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Interviews. Berlin is changing its defense policy under pressure, almost reluctantly (C. Major)

(B2) Germany's defense policy is changing. Even if these changes seem imperceptible or insufficient, seen from France, it is a reality. However, the looming election period risks complicating the debates

From left to right, Federico Santopinto (GRIP), Mayeul Kauffmann (CESICE), Claudia Major (SWP), Jean-Pierre Maulny (IRIS), Nicolas Gros-Verheyde (B2), Jolyon Howorth (Harvard) (Credit: Sorbonne/IREDIES )

An experienced researcher at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP), Claudia Major was present at the 2nd European Defense Talks which took place at the University of Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne on Thursday (16 May). Interviews for which B2 is a media partner

A rapid evolution of German defense doctrine

Since 2014, Germany has become more involved in the field of defence. " There is certainly still a lot to do, especially seen from France, but we must recognize progress. " Because it is " the whole framework for the defense " who has " profoundly changed for five years under the pressure of major strategic changes - Crimea, the transatlantic relationship, Euroscepticism -. With a new defense policy at stake.

The Munich Conference and the Ukrainian Factor

The changes were initiated at the Munich conference in September 2014. Two ministers and the President of the Republic then announced that Germany was " deeply rooted in international networks » and must « to do more to maintain the international order from which she benefits ". International events push Germany to implement these rhetorical announcements " more than expected. »

An evolution of doxa strategic

Strategic documents, and in particular the 2016 White Paper, are reviewed. With " Bundeswehr design " and " the capacity profile that result. The defense budget is adjusted accordingly. Even if it remains far from the objectives of NATO, the evolution is rapid. In 2014, the German defense budget amounted to “ 33 billion ", it is now close to the " 43 billion ". The workforce must also increase significantly: from 182.000 currently at 198.000 for 2024 ».

Engagement in operations becomes bolder

The operational commitment, too, has evolved. The Bundeswehr more often takes part in operations, and in a wide variety of settings. It takes part in the anti-Daesh operation, carried out in coalition. What may seem normal but, which constitutes, for Germany, an innovation. “It has [re]pushed what is legally possible for operational engagement ". For indeed, " Germany traditionally participates in operations within the framework of collective security organizations (UN, EU, NATO). All of these changes are being made alongside a new " strong political commitment », whether within NATO, in the European Union, or bilaterally.

An evolution under the pressure of three events

To fully understand this evolution, we must go back to the basics. Traditionally, German foreign and security policy rested on two pillars: Europe, with the Franco-German relationship in particular, and the United States with NATO. These two pillars are under pressure ". Berlin's strategic base is " completely destabilized by three elements according to Claudia Major: Russian aggression, tensions with the United States, and exacerbated European divisions.

The Russian offensive in Ukraine is a game-changer

Undeniably, the annexation of Crimea by Russia, the war that is taking hold in eastern Ukraine, and the Russian intervention in Syria have constituted, for Germany, a " fundamental change in security architecture " in Europe. They lead to a paradigm shift in the way she sees defense in Europe ". While Berlin was thinking about military and nuclear questions " obsolete on the continent, now they are coming back at a gallop with a Russia that " destroys the security architecture in Europe ". The major changes in German defense policy originated in this disappointment with Russia, which until then had been seen across the Rhine as a partner.

Torn between Washington and Brussels

While Germany tries to understand the new dynamics induced by the Ukrainian crisis, another pillar of its strategic environment is crumbling: the transatlantic relationship. The " structural and long-term change in the very basis of this relationship has already been started. But with the arrival of Donald Trump to the US presidency (in 2017), it takes a new turn. It implies a new vision of the world, appropriate instruments to meet the challenges, and how [Germany] is for the long term ". This is a game-changer in all political, diplomatic, economic and climatic fields. The change is even more fundamental for defence. Because Berlin remains convinced " that there is not " no credible defense in Europe without the United States ". Germany is therefore torn between the desire to engage more at European level and the observation that there is " not really a credible short-term policy in the field of defense without the transatlantic allies.

European winds against integration

Another concern for Berlin, the populist and eurosceptic excesses on the continent. They " challenge a key belief », the certainty that the only direction for European integration is that it is « more in-depth, in more areas ". Germany finds it all the more difficult to accept that European integration is potentially reversible, as demonstrated by Brexit, while its " return "in the ranks of the States" respected " it's done " by Europe ". Hence the German policy which is desperately trying to keep the European house together (keeping cohesion in Europe) in the field of defence, for example with its inclusive vision of PESCO.

Result: a Franco-German divergence of objectives

« When we talk about European defence, Germany thinks of Europe. When France thinks about defense explains the speaker. The political question, cohesion, remains the key from the German point of view, the " pre-condition for any commitment ", while France focuses on an approach " operational, capacity ».

An electoral backdrop, Germany on autopilot

This rapid development risks being halted by the political crisis that is taking hold in Germany.

An active evolution broken in 2017

The changes were made slowly but actively until 2017. Since 2018 and the painful formation of the current government (CDU-CSU-SPD), the country has embarked on a " stagnant phase "which is likely to constitute" a flashback ". The government, formed with great reluctance "," lack of enthusiasm especially in the field of defence. The executive is there more by obligation than conviction ". The motivation to be creative and innovative is not there. Equally important, the German population does not feel militarily threatened ". What has a impact on defense debates ».

Germany enters into political instability

Two points to keep in mind as the country embarks on an intense election period. The electoral campaign will be almost permanent in the next two years. After the European elections in May, several regional elections are scheduled for the end of 2019 in the regions of the former East Germany (in which the governing parties are likely to lose votes). And everyone has in mind the federal elections, scheduled a priori for 2021, but which may take place before. How will it translate willingness to take more responsibility in defense with an unstable German government, permanently elected? A crucial question according to the researcher.

A defense at the heart of the elections

These elections have a huge impact on defense issues because it is one of the only areas where political parties can clearly demonstrate their differences ". This strategy is illustrated by the Minister of Finance. Olaf Scholz, Vice-Chancellor of the Social Democratic Party announced in March that the defense budget would ultimately not be increased as much as expected. A largely political announcement. " This helps to distinguish between conservatives and social democrats ". These intergovernmental differences very strong », in particular at the level of nuclear power and arms exports, make it possible to position oneself.

The issue of arms exports

Industrial, arms export and nuclear issues have received little attention in the process of change. From blind spots on issues that hurt Germany. Back in the news with the war in Yemen, the intervention of Saudi Arabia, and the joint Franco-German armament projects, they have become, in Germany, an issue in the electoral campaign because they question their " morality. " Debate de facto boils down, for the different parties, to trying to demonstrate that they are " from the good side on defense issues.

A collateral victim: European defense

« Beyond Germany itself, the victim is a bit like Europe of defence, plus our partners ". These internal debates and their influence on the German external position do not give a very good image beyond the borders. Germany is not not really perceived as a reliable partner, she seems to send mixed signals ". Words don't always seem to turn into action, such as the " launch of the alliance for multilateralism announced by Foreign Minister Heiko Maas (member of the SPD). Idea " interesting, but whose implementation is slow ».

Germany on autopilot

For the European partners who wish to obtain a clear position across the Rhine on defense issues, it will surely be necessary to wait for the federal elections and a new government. " But until then, we will remain in 'autopilot' mode. concludes Claudia Major.

(Coline Traverson and NGV)

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