Blog AnalysisEU Defense (Doctrine)

[Analysis] The five inconsistencies of European defense

(B2) European defense policy suffers from a number of weaknesses. Weaknesses that are not (yet) remedied or even simply admitted

Observers in Georgia near the demarcation line (credit: EUMM Georgia)

The meeting of EU Defense Ministers on Tuesday (16 June) proves it. The litany of 25 paragraphs sweeping all the subjects throws under the carpet five subjects of inconsistencies, unresolved for years. Which is quite incongruous when all the signals are green (see box). Europeans are today faced with their contradictions, their inconsistencies (1), strong in words, weak in action.

First inconsistency: no clearly identified strategic responsibility

Europe lacks a clearly identified decision-making chain, especially at the highest level. This should be the role of the European Council. But he gradually abandoned this role, encumbered by the internal affairs of the European Union: economic crisis, institutional renewal, Brexit, etc. Some foreign policy discussions did take place, but few in number, not frequent enough, and sometimes focused on the tip of the iceberg, not on strategic depth.

So when Russia was mentioned, it was above all to examine whether sanctions should be taken after the invasion of Crimea and the war in eastern Ukraine and what sanctions to take, not really to see what relations neighborhood maintain. And when we approach Turkey, it is in extreme urgency to forge links with Ankara in order to avoid a wave of migration. There were relatively few substantive discussions on relations with the Gulf countries, with Africa, with Libya, during the presidency of Donald Tusk, which lasted until November 1st. Charles Michel, who had inaugurated his mandate with a series of walks (read: When Tintin Michel goes for a walk, the European Council toasts) could be a game changer. But the internal dissensions on the future budgetary framework (CFP/MFF) of the European Union risk, once again, to divert attention.

The Ministers of Defense meet, but only once per semester, in a formation which is minor, dependent on those of Foreign Affairs. The topics they address are rarely the most important. And the often very optimistic terminology used (progress, congratulations, success, etc.) serves more to mask differences than to settle them. Ditto in the European Parliament, where defense is confined to a sub-committee (security-defense), linked to the Foreign Affairs Committee, without the capacity for autonomous decision-making.

In fact, a strategic body is missing. This is the more general problem of the European Union in terms of diplomacy and defence. It wanders a little sometimes without totally understandable and intelligible logic. The High Representative remains above all a super 'diplomat', responsible for implementing a policy. If the States do not agree, it is reduced to brooding. However, haute couture is not enough to replace a decision. The idea of ​​a European Security Council, proposed by Germany, is interesting (read: Set up a European Security Council? An idea to work on). But it appears rather as a diversionary maneuver and has never received any very concrete follow-up. The European Council must do its job... quite simply.

Second inconsistency: headlong rush

The other typical shortcoming of the European Union is to constantly launch new concepts, new projects, without first having drawn up the balance sheet of what works and what does not work. In this way, capacity projects are stacked on top of each other, without closing files. Where are the today 11 operational projects decided in 2011 for example? And of the 47 PESCO projects, everyone knows that some are " stillborn to use an unofficial expression. In the corridors of Europe, no one dares to say so publicly. But under the seal of anonymity, tongues are loosened. In short, prune. Instead, we weigh down the tree. It doesn't make sense. At least really understandable from the point of view of public opinion as well as experts.

Ditto in operational matters. The battle groups are still unemployed. And our past analysis (2) remains (unfortunately) accurate. We don't see anything today that could make them work better. Of the EU's sixteen external missions, we know very well — including among the most convinced European ranks — that just under a third (a low estimate) do not fulfill the primary objective set by the treaties for the CSDP: the stabilization or peacekeeping (read: Operation Sophia, EUBAM Rafah and Libya… the EU must learn to close missions that have become useless). Rather, they are there to put a point on the map, to occupy the field. Removing them may lead to gnashing of teeth, but this restructuring is necessary.

Third inconsistency: between saying and doing an abyss

In the missions and operations of the CSDP, even though decided jointly (unanimity always being the rule), the means are often lacking. This is another inconsistency and not the least of European defense policy. Some shortcomings are recurrent. Thus, for several years, medical support in CSDP missions has often been delegated to a third country (or to the private sector), for lack of European resources. Others appear glaringly.

The example of the arms control operation off Libya (EUNAVFOR Med Irini) is a (latest) glaring example. States are (almost all) in agreement: the Libyan disorder is one of the worst factors of instability for Europe, we must control the arms embargo and lead to a political process... But when it is to provide operational means to implement this desire, there are far fewer people. (read : A very difficult Irini operation. Member States lacking in resources).

Fourth inconsistency: a structure inherited from the past

All the current structures are the result of reflection on the state of Europe twenty or even thirty years ago. The drafting of the Maastricht Treaty dates back to the 1990s. That is to say the creation of the single market. Another era! At each new phase (every ten years), an institutional layer is added, without really trying to simplify or reorganize the system. Today, it is not so much institutional lack as overweight that prevails.

We thus have a core EU staff in the process of evolving (slowly), alongside the force staffs (Eurocorps, Euromarfor) which are largely underemployed. At the capability level, three structures are in place: the European Defense Agency and OCCAR, which deal with project management, and the new DG Defense and Space (DEFIS) of the European Commission, not forgetting the structures within the European diplomatic service (EEAS) dealing with crisis management. And I'm not talking about those of the Atlantic Alliance.

Each has its own logic and rationale. The question is perhaps not so much to eliminate them, but to have an overall logic, shared by all the actors, a sound distribution of tasks, comprehensible, organized. Leaves to cut the 'dead branches'.

Fifth inconsistency: NATO-EU cooperation

This bond is celebrated everywhere. We find it all over the place when it comes to a meeting devoted to defense on either side of the Schuman roundabout. If the relations between the two organizations are fluid (they were already in the time of Javier Solana ;-)), in fact, the relationship between the two organizations remains distorted by a very different geopolitics which can be summed up in two words: USA and Turkey.

NATO remains, in fact, very dependent both on the American will (its main shareholder) and on Turkish policy (key element of its presence in the South-East). Screwed to these two elements, it obeys a precarious balance and remains in great difficulty to fix its policy, in front of its survival to the Russian hardening started since 2014 with the war in Ukraine and the annexation of Crimea. The two (other) active wars on the borders of Alliance territory (Syria and Libya) are taking place with a more than troubling Turkey alone. The deliberate violation by Ankara of the arms embargo in Libya is a (big) thorn in the side, painful for the solidarity of the Alliance.

The Alliance, in fact, is not in very good shape. Even less could one say that the European Union, even if this appears less clearly. She is looking for a new point of balance that she has not really found. His two training missions in Iraq and Afghanistan are nearing completion. It is looking for new fields of action... It does not have its own legal and financial means of action and is reduced, today, to begging the European Union to lend it its means to carry out its own projects (cf. for military mobility).

Very clearly, the two organizations have neither the same strategy nor the same tactics. The coronavirus pandemic has shown how their cooperation remains uncertain, especially in the event of a serious crisis. Everyone tried very quickly to pull the blanket to themselves, multiplying coordination meetings where there was not much to coordinate. To speak of cooperation is therefore more than risky. We would be closer to the parable of the blind man and the paralytic.

(Nicolas Gros-Verheyde)


Green signals everywhere

For European defence, indeed, all the signals should be green. The Von der Leyen Commission asserts itself as a Commission " geopolitics ". While 'defence and security' has become a fundamental priority, exemplified by a stand-alone chapter in the next budgetary framework (MFF). The first subsidies, coming from the European budget, intended for industrial projects have just been announced. A major fact.

At the same time, several European leaders affirm, with various nuances, the need for a common defence, not only those of the main Member States (France, Germany, Spain), but also of many other very diverse countries (Finland, Greece, Italy, Estonia, Hungary, etc.). The consensus is not total, far from it. But there are multiple expressions of the same problem.

On the external side, the threats clearly exist: near (Libya, Syria, Ukraine, etc.) or far (China). The United States, admittedly in a somewhat disorderly way, with Donald Trump, are constantly sending signals (not very bucolic at times) to Europeans to urge them to organize themselves and manage their regional crises. As for the British scapegoat so convenient to invoke, he has disappeared. The United Kingdom, already 'exit', no longer participates in CSDP meetings or structures. He can therefore no longer be accused of 'blocking everything'.


  1. The term 'coherence' has recently appeared in the European lexical field. Its meaning is rather institutional and industrial: to have more synergies between the different European initiatives (read: What does consistency mean? New defense keyword for Europeans). Its grammatical meaning, however, should be taken further.
  2. Lire: Reviewing the concept of battlegroups: a necessity (2016) et These very expensive battlegroups, really unusable? (2015)
  3. Read Operation Sophia, EUBAM Rafah and Libya… the EU must learn to close missions that have become useless (2019). If you want to see it for yourself, take a look at the websites of certain missions and operations, you will be amazed at the activism of some (visits of officials, presentation of medals, a few meetings): this makes expensive and that does not make a peacekeeping policy.

Nicolas Gros Verheyde

Chief editor of the B2 site. Graduated in European law from the University of Paris I Pantheon Sorbonne and listener to the 65th session of the IHEDN (Institut des Hautes Etudes de la Défense Nationale. Journalist since 1989, founded B2 - Bruxelles2 in 2008. EU/NATO correspondent in Brussels for Sud-Ouest (previously West-France and France-Soir).

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