Escalation of the verb between Russia and the West. What is Moscow looking for? What about the invasion of Ukraine?

(B2) In the current noise and fury, between Russians and Westerners, we must be careful not to fall into the trap of what remains, for the moment, an exercise in bodybuilding. Behind the appearance, there are certainly more prosaic goals. Let's try to see it clearly.

One must always take with a certain circumspection all the official declarations, Russian as American or British. Especially when they are very loud. We have entered into a high-scale propaganda strategic communication. Sound and Fury. A bit like wrestlers in a ring, everyone has an interest in the rise in tension. The verbal escalation hides the stakes of the negotiation and of the great game of go which is in progress.

What is Russia's objective?

The strategic objective: regain the lost rank

While Russia has lost its splendor and has become a country of very average size on the world stage (1), the Kremlin pursues five main objectives: military issues —; 1° to ensure a zone of security around the country—with countries that are if not allies at least not hostile; 2° to be able to rely on a network of allies, friends or obligated in the world, 3° to provide its navy with points of support on strategic routes; 4° find outlets and contracts for its products or be able to benefit in return from the necessary resources.

Consolidate the position of Grand

At the international level, this strategy involves negotiation on an equal footing with the Americans or the Chinese or more regular use of the right of veto at the United Nations Security Council. Westerners' forced entry into Kosovo in 1999 or Libya in 2011 has not been forgotten and " will not happen again repeatedly promised Russian leaders. The annexation of Crimea and Sevastopol, the direct intervention in Syria alongside the Assad regime (with a reinforced military base), the good relations maintained with Egypt or Algeria, the presence (via the Wagner group) in Libya allow Russia to secure support points in the Mediterranean.

Fracture the western block

Russia is trying to divide the Western bloc, starting with the Europeans who seem to it the most friable bloc. The tactic is not new, according to the good old adage 'divide and conquer'. In 2009, Russia proposed a European security agreement to the Europeans. They either refused or—depending on one's interpretation of this proposition—did not grasp the outstretched perch which would have made it possible, by negotiating as equals to impose the rhythm of the negotiation. In 2014, after the intervention in Crimea and Donbass, Moscow underestimated European solidity, thinking of overcoming the European "bloc". But he held firm, against all expectations and, despite divisions, renewed year after year all the economic and individual sanctions taken against Russia (read: The sanctions mechanism with Ukraine and Russia. Point). The Kremlin did not give up, however. The European Union has become its strategic enemy.

Reduce the influence and aura of the European Union

It is not really a question of destroying the European Union, but of reducing its influence, or even neutralizing it. For this, all means are good. Moscow is forging economic ties of dependence (such as Nord Stream 2 or long-term gas contracts), maintains political ties with certain countries (with which Russia has historical ties such as Bulgaria or Cyprus for example, or more recent ones, such as Viktor Orban's Hungary). The Russian power also encourages political movements; his preference today goes to movements of the national right such as the Lega North Italian or the French National Rally, which replaced in the Russian heart the old communist sister parties that had fallen into disuse. Finally, he proposes an agreement aimed at neutralizing part of Europe (that which was not a member of NATO before 1997). All this accompanied by disinformation campaigns (eg propaganda), cyber-attacks, espionage or attempts at political destabilization (2).

Start an arms race

Invisible angle of this strategy, little commented on in the media, Russia has engaged in an arms race. In the same style as the USA (under Reagan) had engaged in star wars in order to push the fires in the USSR, this forces Europeans to increase their defense budget, to have a more aggressive political discourse, to militarize its society . By intervening militarily in Ukraine in 2014, Moscow fulfilled two main objectives: military (consolidating its naval base and ensuring freedom of navigation in the Black Sea) and political (preventing Ukraine from joining NATO). It leads to an increase in defense budgets (3), decided at the 2014 Wales summit. The challenge is to provoke a chain reaction, with internal budgetary tensions and ultimately political and philosophical questioning (eg why finance a tank company rather than the hospital?). With an ultimate goal: to exhaust national resources, force Europeans to make choices and, ultimately, break the duel and negotiate a kind of peace of the brave. For now, it doesn't work.

A battle of ten or twenty years

But the moment of truth for Russia does not lie in the short term (a few years). She is counting on a battle of ten or twenty years. And the first creaks are already noticeable. Europe seems to be entering a phase of strategic downgrading. If we put the recent actions end to end — Syria, Armenia-Azerbaijan, Belarus, the Central African Republic... — Russia scores points against the Europeans, forcing them either to withdraw or to lose influence. The Russia-USA negotiation has already claimed a victim: the Normandy format of dialogue promoted by the Franco-German couple has taken a back seat behind the direct negotiation between the two Greats. In this arms race, Russia has less to lose. The armaments industry is one of the first main vectors of the national economy as well as for exports (4).

Can we believe in an invasion?

This heap of equipment and men on the borders of Ukraine is too full of 'sound and fury' to be fully credible. Usually, Russia is much more discreet in its military preparations. Each of the partners around the table (Russians, Ukrainians, Americans) has, of course, an interest in making people believe this (5), for different reasons. But the objectives are elsewhere: 1. push for negotiation (objective achieved today), 2. if necessary, provoke militarily; 3. Bring pressure on Ukraine both military and political to bring about regime change.

Conquering Ukraine militarily: very risky for Russia

Even if Ukrainians and Russians appear to be two brotherly, complementary peoples, the differences are real. In distant history, as in more recent events. As much as going to Kiev with just a few tens of thousands of men may seem easy in a 'punch' operation. As much as holding the country militarily for several weeks, or even months, seems very risky. On the one hand, " the Ukrainian army of 2022 is no longer that of 2014 as a European diplomat assures me. On the other hand, since the association agreement with the EU and the Russian intervention in Crimea and Donbass in 2014, Ukraine has swung towards the West and dreams of only one thing: getting closer to Europeans and Westerners. Occupying a country that could quickly turn hostile and turn against an "occupier" could be a death trap for Moscow. A military "hell" worse than the Russian intervention in Afghanistan (or the American in Vietnam).

React to a "provocation"... why not !

Now...if, like Georgia in 2008, the Ukrainians reacted, out of the blue, by attempting a military offensive, this may give Russia a pretext to intervene to " come to the rescue " and " protect » the inhabitants of the breakaway autonomous republics of Luhansk or Donetsk. We would be in a protection-annexation type operation like in South Ossetia. An offensive towards Mariupol to establish the land junction between the Don and Crimea and hold the edge of the Black Sea is also mentioned. It's a bit more risky. But for all these operations, tens of thousands of men are not needed. A few thousand well-trained personnel are enough to create the surprise effect. The rest can follow quickly and be prepared discreetly. Russian bases are numerous all around Ukraine.

Lead the attack in another form

Everyone remains focused on the traditional aspect of warfare—the 1940s-1960s type. Today, war is waged more by other means, largely on cyber (denial of access to public or private sites, data looting, large-scale criminal action, etc., cyber espionage), in the disinformation (taking positions in the media, distributing fakenews, "war" by twittos and photos interposed), via the economy (acquisition of companies, corruption, public contracts, etc.), or by the very classic means of blackmail and large-scale espionage. All to lead to a takeover or political and economic destabilization.

Achieve a change of power in Kiev: yes, no doubt

The Russian objective seems more political: to succeed by pressure, military and political, in bringing to power a man or a party more flexible in negotiation with the Russians, less Western. It is much less risky than a military intervention, more discreet, and above all more durable, at least in the short term. This is, moreover, a strong trend in Russian politics throughout its neighbourhood. The Kremlin has achieved two successes in this area: by attracting the Lukashenko regime in Belarus into its orbit, while Minsk was always very suspicious until then with Russia, and by resulting in an overthrow of a muscular palace in Kazakhstan. This strategy has now been brought to light even by the United Kingdom. In a not insignificant press release, Liz Truss, the British Foreign Minister denounces a “ conspiracy ”, on the basis of its intelligence services. She even gives a specific name: the candidate from Moscow would be Yevhen Murayev (6). And the Kremlin maintains close “ties” between the Russian intelligence services and several former dignitaries of the Yanukovych regime (7).

Weaving a smokescreen: surely

The challenge for Russia lies in Ukraine, but also elsewhere. By massing a few troops, a few materials, in the most noisy way possible, we fix the general attention on Ukraine. But Moscow may well choose to strike or score points elsewhere. It is necessary to observe what is happening in the Middle East, in Syria in particular: after eleven years of war, normalization is at stake today for the Assad regime. A normalization which intends to benefit the Kremlin engaged for almost ten years militarily.

look further

We must also closely monitor Africa, especially French-speaking Africa, which seems to be Moscow's first target. After the Central African Republic, Mali is in its nets. And Niger or Burkina Faso could follow. The objective is to force France, the main European military player, to back down. Which would be an ineffable victory for the Russians, military and political. A few weeks before the presidential election, a setback in Mali would put President Emmanuel Macron in a difficult position.

Keep an eye on the rest of the Russian perimeter

Finally, it is necessary to monitor the Russian periphery. Russian troops are present in several countries: Belarus, Moldova, Georgia... And Moscow has always played a complex part, activating one or deactivating the other. The de facto annexation of Belarus with the presence of permanent Russian troops and bases would be just as profitable for Moscow. Cheaper. It would make it possible to complete a mini-encirclement of Ukraine, which will suffice to complete in due time, with the fall of Moldova. To remain centered on Ukraine is therefore a dangerous short-sightedness.

(Nicolas Gros-Verheyde)

1. With a GDP of around $1500 billion (in 2020), Russia is far behind the European countries (ahead of Spain but well behind by Italy or France). It has still not recovered from the fall that began in 2014 (the peak of 2013 with almost $2300 trillion is a long way off). Its population (nearly 150 million inhabitants) is slowly decreasing (the birth/mortality rate does not ensure the renewal of generations). The level of wealth per capita is stagnating: no more than $10.000 per capita (barely more than Brazil). As for the military budget, it is officially barely more than $60 billion (to which must be added the budget of the internal security forces).
2. The fact of having attracted in its nets former glories of national politics such as the German Gerhard Schröder or the Frenchman François Fillon is also part of this tactic.
3. A very real increase. Between 2014 and 2020, according to the latest figures from the European Defense Agency, European defense budgets increased by around a quarter, with the 27 investing an additional €40 billion in their defense (Read: The budget of the 27 for defence: approximately 200 billion euros. EDA data explained).
4. The Russian arms industry accounts for half of national R&D investment (Facon 2011). It represents the 5th export item of the Russian economy, making it possible to garner $15 billion in 2020 (Tass/Congress 2021). Rosoboronexport's order book was nearly $54 billion in June 2021 (Interfax/Congress 2021). Nine Russian companies are in the Global Top 100 (Sipri 2021)
5. The Russians to assert their strategy and initiate negotiations. The Americans to justify this negotiation (with a leitmotif: we fight like lions to impose the free world and preserve peace).
6. Former member of Kharkov (Russian-speaking city), clean on him, young (45 years), Yevhen Murayev is a former member of the party of the regions of Yanukovych. He created in 2018 his own party Nashi (We) and is above all the owner of the television channel Ukraine News One.
7. Serhiy Arbuzov and Mykola Azarov, two former prime ministers, Andrii Kluyev, former head of the presidential administration, or Vladimir Sivkovich, the former number of the Defense and Security Council (RNBO). Four characters are closely followed by Ukrainian (SBU) and Western intelligence. The first three were blacklisted by the European Union for embezzlement (following a complaint from kyiv).

Updated - Clarified Belarus in last paragraph