Sentinel, a useful operation against 'pure' terrorism?

(B2) The scale of the simultaneous attacks that took place this Friday (November 13), at the Bataclan, at the Stade de France... must call into question the security system. It signs a certain failure of the Vigipirate plan and the Sentinel operation.

Pure terrorism

The Stade de France in Saint-Denis, the 10th and 11th arrondissements are eminently working-class districts. The deployment in large numbers of military personnel protecting certain sensitive buildings, on a permanent basis, is rather with terrorism. At least terrorism, in the "pure" sense of the term, that which is intended to sow terror among the population and targets a whole series of "non-strategic" objectives but the population.

An expensive device

Operation Sentinel is a costly device - in terms of men - and impossible to maintain both in duration and in scope. 7.000 soldiers are permanently mobilized (10.000 at the height of the crisis after the attacks in January at Charlie Hebdo, Montrouge and at the Hyper Cacher at Porte de Vincennes). It is also, for the most part, useless in the face of this type of terrorism. Can we protect all theaters, stadiums, restaurants, all public places? In this case, terrorism will attack grocery stores, supermarkets, the bus and the subway. Will we protect the center of Paris? The terrorists will target targets in the suburbs or in the provinces. The use of soldiers on a permanent basis also poses legal and operational problems.

A device that has its limits

All questions must now be asked, without taboo. Military numbers are not infinitely expandable. Counting the external operations, the maintenance of the presence in the permanent external and overseas bases + the internal operation, there are already more than 20.000 men permanently mobilized. Is it wise to employ soldiers in metropolitan France in large numbers for police missions? Will they not be more effective in the missions for which they have been trained, outside the territory? Isn't it more useful to employ police and gendarmes whose function it is and who have the capacity to intervene? This raises the question of the increase in staff, therefore the additional budget (therefore an increase in the deficit).

A device that creates an illusion of security

This device is misleading. It also creates false security in all other places. It is not a question of creating panic, but of sensitizing the population, of having a certain mistrust in relation to suspicious acts and of taking the right measures in the event of an attack. In a population which, for the most part, has never experienced war, or even previous waves of attacks (of the OAS or FLN type during the Algerian war), it is also important to develop a spirit of resilience. Even the most recent waves—the GIA or Iranian ones of 1986 or 1995—which were (also) aimed at popular targets—may seem distant.

Develop resilience

Having the right reflexes in the event of an attack, learning to control one's composure are not innate. There are rules, advice to give to the population. Avoid pointing the finger against certain religions or nationalities, developing racism or racial hatred is also imperative. It would be worse than anything and would fuel the attacks of tomorrow.

(Nicolas Gros-Verheyde)

Lire: Army deployed in France. An “inner operation” of protection