Europe of defence, or defense without Europe (Vincent Desportes)
(BRUSSELS2) The process of building European defence, “cit doesn't work ". Recognizing a new reality, everything has to be started from scratch, starting from the bottom, that is to say by strengthening national capacities. This is the warning message launched by General Vincent Desportes, within the framework of the European Days of Strasbourg... True to form, the former officer of the armored cavalry, who directed the Center for Doctrine and employment of the forces then the Joint Defense College (the war school) does not mince its words.
Unroll the eyes
Even the most blind, the reality must open their eyes: the world has caught fire around us and the war has returned in force. To the northeast, with Ukraine, to the east with the fire that is ravaging the Middle East, to the south, in Libya, in Nigeria then in the Sahel as far as Mali.
Only one evidence: contrary to our sometimes "simplistic" diagrams of Western Christians, the world does not progress in a linear way from evil to good. The post-modern world is a utopia of the have-nots and our perception of the world, born from the dreams of San Francisco in October 1945, was an illusion of the world.
The Return of War and Brute Force
There are, and always will be, brutal setbacks, and our ways of warfare must be able to revert to their most brutal characteristics when no compromise is possible. Mr Putin reminded us that brute force is as much a strategic as a tactical asset for those who possess it and are not afraid to use it. He showed us, implicitly, that our strength, without will, without vision, had nothing to do with power.
Added to this are two recent warning shots: Brexit and the election of Donald Trump. Let's take them for what they are: real opportunities to be seized, but also new requirements, in the short term.
The fact is: the world caught fire around Europe. Europe, and France for that matter, are only drawing too slow and too modest conclusions about the need to strengthen their defence.
Europe must rebuild the spirit of defense
Europe's problem is that'it killed the spirit of defense at the same time as it killed war. It has removed from the minds of the younger generations of Europeans any legitimacy of war as a tool for consolidating or defending a political project; therefore also a great deal of legitimacy to defense spending.
A Europe that is too slow, too modest...
The big problem with European defense is that it was based on the idea that the war was illegitimate. European processes hold back progress and effectively prevent interventions. Europe intervenes less quickly than the UN! Good performance.
Nobody came to help France in its offensive phase when it got involved in Mali to defend the security of Europeans. The European training mission for the Malian army was difficult to set up. The constitution of EUFOR RCA (in the Central African Republic) was a soap opera. And the force was only formed with a massive contribution from France on the one hand and non-member states on the other.
... and not very visible
In the fight against the Islamic State - which nevertheless concerns all Europeans - Europe, as such, is absent and the Europeans are almost as absent... in the same way as in Afghanistan, Europe has led its most longest and most massive operation without ever existing there. More than many others, the French have been Europeans, particularly in military matters.
Urgency to re-invest in defense
The succession of disillusions forces us to be realistic. The first conclusion is based on the precautionary principle. Let's go to Europe! But let's stop depriving ourselves of the means necessary for the exercise of our responsibilities and the protection of our interests. Europe itself needs it to fulfill the missions of which only the French armies are capable. The rapid and massive reinvestments of the French State and European States in their defense are today of crucial urgency..
Build a common vision and interests
However, defense can only be the defense of a shared vision and common strategic interests. It is clear that both are lacking. As long as there is no common strategic vision, no common strategic interest, there will be no common defense because, in each Member State, the feeling of European solidarity is not strong enough to impose the domestic political risk. Even more, as long as there is no shared operational vision, there will be no pooled forces.
Take the example of armored equipment. When Germany speaks of light armored vehicles, it thinks of the 30 ton class while France dreams of vehicles below 10 tons
Ground interventions: a prerogative that remains national
For a long time to come, only air and naval capabilities, the commitment of which does not precisely constitute a political risk, can be shared. The " pooling and sharing » only works when there is no political risk.
[For the ground forces, it's another question] The intervention of ground troops is too dangerous to overcome national selfishness. If we want to control our external action, we must increase ours.
We can pool capacities but not strengths. The time is no longer for dangerous chimeras, for long cherished but visibly vain dreams. The time is first of all for a return to the harsh reality of the world and therefore for the restoration of our national defense capabilities.
Be realistic: start all over again from the bottom
Today, you just have to be realistic. Approach " bottom up does not work: in sixty years, the accumulation of small pieces of European defense has never made it possible to create the hoped-for vision. It is therefore necessary to completely resume the approach, starting from the bottom, by demanding the community of views. We must stop making the defense Europe argument an acceptable excuse for the stagnation of defense budgets.
The time is then for the sacrifice of our sacred cows, for the realization of the paradox of the Red Queen by Lewis Carol. It's been sixty years that the process of building European defense has not worked, that in a world that is going very fast, the policy of small steps makes us go backwards. It's been sixty years that we toss the Europe of defense, and nothing happens.
My grandmother used to tell me: if after half an hour your mayonnaise hasn't set, throw it all away, get a new egg and some new mustard and get down to work seriously. This is now a matter of vital urgency
Major General Vincent Desportes
Engineer, doctor in history, graduate in business administration and sociology, Vincent Desportes combines an operational career which led him to exercise multiple commands. Since 2008, he has commanded the Superior School of War. He is now special advisor to the president of Panhard General Defense. He published in October 2015, a "cry of alarm" at Gallimard, with an essay entitled "France's Last Battle. Letter to the French who still believe they are defended".
It is a pity that once again General Desportes is adopting a technical and corporatist approach which does not risk advancing the development of a common defense policy for the countries of the European Union, the need for which is nevertheless all recognized. (all the polls on this subject among European citizens have shown this for many years).
Technical approach because starting well with the politico-strategic "defense can only be the defense of a shared vision and common strategic interests" he does not dwell on it by stating that "it is clear that one and the other are lacking. As long as there is no common strategic vision, no common strategic interest, there will be no common defence”. Yet it is on this point that the efforts of the military and politicians must be directed. Why did France find itself alone in Mali? because it has always wanted to have an autonomous African policy and has never really bothered to develop and implement it with the other member states.
France has associated some representatives of member countries to participate in the drafting of the latest white paper, a prelude to the definition of French defense policy. It is in this direction that we must move forward: to try to harmonize the 28 white papers or equivalent documents in order to arrive at a common strategy over several years. It should be noted that the work that this "bottom up" approach will respond to is the "top, down" in progress initiated by Ms. Mogherini: rolling out the global security strategy (Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign And Security Policy) approved in June , which turns a common vision into a concrete action plan. The general common vision therefore exists contrary to what General Desportes peremptorily asserts.
Technical because the pooling of capabilities and resources stems from the implementation of the common strategy and presents little difficulty for armies accustomed for several years to acting together within NATO, which for more than 60 years is also a place of a shared strategic vision for the defense of the territory of its members against a state military threat.
Corporatist approach because the reinforcement of French military capacities if it will give more means and, undoubtedly hopes the General, more importance to the French soldiers will always remain either insufficient if France wants to do everything alone (..) or unsuitable if they are not the result of a European politico-strategic approach
Finally, to say that the capabilities and forces of the army, unlike those of the navy and the air force, can never be pooled because the commitment of the latter does not constitute "a political risk" is an unfounded assertion and at the limit a little sufficient: let us remember for example these politically very strong images of the Jordanian pilot burned alive by the EI.
Always a pleasure to read you, even if we wonder how long we will cry in the desert...
https://eurodefense.fr/2014/04/30/leurope-de-la-defense-en-panne-de-volonte-politique-2/