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Dark cloud over Operation Irini. Malta brandishes the threat of a veto

(B2) Barely started, the European operation to monitor the arms embargo off the coast of Libya is experiencing its first 'tile'. Very political tile caused by the government of Valletta

In the corridors of Maltese power during the 'gymnich' in Valletta (© NGV / B2 mai 2017)

Although the establishment of CSDP operations and missions has always given rise to discreet but often lively discussions between Member States, it is very rare for this discussion to take place just a few days after the announcement of their establishment .

Withdrawal of military assets

The Maltese government has officially notified the European Union that it will no longer commit military resources to Operation Irini, according to the daily Malta Today. Valletta will not send the promised military embarked team (VPD) in this way. The latter having a key role: boarding ships suspected of arms trafficking to carry out physical checks.

... and a veto to the Athena committee

Malta has also indicated to the Athena committee – which deliberates on all questions of financing military operations – that it will veto decisions relating to Operation Irini, on expenditure for the landing of migrants and the financing of drones. News that comes just hours before the launch of naval operations (Read: The Jean Bart anti-aircraft frigate deployed in Operation Irini, off the coast of Libya).

A very political measure

For the government of Valletta, this decision responds to very political concerns at the internal level, as well as European.

Valletta aligned with Tripoli policy

Malta has always been very close to Libya. Both geographically and politically, maintaining many cultural and economic ties (1). It thus supported the Government of National Accord (GNA) in Tripoli, as it also did in the time of Gaddafi. This announcement will therefore not surprise those who follow Libyan politics. It comes days after the Tripoli government sent a letter to members of the United Nations Security Council denouncing Operation Irini as partial and partisan (read: Libyan government rejects Operation Irini).

A very clear rapprochement with Turkey

This decision also reflects an evolution of the island, in a rapprochement with Turkey. Malta's rapprochement with Ankara continued last week with the meeting of Maltese Foreign Minister Evarist Bartolo with the Turkish Ambassador in Valletta. While Maltese Interior Minister Byron Camilleri has started informal talks with Turkish National Defense Minister Hulusu Akar. Objective : " build serious bridges with Turkey, as our Maltese colleague points out.

A mean of pression

This position reflects a particularly sharp break in the European position, whether on Turkey or on a CSDP operation decided unanimously. But it is also explained by the resentment that the island of Malta has of a lack of return of solidarity on the part of Europeans.

A breakdown of solidarity on Turkey

The Europeans have condemned, on several occasions, the agreement reached by Tripoli both in terms of the supply of arms and the delimitation of an exclusive economic zone (read: The Europeans condemn the memorandum signed between Libya and Turkey. Illegal! they say).

...on relocation

But the country also suffers from the absence of a framework for the relocation of migrants. Malta says it is grappling with a “ unprecedented crisis "with flows" disproportionate » arrivals (+438%) due to human trafficking and wants to keep its ports closed to migrants rescued at sea. sea. The government states, according to our Maltese colleague, that there was no tangible support and solidarity from EU partners” despite numerous requests (for a temporary solution) and discussions on a permanent solution.

... and on aid to Libya

It should also be noted that Malta had sent a request a few days ago to the High Representative of the EU asking him to set up humanitarian aid vis-à-vis Libya - and especially the government in Tripoli - and to reactivate the mission EUBAM Libya (responsible for border assistance), redirecting it towards humanitarian aid. A request that was met with a very polite silence, closer to a clear refusal than the opening of a discussion (read: Humanitarian intervention in Libya requires Malta. A bit far-fetched idea, answers Brussels).

Commentary: the moment of truth draws near

The Europeans will no longer be able to do without a real debate on Libya and redefining their position more clearly.

An implicit evolution

In recent months there has been an implicit development. Despite official statements of support for the Tripoli government, the Europeans seem to have lost all hope that the government led by Fayez El Sarraj will manage to stabilize Libya. Its inability to resolve the Libyan crisis, its agreements with Ankara, have completed convincing the majority of Europeans that the solution will be found with General Haftar or will not be found.

A position very close to France

We thus find a very clear French influence. Paris has always had a more pragmatic than ideological position on the Libyan question (2). In the translation of the old sporting principle 'may the best win', the spirit of the Quai d'Orsay and the Élysée was that it was necessary to stabilize the Libyan pole at all costs and to silence all the other principles on this point.

The failure of the Berlin process

The Berlin process, set up at the end of January, did not produce the hoped-for effects. The government of Angela Merkel, German Chancellor, intended to take advantage of its apparent 'neutrality' on the subject, unlike its French and Italian counterparts, to impose a new rhythm on the negotiation, more political and less military.

An indirect boost to Haftar

Paradoxically, Austro-Hungarian opposition to a European maritime operation too conducive to helping migrants (such as Sophia) facilitated this development. Operation Irini (responsible for controlling the arms embargo), further offshore and further east than the former Operation Sophia, will clearly be more effective against arms trafficking to the Tripoli government (therefore coming from Turkey). It could thus give an indirect helping hand to General Haftar, who resumed the offensive, in the midst of the Covid-19 crisis, to take power.

Greek and Cypriot interests at stake

Several European countries in the area, such as Greece and Cyprus, have also campaigned for this development. Faced with Turkish harassment in its maritime economic zone, in the form of wild drilling in corners supposedly rich in gas (or oil), Nicosia supported by Athens have repeatedly asked for a European presence in their zone (3).

(Nicolas Gros-Verheyde)

  1. Many Maltese have both interests in Libyabusiness', or even a second home. We must not forget that some Libyan traffickers have 'support points' on the island.
  2. Under the influence in particular of Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian, first at the helm of Defense then, now, of Foreign Affairs... before another position perhaps... 😉
  3. It is not entirely innocent that a ministerial meeting has been scheduled by videoconference between Paris, Athens, Nicosia with the main Arab players supporting Haftar (Egypt, United Arab Emirates).

Nicolas Gros Verheyde

Chief editor of the B2 site. Graduated in European law from the University of Paris I Pantheon Sorbonne and listener to the 65th session of the IHEDN (Institut des Hautes Etudes de la Défense Nationale. Journalist since 1989, founded B2 - Bruxelles2 in 2008. EU/NATO correspondent in Brussels for Sud-Ouest (previously West-France and France-Soir).

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