The contours of the reconfiguration of the operation in Bosnia
During the meeting between the European ambassadors of the COPS and their Euro-Atlantic counterparts of NATO (NAC), Monday, October 27, there is a subject on the agenda: the future of the operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina ( Eufor Althea). Set up the day after the Dayton agreements - under the colors of NATO (Sfor), it passed - in December 2004 - under European command, using NATO's command structures (according to the Berlin agreements More).
Turbulent internal political situation but without security risk. Today, for a number of European countries, subject to increasing demands for intervention - in Afghanistan or Chad - it is time to end their commitment, which no longer has "reason to be in a country which is going to be a member to the European Union". And because from a strictly military point of view, this operation no longer has any justification, because "the objectives have been achieved". Only the neighboring countries - such as Italy or Greece - have some doubts, with regard to the stability of the country. And indeed, we can fear certain drifts. The extremist political parties are currently engaged in a nationalist one-upmanship. But "it is not because there are political problems in a country that we should keep a military force there," said a European diplomat. As for the reality of the threat, adds another, "It is difficult today to know if the political rhetoric - rather unhealthy which reigns in Bosnia where men stir up ethnic conflicts - degenerates into a security risk".
The new force: 200 people on support for the army. The guideline for the future mission revolves around three considerations: "a) demonstrating politically that the EU remains committed to the region, b) including with military means, c) keeping a useful objective". On this basis, the envisaged scenario would consist in keeping a very small military mission - around 100 to 200 people (compared to 2200 today) - more intended to consolidate, train and train the Bosnian army (1). A task that is usually the responsibility of "civilian" security sector reform missions" (already in place in Guinea-Bissau or Congo). In the case of Bosnia, the format of the mission will remain military.
Advantage: deterrence and possible increase in power. This option has two advantages (on the transformation into a civilian mission). 1° The EU would thus maintain a military base in the region, capable of avoiding any impression of disengagement, and of a dissuasive nature. 2° The maintenance of a military force makes it possible - if necessary - if the situation worsens - to quickly increase in power. From all points of view (operational, diplomatic, legal and economic), it is always easier to extend an operation than to envisage a new operation. The Concept and Operation Plan (Conops and OpPlan) should also provide for this ease of ramp-up.
Reinforcement Battlegroups. In case of emergency, the "Battlegroups will be called" to the rescue. Composed of a minimum of 1500 men each, this option allows a rapid return to the format of the current operation. See more. Since the EU has two battlegroups of 1500 men on duty. They can intervene for a maximum period of four months, which is sufficient to alleviate the emergency. And leave time to study other devices. What constitutes a return to the sources, in a way, since this instrument (never used until now) was designed, having in mind the antecedent of the Balkans.
The necessary coordination with NATO. The new EU operation should act in coordination with NATO - which through MAP - the Membership Action Plan - is also present in the country. The "advisory" function would be devolved to NATO experts. And "the EU would thus focus more on training". It should be noted that the EU also has a mission in the country intended to help the Bosnian police (EUPM), in certain functions (fight against corruption and organized crime, etc.), now headed by Stefan Feller.
