Availability of British C-130 aircraft becomes critical

(BRUSSELS2) The investigation report just published byUK National Audit Office (NAO), and submitted to the House of Commons, across the Channel, is a severe warning for the Royal Air Force (RAF). The fleet of Hercules C-130 aircraft
— which provides tactical (in the field) and strategic (base-field) liaisons — presents “significant availability and capacity risks ».

Aggravated risks if the new A400M aircraft continues to accumulate delays. The critical period is between 2011 and 2013. The report therefore recommends certain measures to be taken quickly, especially since the " demand in operation should remain at a high level ". Reading the report, we understand better why it was totally impossible for the British to provide air capabilities for Eufor Chad and their eagerness to leave Iraq.

For several years, the number of aircraft available has been steadily decreasing

It is decreasing under the combined effect of the scheduled withdrawal of the Hercules C-130K (older, acquired in 1967), losses in operations (4 aircraft lost between 2005 and 2007, in Iraq and Afghanistan) and accelerated wear and tear. The Hercules C-130J (more recent, dating from 1999), are not enough to compensate. From 51 planes in 2001, the RAF fleet has thus increased to 43 planes available (24 C-130J and 19 C-130K), and should reach 38 at the end of 2008 and 33 by 2010! The commitment of the Hercules in Iraq and Afghanistan "exceeds what was planned" recognizes the British Department of Defense, The operational availability remains high however - 94% for the C-130K (compared to 75% in the United Kingdom) and 85 % for the C-130J (against 72%) — thanks to the 100% commitment of maintenance personnel and a certain flexibility in assessing faults. “A deployed aircraft remains available with a minor defect if it is not deemed to pose a safety risk” mentions the NEO. But this is at the cost of accelerated wear of equipment.

The conditions of employment in operation differ, in fact, from those provided for at the time of the acquisition.

The number of exits increases, the flight duration decreases. 70% of flights are thus of short duration (less than 2 hours) instead of the 14% expected and only 3% are of long duration (more than five hours) instead of the 28% as anticipated. Thus, where a flight, before 2003, lasted three hours on average, it now lasts 1 hour 30. The number of take-offs and landings has therefore doubled. The load is also increasing: the Hercules fleet has carried an average of 123 tonnes of goods per month since July 2007 compared to 21 tonnes per month for the same period from July 2006.

Results. Fatigue of equipment and pilots

The wear of the materials is rapid, the fatigue concentrating on the wings. The cost of refurbishment has also forced the Department of Defense to withdraw 9 Hercules C-130K, earlier than planned. Of the nine remaining after 2008, five have had their center wings replaced to ensure capacity until 2012 (cost £15,3 million). On the C-130J, some work will be necessary from 2012, to allow them to reach 2030. The pilots are also subjected to severe test. Where a pilot flies 13 hours normally, he flies 60 hours per month on average in operation.

Another phenomenon: the lack of available parts lengthens downtime. On average, a Hercules C-130J is unavailable 24 days a year. While “cannibalization” — taking parts from immobilized equipment — makes it possible to overcome certain defects, it has drawbacks: hours of maintenance, to take the part, repairs, etc. The report also points to severe defects in the parts: " the interface between the Department and Lockheed Martin software systems (the supplier) is poor”.

Consequences

Certain missions in the United Kingdom — training, non-operational transport — can no longer be carried out. And the budget explodes. Operating and maintenance costs for the C-130 fleet have risen from £212 million (2002-2003) to £245 million (2007-2008), out of an overall transport cost of £983 million. Recourse to pooled European resources is also close to the usage limit (see box).

Measures to take

Investment decisions have been made. The Department took the decision to equip two additional C-17s (the RAF now has 5 C-17s: one owned, four leased and purchased in 2008). Partly useful solution. These heavier planes can land, in theory, on the Camp Bastion airstrip in southern Afghanistan. But not elsewhere. The department would also like to acquire C-130Js (£37 million).

Other solutions exist - rental of Hercules or equivalent from other nations or chartering planes - but the costs or employment restrictions (charter) are such that "this option is not always realistic and affordable" , says the report. It therefore recommends a series of alternative measures: improving the availability of spare parts (+ 168 days/aircraft per year), increasing the maintenance staff (+ 300 days/aircraft per year), studying the repair of the C-130K or acquisitions (purchase or charter to maintain bases overseas), and various technical solutions (new all-weather runway, improvement of the planning management system, evaluation of the cost of changing wings, etc.) as well as the purchase of simulators training flights.

Explanation - the C-17 pool

The forces within NATO have developed a system, managed by the Europe Movement Control Center, operating as a stock exchange between 15 countries (Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, -Netherlands, Norway, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom). Each participating nation has a credit or debit of up to 500 hours of flight hours over three years. The unit is the Hercules flight hour (example: one hour of C-17 is equivalent to 7 hours of Hercules flight). The United Kingdom, which has been a net contributor to the hourly credit system in the past (air-to-air refueling or strategic transport capabilities) now uses more hours than it provides: 3407 hours used in 2007 compared to 3162 hours , i.e. a negative balance of 245 hours.

Photo credit: Raf (Hercules J and K)