The Beluga affair becomes a legal affair. The questions arise...
Several investigators from the prosecutor's office in Bremen (Germany) left for the Seychelles to shed light on the failed assault on the Beluga Nomination. This is the first time that this jurisdiction has initiated an investigation for piracy. A thick cloud of smoke covers, in fact, this failed operation to recapture a ship which proves how easy speech is in an armchair 6000 km away but how difficult art is on a sea where all the elements are not united. for a perfect operation.
In the end 4 dead: 1 pirate killed by gunshot, 2 sailors killed (by gunshot), 1 other dead sailor (the chief engineer wanted to escape the kidnappers, jumped into the water, probably drowned) , 2 survivors (recovered by the Danish ship) and 7 hostages... And many questions.
The role of the armed forces?
The affair remains very confused because each of the authorities, who had means on the spot, rejects the fault of the shootings. The Seychelles authorities immediately sent a surveillance plane and then an intervention boat to the scene. And according to the statement they made in Brussels2. "The Coast Guard chased the boat (pirate) then handed over to the NATO forces on the spot". They also refuse to confirm the exchange of fire. NATO, which I also questioned, also maintains its version of the facts, "When the Danish ship Esbern Snare arrived on site, the captain of the Beluga Nomination asked her to stay away. The Esbern Snare didn't want to escalate a dangerous and unknown situation. So he left". And hides behind the judicial inquiry not to say more. In fact, it would seem according to the testimony of a surviving Ukrainian sailor that the two ships would have fired on the pirated boat. Despite some distilled information, we do not It is not known, however, whether the two sailors killed were killed in retaliation by the pirates, or caught in the exchange of fire.
The role of the shipowner?
The owner of the Beluga has a more than vague role. After having publicly complained about the lack of military means to escort his boat (from Eunavfor as from NATO) and the lack of intervention, he seems much more cautious today. It must be said that its ships fly a "flag of convenience" which belongs neither to a member of the European Union nor to a member of NATO. Logically, he should therefore have requested the protection of... Antigua & Barbuda and not that of the European forces. On the other hand, if the information of our colleague die Spiegel is confirmed, he would not have given an answer when the authorities asked for his permission to intervene. Its responsibility, like that of the naval forces which intervened, could also be engaged, if not... to get their hands on the pirates.
First lessons: a military maritime action which finds its limits and obliges to rethink the police action at sea in the Indian Ocean
1° Among the protective measures, one has just been shattered. The "citadel" is not infallible or impregnable. We feared him. We have proof of that now. On the Beluga, the pirates entered through the roof, blowing it up. A technique that they will certainly repeat in the next takes.
2° The reconquest of a pirated ship is more delicate than ever, not only because it takes place at sea, but because it comes up against increasingly determined, trained and aggressive pirates. Such an operation is therefore not only a matter of a naval battle technique but more of a negotiation with hostage takers. This technique is not easily mastered. And the forces in place will have to adapt to this situation, by increasing their numbers.
3° Confusion reigns at the level of communication. And it seems urgent that the European navies (in particular that of NATO) which operate within the framework of operations - which are not military but of police) - practice a communication a little less triumphalist but more transparent. The credibility of these futures transactions depends on it.
4° The balance sheet begins to be heavy. As of February 8, there are 29 ships and 681 sailors held hostage by pirates, according to the headquarters of the European operation EuNavfor Atalanta. A list that includes the Prantalay 11 liberated by the Indians but not the Prantalay13 (The Indian police having learned from the pirates that 4 "Prantalay" fishing vessels had been captured in April and not 3 as initially thought). According to the NGO Ecoterra, on this same date, there would be 48 ships and 808 hostages in the hands of pirates. The difference can be explained by the fact that the European list does not include the smallest vessels (dhows, etc.) belonging to local fishing fleets. According to figures from Brussels2, the latest scuffles caused more than 25 deaths and several serious injuries (sailors and pirates).
5° The fight against pirates is therefore today leading to a dead end for European countries. Either we use the hard way like the Indians and the Russians, not hesitating to send patres ad the pirates and, by the way, a few sailors. Which seems inadequate from a point of view of fundamental principles. Either we negotiate and pay a ransom, which is just as inadequate. Because in this way we reinforce the pirates' ability to act.
6° The question of accompanying ships arises. With about twenty ships in the area, of which 2-3 are permanently mobilized to support WFP and AMISOM ships, EuNavfor's primary mission, and 2-3 others on a supply mission in port, the maritime forces can no longer suffice to cover a space of "captures" which widens by a few miles every week. Should we put private guards on board? Some shipowners are tempted. But the representative professional maritime organizations (shipowners as well as sailors) oppose it, considering that the risk could be additional.
7° On top of the judicial question of the treatment of pirates will be superimposed the question of responsibilities: of the shipowner, of the armed forces... If the courts accept jurisdiction. The question of the conflict of jurisdiction will then arise: in this case, the courts of Liberia (that of the flag State), German (that of the shipowner), Seychelles, Denmark (intervening boats) could thus be competent at the same time. , Filipino or Ukrainian (sailors killed or taken hostage), etc.
It is essential to rethink policing at sea in the Indian Ocean area. The field of questions is wide: what new means (police and military) to operate against pirates? What should be done to better protect the crews, who are on the front line against pirates? Should the public forces be on board (like the French on board Breton fishing vessels off the Seychelles)? But at what cost? Should we organize a special accompanying force, mixed, private-public, but strictly supervised? Is it up to the public authorities to bear the costs of an operation or should it be based on a broader system of risk insurance, with contributions from insurers for example? Should we review the maritime routes, passing through Cape Town (a reorganization which has vast socio-economic implications: South Africa wins, Egypt loses, etc.)? Etc.
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