(B2) Strategic autonomy has become in recent weeks the 'must' of the European debate. The ministers spoke about it this Monday at the Foreign Affairs Council. In this rather philosophical discussion for the moment, shouldn't we come back to earth?
(credit: EUMM Georgia)
Before trying to give broad definitions of what strategic autonomy is, we should perhaps ask ourselves some concrete questions, whether we can achieve it and how? Some practical tests would not be useless...
Examples:
1. Can we do without the presence of the Turkish contingent in the EUFOR Althea stabilization operation in Bosnia-Herzegovina? The Turks are not a negligible portion there—one company out of a total of about 600 men at most. But the Europeans have never sought to replace them. Real necessity or vestige of an operation carried out under cover of NATO? This challenges...
2. Are all the shortcomings identified in the past (helicopter means, medical support, intelligence) at European level filled? Concretely, do we have the means today to carry out an operation like EUFOR Chad in 2008, without depending on Russian helicopter assets? Will we be able to have an operation in the Sahel tomorrow without depending on drones and American intelligence? More simply, are we able to simultaneously deploy one or two 'Role 2' (field hospital), or even several 'Role 1' (advanced medical post), without depending on private partners in other third countries?
3. At the organizational level, are the Europeans ready to adopt a less archaic and more solidarity-based method of financing their CSDP missions and operations, by creating a larger common pot than the current one, which leaves it to the shoulders of the participating countries both the political and human price of commitment and its financial cost?
4. Are the Europeans ready to deploy a stabilization force of a few thousand men in a conflict in their neighborhood if the UN or a neighbor asks them to, in a risky environment? For example, would they be prepared to provide an interposition force of a few thousand men between Armenia and Azerbaijan, in Nagorno-Karabakh (assuming the Russians request it), or even to get involved in Libya to observe the ceasefire? fire (if the UN and the Libyans want it)?
5. Can the imposition of sanctions (individual restrictive measures or economic embargo) suffice in European diplomacy and crisis management? What other vector could replace them?
Once we have begun to answer these questions (and others), we can then tell ourselves that the discussion on strategic autonomy is not just a pleasant parlor conversation.
At the risk of playing the killjoy, I am indeed firmly convinced that without the means to impose peace, without a minimum of hard power, it will be very difficult for the old continent to acquire real strategic autonomy, to impose itself in international life.
The eviction of Europeans (1) from crisis diplomacy - already noted in Syria or Nagorno Karabagh - then risks continuing (in Libya, Somalia or the China Sea) and becoming the rule, in a world where the powers are awakening. And strategic autonomy will remain a meaningless slogan. Except (perhaps) in economic matters. Which is a whole other subject really.
(Nicolas Gros-Verheyde)
A process of astanization, as the High Representative, Josep Borrell, says on his blog, with reference to the Astana process set up in Syria by the Russians and Turks.
A Franco-German pass of arms...
On this subject, everyone remembers the semantic quarrel between the German Minister of Defense and French President Emmanuel Macron. To see in this exchange the alpha and omega of European reflection or a simple quarrel of egos would be wrong.
A semantic dispute
Behind the illusion of European autonomy denounced by Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer (AKK), the German Defense Minister, hides fairly classic arguments: the visceral link of the Bundeswehr with NATO (read: Defense. Germany talks a lot and does little. Why ?), just like the German will to put itself back in the lead in a relationship with the USA that was badly damaged before the arrival of Joe Biden.
... with nuclear overtones
This quarrel arises over a very serious matter of substance, which could transcend the forthcoming discussion on the strategic concept of the Alliance. Should nuclear deterrence in Europe remain American (AKK's position) or become European as proposed by Emmanuel Macron or no longer be at all? This is the real 'illusion' that AKK denounces. She says firmly 'Nein, Danke' to the Paris proposal to extend the French nuclear umbrella to Europe.
Chief editor of the B2 site. Graduated in European law from the University of Paris I Pantheon Sorbonne and listener to the 65th session of the IHEDN (Institut des Hautes Etudes de la Défense Nationale. Journalist since 1989, founded B2 - Bruxelles2 in 2008. EU/NATO correspondent in Brussels for Sud-Ouest (previously West-France and France-Soir).
One thought on “Strategic autonomy. Let's do practical tests before chatting"
Very relevant questions even if there remain others relating to the equally important decision-making.
There can be no strategic autonomy when strategy and operations are decided by a college of 27 decision-makers who must agree unanimously. The institutional architecture of the ESDP is still in the stone age and its fundamental purpose is to prevent action. This suits both non-strategic countries, like the Scandinavians, as well as illiberals (concerned about Russia), as well as old powers like France, who do not want (despite their falsely European exhortations) to find themselves in a straightjacket that limits their own strategic sovereignty. In fact, France has not yet discovered how to make “its” strategic sovereignty compatible with that of the EU.
It is not enough to adopt a strategy (for example for the Sahel) when a country (France, in this case) decides that it has a strategy (never written, moreover) specific to each case to which the European strategy must bend. A big joke.
Very relevant questions even if there remain others relating to the equally important decision-making.
There can be no strategic autonomy when strategy and operations are decided by a college of 27 decision-makers who must agree unanimously. The institutional architecture of the ESDP is still in the stone age and its fundamental purpose is to prevent action. This suits both non-strategic countries, like the Scandinavians, as well as illiberals (concerned about Russia), as well as old powers like France, who do not want (despite their falsely European exhortations) to find themselves in a straightjacket that limits their own strategic sovereignty. In fact, France has not yet discovered how to make “its” strategic sovereignty compatible with that of the EU.
It is not enough to adopt a strategy (for example for the Sahel) when a country (France, in this case) decides that it has a strategy (never written, moreover) specific to each case to which the European strategy must bend. A big joke.