mali. A certain failure of the concept of battlegroups (Maj)

(BRUSSELS2) If the European reaction can be welcomed, the French operation "Serval" will have made an indirect victim... the European battlegroups. On paper, everything pointed to a European "battlegroup" to be able to intervene, at least in the second stage.

All the legal and political elements were present - an international framework, a certain European consensus, a request from the legitimate State,... -. Most of the doctrinal elements are also present: crisis, outside a European territory, less than 6000 km from Brussels, where a rapid intervention is necessary before the relay to another force...

Finally, the operational concept provides for this type of mission. " Battlegroups can be employed for the full range of tasks listed in Article 43(1) of the Treaty on European Union and for those set out in the European Security Strategy. These actions include: “combat force missions for crisis management, including peace-making missions ..." as the objective of " contribute to the fight against terrorism, including by supporting third countries to fight terrorism on their territory ". We therefore understand that we are "right" in a "Serval" or rather EUFOR Mali type operation.

Let us add that the soldiers composing these battlegroups are formed and trained for this. According to an expert from the European seraglio, consulted by B2, who describes the official doctrine of the Battlegroup: “ They are trained in combat and the best way to take advantage of the full extent of their capabilities would be to use them for combat forces missions in crisis management, given their limited size. »

Ultimately, we can add that the permanent battlegroup for the next six months is made up of three countries that are at the heart of European defense and have well-seasoned armed forces: Poland, which is the framework nation, the Germany and France in support. Three countries that wrote a letter together precisely to use the battlegroups... The finger is on the wound of the problem: why nothing today in Mali?

A lack of appetite

We can accuse whoever we want in Brussels. The problem is not there today. He is in the capitals. Warsaw, like Berlin, has neither the impetuosity of France, nor the same speed to act, nor the same will. you have to be clear. And the lack of will vanishes the further east you go... The Poles are not "hot" at all to go to Mali! It's crisp and clear.

The two ministers T. Siemoniak and R Sikorski had confirmed it to us directly (to B2) during the meeting of the "Weimar" in Paris. And no sign comes to deny this lack of appetite. In Warsaw, we still see Mali as a somewhat French affair. And above all we do not want for the moment - while a deep restructuring of the army is underway (professionalization, reduction of format, closing of barracks) - to commit too far overseas. This is all the more so as the Polish soldiers are beginning to return from Afghanistan; which closes a 10-year cycle (with Iraq) of strong commitment beyond the borders, which Poland has never known in its history (Vienna is not Bamako).

A design error?

Let's not hide behind a concept. They are not usable in Mali. But they weren't yesterday in the Congo and the day before yesterday in Chad. The only place they would be usable... would be in the Balkans (area they thought and designed for). There is therefore a conceptual error in these battlegroups or, rather, the international, European and economic deal has evolved which now forces us to think about a new positioning. They are either too heavy (for a small EUTM Mali type training operation), or too light (for a "Serval" type operation), or too military (for an EUMM Georgia type observation operation), or not enough. Etc... So they are not modular enough. Even if we have tried to gain flexibility lately. Above all, they are too dependent on totally divergent calendars in the capitals and which will not converge anytime soon. If Germany agrees to provide discreet support to the French operation "Serval", it would perhaps refuse to do so in a more visible way with a battlegroup. And vice versa. Finally, there is no convergence on the use of these groupings. For some, the essential effect is training. But no way to hire them. It would cost too much or break the commitment-rest-training cycle.

A new positioning

This concept could therefore be usefully reviewed on several levels. Some tracks...

1° We must find a way to free it from national political contingencies. For countries where an authorization is necessary, this would suppose a vote of the national Parliament authorizing their use by a European authority by delegating in fact part of the control of the men (even if it means drawing up some restrictions or caveats). With simple information during actual use.

2° It is necessary to release a budget, of expectation, allowing not only to finance the first weeks of the action (*) but a part of commitment. As is done for EU civilian missions.

3° It is necessary to have the capacity and the possibility of having a modular engagement of the battlegroup. If for the French operation "Serval" we had been able to detach the "transport", "medical", "intelligence" capacities, for example... the debate in the countries concerned (Germany, Poland) would be easier than the commitment of combat troops.

4° We must have a totally civil-military approach to commitments. The European Union engages in sometimes military, but often mixed, terrain. Europe should thus be able to very quickly send police officers to the field as gendarmes or judges. Even in Mali. Because the problem that will arise tomorrow: these are the prisoners. As Gilles de Kerchove pointed out recently during a question and answer session with MEPs, " we're going to arrest a whole bunch of people, terrorists or not. We will have to manage these arrests in number. It is not certain that the authorities in Mali are today capable of managing a package of detainees for terrorism. We must therefore reinvigorate justice. And quickly...

Read also:

• The Paris declaration of the “Club des Cinq”, commented on
• Battlegroups. Why is the schedule not kept? The reflection continues
• Battlegroup Weimar in training

(*) Maj. Clarification: there is already possible pre-financing for EU rapid reaction operations, with European funds available to finance it from the first moment). But this does not seem to me sufficient to allow a State with the will and the means, but without significant budgetary means to commit.