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EUNAVFOR Med. The first effects of Operation Sophia

Last handshake of mechanics and pilots before boarding for a reconnaissance flight (© NGV / B2)
Last handshake of mechanics and pilots before boarding for a reconnaissance flight (© NGV / B2)

(B2) Since the transition to the operational phase in October, which is the real start of the European operation in the Mediterranean, the operation EUNAVFOR Med was able to achieve some results.

First effect. The death toll has fallen

This is a noticeable and most dramatic effect. If we look at the statistics, the number of deaths has dropped from almost 2% of the passages to less than 0,1%. A notable point for Rear Admiral Gueglio whom we interviewed (Read:EUNAVFOR Med. Be there, react, save lives, deter (CA Gueglio)). Because the smugglers have no qualms about sending barcasses into the water and letting them sink. For them, the job is done.

Second effect. Reduced freedom of maneuver for smugglers

In the last six months of 2015, we have given the freedom of maneuver of the smugglers greatly reduced by the presence of EUNAVFOR Med. She is " now limited to Libyan territorial waters ". And the traffic has stabilized. It was down slightly in 2015 (-9%) compared to previous years. And even if the first two months of 2016 seem to show a slight increase (+9%), we can speak of stabilization because the winter months have been particularly mild this year, with only a few days with winds above force 3 .

Third effect. The lack of large capacity boats 

For three months, " departures with wooden ships were not observed, only dinghies “, we explain to EUNAVFOR “ while they are safer and allow traffic to continue especially during the winter ". For European sailors, it is a consequence of the flood of migrants arriving in Libya, a lack of supply of wooden ships and the policy of systematic destruction used by the European navy like the Italian navy. Thus, of the 90 ships destroyed by EUNAVFOR, about twenty were wooden boats. And to replenish the stock is difficult. Previously, we saw the ships reused several times, towed, and repaired to serve again. " It never happened again after October” (1). The « there is a lack of wooden boat capacity in Libya. The fishermen who use them keep them for their own activities and further protect them against possible thefts from traffickers ».

Fourth effect, more mitigated, the arrests

The only regret is that arrests remain limited. Even if the operation can claim to have contributed to the arrest of 53 people (2), it remains quite limited. Often, they are only second knives, "facilitators", that is, migrants who were taught in two minutes to operate an emergency telephone or drive the motor, rather than traffickers or smugglers. " We are not authorized for the moment to go back to the source – which would be possible in phase 3 – that is to say to pin down those who organize the traffic. You can only stop them caught in the act, 'in the honeypot'" regrets an officer.

The European bet

The bet of the Europeans is that the smugglers do not practice their activity with a political goal but for economic reasons, with the objective of making a significant profit. " If the cost of the passage becomes less attractive, they will turn to other more profitable activities. By depriving traffickers of being able to recover their equipment (vessel, engine, telephone, etc.), we help to offset the costs and reduce the profitability of smugglers. The greatest fear of smugglers is being arrested and not being able to continue their illegal activity. » But everyone knows that the real exit strategy can only be achieved with the cooperation of the neighboring countries, starting with Libya. The action of the Libyan Coast Guard exists. But it is still very fragmented and too limited.

(Nicolas Gros-Verheyde)

(1) A remark made before March 16, where we saw a few wooden boats reappear (but smaller than those we saw before)

(2) The European operation does not in itself have the power to question suspects. A first screening methods migrants helps identify potential suspects. It is in fact the competence and the responsibility of the Italian coastguards and police, on arrival at the port in general, or on the boats in a more exceptional way, to carry out these interrogations. On some ships, Frontex police officers or specialists are present.

Nicolas Gros Verheyde

Chief editor of the B2 site. Graduated in European law from the University of Paris I Pantheon Sorbonne and listener to the 65th session of the IHEDN (Institut des Hautes Etudes de la Défense Nationale. Journalist since 1989, founded B2 - Bruxelles2 in 2008. EU/NATO correspondent in Brussels for Sud-Ouest (previously West-France and France-Soir).

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