Joschka Fischer proposes a new enlarged NATO…to Russia!

In an article published in several European newspapers, as part of Syndicate project, the former German Foreign Minister (Green), Joschka Fischer, proposes involving Russia more in European defence, or even expanding NATO to include Russia: "Why not consider transforming NATO into a real European security system that includes Russia? The rules of the game would be changed and a whole series of strategic aims could be achieved – European security, neighborhood conflicts, energy security, arms reduction, anti-proliferation, etc. Yes, a breakthrough like this could transform NATO. But it could transform Russia even more." Of course, he adds,this approach presupposes the presence of two things which do not exist for the moment: a transatlantic understanding vis-à-vis Russia, and a European Union which acts in greater concert and which is therefore stronger. The challenge posed by Russia, however, no longer allows for perpetual postponement. Challenges
are just too big."

Here the full text of Gerhard Schröder's former Foreign Minister (from 1998 to 2005) and leader of the Greens in Germany for almost 20 years - reproduced with
Courtesy of Syndicate Project:

For 19 years there has been a question of strategy which the West (America and Europe) leaves unanswered and which is nevertheless of primary importance: what status does post-Soviet Russia have in the face of the world? and to the European order? That of difficult partner or strategic adversary? How to deal with it?

The seriousness of this indecision was particularly apparent during Russia's brief war against Georgia last summer, and even then the West did not speak out clearly. According to most Eastern Europeans, the UK and the Bush administration, he is a “strategic adversary.” But most Western Europeans prefer to see him as a “difficult partner.” Neither of these two apparently irreconcilable conceptions has been the subject of in-depth examination.

If Russia is to be seen as a strategic adversary - as corroborated by the re-establishment of the imperialist "Great Russia", under the impetus of Vladimir Putin, and the breaches made of the rule of law, on the home front as well as on the the external front – the West had better rethink its priorities from scratch.

If Russia is no longer the superpower it was during the Soviet era, it remains a great military power, at least in Europe and Asia. If we want to be able to react to numerous regional conflicts (Iran, Middle East, Afghanistan/Pakistan, Central Asia, North Korea), as well as to global challenges (fight against climate change, control of disarmament, armament and nuclear non-proliferation, energy security), which are at the top of Western resolutions, we must cooperate with Russia.

A strategic confrontation with Moscow, ie the return of a “mini-cold war,” would weaken these resolutions, or at least would greatly complicate their implementation. Accordingly, the question could be summed up as follows: does the threat emanating from Russia compel the West to resort to a change of strategic line? I do not think so.

Putin's aspirations and policies to elevate Russia into a world power are structurally very vulnerable. And they are even more so at a time when oil prices are falling to less than 40 dollars per barrel. And he is aware of it.

Population growth in Russia is plummeting alarmingly. Economically and socially, it is lagging behind. Its infrastructures, like its subsidies in the education and professional training sectors, are insufficient. Its economy is essentially based on its exports of energy and raw materials and its modernization efforts depend largely on the West, in particular on Europe.

However, its geopolitical position and its potential in Europe and Asia make it a strategic component to be reckoned with. The West therefore has every interest in moving towards a strategic partnership with this country. But that requires the West to have long-sighted thinking and a firm and determined position of power. Indeed, any sign of division and weakness will be interpreted by the Kremlin as an incentive to return to its imperial policy.

A few months ago, the Russian government drew up a proposal to renegotiate a new European order, within the framework of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. Russia considers that the 1990 agreements were unfair, because they were based on its weakness at the time, and it calls for their revision. Moscow's main strategic objective is a weakening or even a withdrawal of NATO, up to a Russian military alliance of ANT (tactical nuclear weapons), and the restoration of its zones of influence in Eastern Europe. and in Central Asia.

But Putin is making a gross mistake here. All these goals are unacceptable for the West and the Kremlin seems stubbornly not to understand that what constitutes the surest guarantee of
the existence of NATO has always been, is and will continue to be Russia's aggressive foreign policy.

In the former homeland of Marxism-Leninism, the leaders still do not seem to be familiar with the dialectic. After all, if the Russian government were really keen on
transforming the post-Soviet status quo, first and foremost, it would engage vis-à-vis its neighbors in a policy that reduces fears rather than aggravates them.

But this also applies, albeit symmetrically, to the West: on the one hand, the principles of a new Europe, as defined by the OSCE after 1989/1990, do not authorize decreeing that the alliances be subject to the veto of a big neighbour. The same goes for free and secret elections and the inviolability of borders.

On the other hand, the installation of anti-missile defense systems in Poland and the Czech Republic, as well as the planned NATO enlargement to Georgia and Ukraine, are putting tensions where they are absolutely not required.

The West should not refuse Russia's wish for new negotiations on a European security system. He should rather seize it as an opportunity to finally answer the key question of Russia's place within Europe.

NATO has a central role to play here, because it is indispensable to the vast majority of Europeans and to America. The bargaining chip could be the non-change of the current principles and institutions of the post-Soviet European order, including NATO, and their acceptance by Russia. This would gain a considerably increased place within NATO, and even the prospect of full membership. The peripheral nature of the NATO-Russia Council was clearly insufficient and ineffective.

But why not consider transforming NATO into a real European security system that includes Russia? The rules of the game would be changed and a whole series of strategic aims could be achieved – European security, neighborhood conflicts, energy security, arms reduction, anti-proliferation, etc. Yes, a breakthrough like this could transform NATO. But it could transform Russia even more.

If the West approaches this discussion with Russia without blinding itself, with a clear idea of ​​its own strategic interests and new proposals for partnership and cooperation, the worst we have to fear is that it will not not succeed.

Of course, this approach presupposes the presence of two things which do not currently exist: a transatlantic understanding vis-à-vis Russia, and a European Union which acts in greater consultation and which is therefore more strong. The challenge posed by Russia, however, no longer allows for perpetual postponement. The stakes are simply too high.

Copyright: Project Syndicate/Institute for Human Sciences, 2009.
Translated from
English by Michelle Flamand
(English version "An Answer to the Russian Challenge")