Battlegroups. Holes in the schedule
(B2 - exclusive) The rapid reaction force of the European Union continues to suffer avatars. THE last known schedule is rich in lessons. The 'holes' or weaknesses remain
Member States are still reluctant to commit to maintaining permanence. Remember that according to European doctrine, it is necessary to have two tactical groups 1500 (GT 1500) on duty each semester. The goal is far from being achieved.
A permanent facade at the start of 2020
Thus, in the first half of 2020, only one battle group 1500 (GT 1500 the other name of the battle group) will be on call: Helbroc led by Greece, with Bulgaria, Romania, with the participation of Serbia and Ukraine. In other words, given the financial and logistical weaknesses of the participating countries, almost zero availability for external intervention.
Holes in the racket in 2021 and 2022
For the following two years, in 2021 and 2022, of the eight 'slots' to be filled, only two are effective. One by Italy (in the 2nd half of 2021), the other by Spain (in the 2nd half of 2022). That is to say only one battlegroup of permanence. No slot is filled in the 1st semester of 2021 and in the 1st semester of 2022. This means that the European rapid response will not exist. Unless changed.
Of course, that seems far away. But traditionally it is at least one or two years in advance that countries announce their commitment. It is then necessary to perfect the composition of this one with the other nations and to begin the trainings and certifications which are spread out over at least nine months preceding the assumption of function.
Visegrad and France on duty from July 1
Finally, in the immediate future, in the second half of 2019, two battlegroups are available. It sounded great. But when we look in detail, we can be quite worried. The first battlegroup is led by the Visegrad, therefore with a very limited depth of action geographically and tactically (to be polite).
The second is assumed entirely by France, without any other support. What makes it more pointed, autonomous and fast of action, but does not answer any more the concept of multinational battalion. Given the already tight French capacities (needs in the Sahel remaining at their highest in particular), his departure would require a very strong political commitment, especially since the French early warning system (Guépard) is superimposed on the European system. Unless Paris takes advantage of this proximity to very skilfully “dress” a national operation into a European operation.
This would already be a success for this European standby force which has never been used since its creation in 2007, despite the needs and several requests.
(Nicolas Gros-Verheyde)
