Ten years of ESDP. Where is the European “trademark”…

(BRUSSELS2) For the 10 years of the European Security and Defense Policy, the review of the Council of the European Union on the ESDP, has released a special issue. I was offered, on this occasion, to be one of the "guest comments", alongside different personalities (Javier Solana, Carl Bildt, Jamie Shea, Marc Otte, Arnaud Danjean, Nicole Gnesotto, Jolyon Howorth...) who delight in the ESDP
today or yesterday. A real exercise in style — remaining independent, without blush or concession, without aggressiveness either — so as not to tempt me... Notable fact: no "proofreading" or "correction" was asked of me. What is relatively rare in this type of review "official".

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Ten years ago, the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) was embryonic. Today, it has become reality even if it is not yet exempt from stammering and trial and error. Little by little, in total discretion, Europe has built several instruments, which have enabled it to act and have given it a particular originality. It is this “trademark” that needs to be defined.

In the past crises of the 1990s - in the former Yugoslavia, in Rwanda, etc. - Europe remained, more or less, at gunpoint. Letting go, letting the atrocities happen. The "never again", resulting from the Second World War, which had been the driving force behind European construction since the 50s, was repressed. Europe was not only divided politically, it was paralyzed, unable to act; not having the instruments to promote unity, nor the operational tools to intervene. For those who experienced these moments, and there are many of them who today exercise first-level political responsibilities, at both European and national level, the memory can be bittersweet. But these "crises" had a merit: to make the creation of a Europe of Defense a priority again. Because it was a question of “never remaining like that again”, passive.

A different "syntax"

It was still necessary to agree on this Europe of Defence. Because historically and militarily, it is the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) that has been responsible for building and consolidating European defence. The EU therefore had to, alongside the Alliance, define its strategy, its own objectives, and equip itself with its own operational tools. An autonomy which is the necessary condition for the realization of its policy. This is what the EU devoted the first years to. Even if the two organizations seem to be “stepping on each other's toes”, clear differences can be traced which, far from confusion, impose complementarity.

At the first, military organization, the function of guaranteeing the collective security of its members, if necessary by going beyond borders (Kosovo, Afghanistan, etc.), in the event of a risk to the security of its members. In the second, civil organization, the care of developing a common foreign policy, of which the defense and security policy (ESDP) is one of the tools and instruments, to stabilize, to intervene in conflicts on the edges of its borders as far from them.

Behind these two organizations there are also two conceptions of security. In one, it is an objective, in itself, obviously under political control. In the other, it is an instrument – ​​among others – at the service of a foreign policy that complements other policies (humanitarian aid, development, civil security, etc.).

One is largely driven by the United States – it's hard to deny that – but retains an intergovernmental essence. The other springs from a will more specific to the Europeans, with a historical Franco-German impulse, which has become broader and more diversified today, with the enlargements towards the South, the North, and the East of Europe. It has a vocation that is frankly integrating the states that make it up, federating national energies (to be distinguished from the federal model).

A new capacity for action

The "trademark" of the EU, its main asset, is undoubtedly its ability to intervene in almost all regions of the world, even in the most complex political situations (Africa, Asia, Middle East... ). Its multiplicity of opinions even within the Member States is not a disadvantage. On the contrary... It gives him a sort of "neutrality" and gives him the necessary legitimacy to be accepted. An Artemis operation in the Congo led by Belgium alone, an Eufor operation in Chad led by the
only France or an SSR operation carried out in Guinea-Bissau carried out by Portugal alone would inevitably have been accused of intervention by the former colonial power. With the EU, the country concerned has some guarantee that this will not be the case.

Its historical differences, its geographical divergences offer it, moreover, a range of knowledge and approach to almost all the regions of the world that no other power can currently unite. Undeniably, the latest enlargements have not eroded its power of action. The reunification of the European continent could, on the contrary, mean a reinforcement in terms of Europe of defence. The highlighting of the ESDP as the number one priority of the Polish EU Presidency in 1 is a striking example of this.

Finally, its "friendly" character, "less aggressive" than other intervention forces (United States, NATO, Russia) allows it to be appreciated by most parties in conflict. The fact that Europe cannot start war can sometimes be a weakness. It is also a strength. When Europe negotiates, it is not perceived as systematically hostile, as a desire to monopolize, to invade. The recent examples of Kosovo (in its independent phase), of Georgia (in its conflict with Russia) are there to remind us of this. The fact that the EU exists without having destroyed its Member States is also a sign of respect for many States in the world.

As a result, ESDP finds its best expression in peace stabilization missions, all the more so when military and civilian elements overlap in time or space, as in the Middle East, in the African region of the Great Lakes, even in the Horn of Africa...

“2nd generation” operations

For the past two years, the operations undertaken have shown that a decisive step has been taken. One could even speak of “second generation operations” so much the reality of 2009 differs from that of previous years. The timeline bears this out. The EU is today in a position to carry out autonomous operations of a certain importance, of a military or civilian nature, on land and at sea, all of this almost simultaneously.

In February 2008, the 27 decided unanimously to lead a "rule of law" mission (Eulex) with 3000 people in Kosovo while they were deeply divided on the recognition, or not, of the independence of this autonomous province of the former Yugoslavia. A very clear political development. Several years ago, Europe was divided on similar issues but could not agree on action.

In March 2008, the EU began to deploy in eastern Chad and in the Central African Republic, a military operation (Eufor) of nearly 4000 men (and women), far from its natural borders. This represents a certain logistical gamble. With additional originality. None of the “large” Member States – apart from France – were present in numbers. This operation is only made possible in a configuration that the founders of the ESDP had not foreseen, thanks to the new Member States (Poland in the lead), to the States at the
declared neutrality (Ireland, Austria) or non-members of NATO (Sweden, Finland). The support of France, which has establishments on the spot, is a guarantee of this logistical success. But it constitutes a political risk for the EU: that of being caught in the act of neutrality. Several specialists are also betting on the failure of the operation. It is not so. At the end of the one-year mandate, the European Union gives way to the UN.

In September 2008, the EU deployed a force of more than 200 "civilian" observers to Georgia to monitor the withdrawal of Russian troops and a ceasefire, in accordance with the agreement signed between Russian President Dimitri Medvedev and the current president of the EU, Nicolas Sarkozy, on the lines of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, the two secessionist regions of Georgia. While the tension is at the maximum on the European ground, the EU has managed to impose itself between the two Great " - Russia and the United States who exchange invectives
oral and arm the belligerents. All in a few weeks. Which is a feat when you know the limited resources of the EU. Fifteen years earlier, Europe had not been able to prevent these two regions from igniting and causing thousands of deaths.

Finally, in December 2008, the EU deployed a force of around ten ships and planes off Somalia to fight against maritime piracy which threatens World Food Program ships and the humanitarian supplies of the Somalia, European fishermen as well as merchant ships of all nationalities. Right in the Gulf of Aden, a stone's throw from the Suez Canal, and not far away, this deployment also has a significant strategic virtue.

Meanwhile, it continues to deploy smaller missions in high-risk locations: Afghanistan (police), Iraq (police and justice), Palestine (police and prisons), Guinea-Bissau (security reform )…

Civil and military integration

In most of these operations, the EU plays together. Using alternately, or cumulatively, military and civilian means, according to needs and also political contingencies. The financial and diplomatic “strike force” of the European Commission is often a valuable aid. In Chad, it makes it possible to finance the return of refugees and displaced persons; in Georgia to stabilize the country; in the Gulf to develop a program aimed at strengthening local capacities in the fight against piracy. It is a matter of combining long-term economic development with short-term crisis management. The means available are made available to one or the other. The military gave a decisive “helping hand” for the rapid implementation of the operation in Georgia. While the "civilians" brought their essential diplomatic touch to the military mission in Chad or Somalia.

This is the hallmark of EU defense policy : to be a political organization, integrating a set of instruments, civil and military, without aggressiveness, with a vocation to act in all regions of the world, where decisions represent the common will. In the past, this may have given the impression of the most common denominator, but sometimes it also gives... the multiple maximum.

Permanent political control

Undeniably, the Political and Security Committee (PSC), although very discreet, is the heart of the European system, the mark of political control over the whole crisis management chain. This meeting, several times a week, of diplomats from the 27 Member States, specializing in defense and security issues, allows them to have the same information on a crisis situation at the same time. And to prepare, if necessary, a common response that emerges from the ESDP, traditional diplomatic instruments or Community policies. By receiving multiple speakers (special envoys from the EU, heads of mission, officials from the UN, NATO, NGOs, etc.), it avoids withdrawal into oneself. His discretion, sometimes decried, also prevents him from being confronted with too much media or political pressure. This body is all the more useful as a number of countries, in the new Member States, do not automatically have the international diplomatic palette that certain “historic” countries have. But, ultimately, it is always the Member States who give the green light to an operation, by interposed Ministers, often with the authorization of their national Parliament.

Nicolas Gros Verheyde

To download this special issue which is worth the detour (apart from my prose 😉 ).