircraft like the Rafale includes 90.000.

he can carry twice as much equipment as its direct competitors – the Transall C-160 or the Lockheed C-130. Its hold can thus accommodate 9 standard military pallets, or 116 soldiers with their equipment, or 66 stretchers and a medical team. Above all, it can transport an NH90 type helicopter.

(NGV)