Chad RCA ESDP Mission. One year later… the EU arrives. A little slow ?

(BRUSSELS2) The launch of the military mission in Chad and the Central African Republic (read : The mission in Chad launched on 2 8 January. The strengths of member states) allows us, perhaps, to make certain observations and ask certain questions.

An original assembly

First, the EU can take on a military mission with a single “large” member state providing the backbone of the force, and several medium-sized countries providing an important contribution. This composition is all the more interesting in that it comes from neutral or non-NATO member countries (Ireland, Austria, Finland, Sweden) or from new member states (Poland, Romania); some do not have experience of this African terrain or any particular commitment. Which testifies to a "real European commitment" beyond strictly national geostrategic interests, underline diplomats, and is an encouraging sign, "very encouraging" same, for European defense and security (ESDP).

Cautiousness of certain states

Secondly, this operation suffered from the lack of concrete action by certain Member States. For more than six months, we have planned, prepared, coordinated. The meetings followed. It took no less than five "generation conferences", which brought together military experts, so that General Nash, commanding the Operation, felt satisfied. Ambitions have dwindled. The number of helicopters required has thus been reduced from around twenty to around ten. The European force then seemed more slow-burning than quick-reacting.

Meanwhile, the situation has worsened on the ground. In the east of Chad and the northwest of the Central African Republic, where there are large numbers of refugees, the security risk and the need for protection have increased. Some European leaders, Louis Michel recently (N°3454), were moved by it. But they were isolated. Apparently, some Member States (United Kingdom, Italy, Spain, Germany) however did not want to go beyond the limits they had set themselves, at national level: limit of commitment outside their borders and, above all, budget limit. In particular, they did not want to derogate from the funding rule - at a minimum - set by the Athena mechanism, for EU military operations.

Find a virtuous circle

Thirdly, is the military legitimacy of the European Union called into question? Certainly not. But, in the eyes of the public, it seems difficult to justify how a humanitarian NGO or a civil security force, take 48 hours on average to activate sometimes significant means, and can risk their lives, when the European soldiers are still not not ready after a few months. It is also difficult to explain why Europe does not manage to find the few helicopters necessary and to finance this operation which it has, however, enacted "imperative necessity" ?

General Bentegeat, chairing the EU Military Committee and Karl Von Wogau, chairing the EP Defense sub-committee, gave successive explanations: “the weight of public opinion and the cost of operations” for the first, "lack of community funding" for the second. This analysis should be continued.

Thus, it is important to know why the usual “virtuous” circle of European politics – political engagement + diplomatic negotiation, public discussion + media pressure – does not work in the ESDP. Negotiations are taking place behind closed doors. And the main actors — Council, Member States, military… — sometimes take shelter behind a smokescreen named " top secret ". Delicate attitude. In terms of principles, first of all, one cannot qualify as " top secret », the fact that such a country is going to provide such equipment or such a unit or… does not provide it. Then, in terms of political effectiveness, refusing to give the slightest impact to the discussions can be a source of errors and delays. The absence of public pressure, virtuous », thus makes it easier for States to forget their promises and the urgency of the field. And we let the impression of permanent failure of Defense Europe spread among the citizens. Feeling "unfair and inaccurate", underline the diplomats, because "it takes time to set up such multinational operations, at the UN as well as at the EU".

Military credibility in question

In conclusion, like several specialists and political leaders, we can wonder if Europe will be able to move forward in Defense and Security, by being satisfied with the structural changes allowed by the Lisbon Treaty. Shouldn't Europe also have to evolve in terms of funding, decision-making methods and... mentalities? The establishment of a new High Representative in 2009 may help. But Europe will not be able to afford forever, to take so many months to deploy a mission, all in all, of modest size compared to those deployed by the UN or NATO... It is its international credibility military that is at stake.

Reminder of recent events

Faced with the situation of refugees and the instability of the region, the UN Security Council decided, on January 14, 2007, to send a mission to assess the needs of a peacekeeping mission. The African Union and the European Union follow. In mid-February 2007, the Secretary General of the United Nations recommended sending a force to Chad and the Central African Republic, the military component of which would be provided by the EU. On September 11 and 17, the two governments concerned approved this deployment of force. And on September 25, the Security Council votes resolution 1778, the legal basis of the operation. The EU approves the general concept of operation on September 12, the Joint Action (giving the political green light) on October 15, and the concept of operation (Conops) on November 19. The mission has three objectives: 1) to contribute to the protection of civilians in danger (refugees and displaced persons), 2) to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid and the security of humanitarian personnel, 3) to contribute to the protection of personnel, United Nations facilities and equipment. It is part of a set of EU measures to find a solution to the crisis in Darfur: support for the efforts of the African Union (AU) and the UN to relaunch the political process of a lasting solution, establishment of the hybrid AU/UN operation in Darfur, funding and political mobilization to facilitate humanitarian aid.

(published in Europolitique, January 2008)