When a Brit stubbornly defends the CSDP… we dream!
(BRUXELLES2) I was on the airwaves of BFM Business this Saturday to speak with Michel Barnier, Michèle Alliot-Marie from the European army in the program 500 million Europeans de Yann-Antony Noghes. (rebroadcast Sunday) He had the good idea to invite two Romanian MEPs Christian Preda (EPP) and the British Charles Tannock (ECR / Tory) to speak. Which gave rise to a rather unique exchange with the latter.
No need for a European army, the CSDP is enough to defend a Tory MEP
As a good British conservative, Charles Tannock naturally played his bad boy role very well, tackling the European army as a very bad idea, a "threat" for NATO (hey! I thought it was against Russia ), but above all believing that we did not need a European army because Europe already has a common security and defense policy (CSDP) which works well with efficient and effective operations. He cited in particular the European operation against piracy (EUNAVFOR Atalanta), which London had initially done everything to torpedo considering it ineffective, counterproductive, etc.) as well as the training operation for Somali soldiers (EUTM Somalia) . Basically, faced with the risk (very possible it must be recognized) of seeing an "EU army" put in place, the British stand up as one man (and woman) to defend the CSDP and its operations. Pinch me... I'm dreaming! If the result were proven, and exceeded the time of a telephone conversation on the radio, the Juncker proposal would already be a success in itself!
Some lures on European defense and the United Kingdom
This exchange also made it possible to demonstrate, in a clear way, some decoys, which revolve around the United Kingdom and European defence.
1st lure: The United Kingdom must be associated with European defense projects
London is, in any case, directly or indirectly opposed to anything that might present the slightest hint of effective European integration, whether in the industrial, operational or political field. Those who still believe that we can associate the British with any European defense project are seriously mistaken. If there is a European defense project, it will be done without the British or else it will not be done. Because the whole objective of a British presence inside will be to slow it down, torpedo it and neutralize it. The less they participate in European projects, the better off Europe will be... Negotiating an "opt-out" with the British on the common foreign and security policy would not be a loss of influence for Europe but, on the contrary, the alleviation of a dead weight and the best guarantee of a revival of the idea of European defence.
2nd lure: The weight of the British in operations is vital
Some European officials claim that without the British nothing can be done in terms of defence. It was true in the 1950s or 1960s, even 1990s. It is totally false today. Nostalgia for the Franco-British raid on Suez in 1956. Since the beginnings of the European security and defense policy (ESDP and CSDP), the United Kingdom has contributed very little to European operations. This did not prevent their realization. The military stabilization operation in Chad (EUFOR Tchad RCA) in 2008 was carried out mainly with French, Polish and Irish contingents and a few others, the British were to be 2... if I remember correctly. Ditto for the observation mission in Georgia in 2008 (EUMM Georgia) on the lines of contact with South Ossetia and Abkhazia. In the European anti-piracy operation EUNAVFOR Atalanta, so vaunted by Charles Tannock, since 2008, the British navy has only managed to provide one ship for a few months. And the provision of the Northwood operations headquarters was both a political and a financial operation. Political, because it was a question of rallying the British to a project which he opposed. Financial, because HQ costs are partly covered by the common budget for operations at European level (the Athena budget). The British, often hostile to any pooling of funding for military operations, were not critical here. On the contrary... In recent operations, British participation has been symbolic: 2 soldiers for EUFOR RCA 2014 (1) and 0 for EUMAM RCA! Even the EUFOR Althea operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina - which is supported by the United Kingdom - only attracts a weak participation...
3rd decoy: a British army in full form
In reality, the Europeans do very well without British operational support for 15 years. And that is not likely to change. The British Army is grappling with one of the greatest crises in its history. Its budget is constantly shrinking. To the point of being able to fall below the 2% of GDP, recommended by NATO and again recalled at the Wales summit in September 2014. It "digests" the intensive commitment of more than 10 years in Iraq and Afghanistan . And if it will remain one of the great European armies, London reserves, and will reserve, its military commitments to those taken alongside the Americans, whether bilaterally or within the Atlantic Alliance.
4th lure: in 20 years the United Kingdom will be able to do without a European defense
I asked Charles Tannock whether he was sure that in the finally near future, 20 years (that of a European army), the United Kingdom would not need European solidarity. Surprisingly enough, the MEP, although usually sure of himself, and with sharp expressions, suddenly became very vague, responding with a pirouette that his mandate was only valid for 5 years! Even under the influence of the arrests of my colleague YA Noghès, he did not want to go further. As if, for him, the British future itself in Europe stopped in 2019... Which, in fact, raises the real question: can we count on the British to build the European future? Asking the question is already answering it. This is why the European continent should expect nothing from the United Kingdom, neither positively nor negatively. It must move forward in terms of European defence, immediately bypassing what can only be opposition to a (European) project that no longer concerns the United Kingdom...
5th lure: defense will forever remain a national thing
It is a conception, very fashionable in France, in some circles, which is based on a certainty: the French defense, its pugnacity, its temerity, have no equal in Europe. And it is not shareable. It's true. Because the French model - with a president who decides alone in agreement with a General Staff - is indeed an exception in Europe. No other country in Europe has this model... imperial (apart from Russia ;-). To believe, however, that the French military budget can be preserved for years, while the rest of the public budget will be on a diet, and that there will never be any European defense, is however a decoy. THE status quo is as unrealistic as that of a European army, in good and due form. France would therefore have every interest in contributing to the debate and reflecting on what could be a European structure, a European body, a European headquarters, which will allow Europe, within 20 years, to equip itself with a scale of international projection while keeping national structures (in the countries that so wish).
(Nicolas Gros-Verheyde)
Towards a British opt-out?
This exchange led me to complete my reflection on the reasons for Jean-Claude Juncker's "exit" from the European army. As we know, this interview given to the daily Die Welt, last weekend, is very explicit and is not a simple little sentence. It is certainly explained by his (real) convictions, his desire to provoke debate (no doubt) and his desire to contribute to a German-German debate (also), as we have already explained. But we must not forget also the very political terrain of Europe, which the President of the European Commission knows like the back of his hand. We all know that the European army is the great scarecrow, the fantasy behind which the British take shelter as soon as we talk about any progress whatsoever in terms of European defence, even from a technical point of view. David Cameron proved it during the last summit devoted to European defense in December 2013. By putting in the public square what is only a vague idea as a European project, JC Juncker has, in a way, reduced to ashes this convenient argument. It sort of clears the way for a future defense debate at the June summit (after the UK election in May) by giving the Brits a 'bone to gnaw on'.
Read also:
- An army for Europe proposes Juncker: is it interesting, is it feasible?
- For Nigel Farage, the European army is already there. Yes Yes...
(1) Placing one or two soldiers in a multinational operation fulfills, in addition to the function requested within the mission, two other, strictly national objectives: to symbolize the participation of the State concerned (which can thus include in its statistics at the end of year X participation in national operations) and ensure direct information gathering and feedback (through reports sent regularly to the capital).
