Should foreign policy have a single voice?

(B2) Can we have a foreign policy decided by qualified majority? This proposal made by the Juncker Commission last September seems buried. Well Named

An attractive idea... on paper

The objective of the Juncker proposal (read: Commission proposes to revolutionize EU foreign policy: abandon unanimity) was to resolve certain series of deadlocks observed recently with one or two countries in a position of systematic opposition for reasons that seemed unrelated to the substance of foreign policy, but to other subjects. The position of Budapest, in particular, which often vetoes conclusions as soon as the word 'legal migration' appears, has greatly irritated the Berlaymont (read: Hungary is blocking the negotiation mandate on the post Cotonou. Europeans grumble). This proposal is interesting because it would also make foreign policy a little more common. From the point of view of political technique, the great interest of the qualified majority is ... not to be used. Member States are more inclined to compromise, knowing that they cannot veto a decision. Whereas unanimity rather pushes recalcitrant States to harden their position, knowing that the very threat of the veto, without being used, is already sufficient to avoid adopting a position. Foreign policy is generally decided by consensus, without really resorting to voting. When one or more oppositions are detected, we generally try to solve the problem, rather than going to confrontation.

A policy that is difficult to share

These qualities are undeniable. But they rest on an erroneous foundation. Today there is not a single Union foreign policy common to all member countries, but '28' foreign policies specific to each country, to which is added a foreign policy which is common to them on all points where they can find an agreement. Even the common positions very often hide important, structural divergences, which cannot be resolved by a simple voting technique. Foreign policy is indeed the result of the history of a country (1), of its position in relation to its neighbors (2), in relation to the world (3). It is often so consubstantial with the very existence of a country, with its interior cement (4), with its intimate psychology, that it cannot be imposed by 'force'.

A common policy, not unique

This position could cause more problems than it solves. What country would allow itself to rally to a common position that it does not share? We would very quickly come up against positions, more or less public, to indicate that such and such a capital does not share the common position adopted. Good would then be the enemy of evil, especially since several devices make it possible to rally unanimity with opposition (see box). Foreign policy can be common, it cannot be unique.

A common policy strong in its differences

The European Union, on the contrary, would do well to 'cultivate' its differences, even to be proud of them. This is what makes its richness and its irreplaceable role in the world. All the other 'forces' present in the world (USA, Russia, China, Japan, India...) are represented by States, which have a single policy, decided centrally, well identified, even if they sometimes oscillate due to certain political changes. The interest of the European Union is to bring together countries which have strong differences, differences which will remain and, despite this, to be able to speak with a common voice.

Being able to talk with everyone

Some are loyal supporters of the Israelis, since the beginning of the creation of the Jewish state, and others closer to the Palestinians. Some are declared enemies of Russia, others have, if not affinities, at least respect for the Russian government. Some are friends of Juan Guaido in Venezuela, others can talk to Nicolas Maduro. Governments find themselves in the axis of the government of Tripoli in Libya, others in that of General Haftar. At the height of the war in Syria, some countries maintained an official link with Bashar's government, while others fought it, more or less directly, and so on. The great interest of the European Union is to thus be able, despite all its differences, to speak with a common voice and... to discuss with everyone.

An innate role for Europeans

Europeans would do well not to spend their time bickering over who is right, but to pride themselves on being the mediator, the (re)conciliator of all conflicts. Europe must learn to take its responsibilities and offer itself as an intermediary, ahonest broker'crises that interest him the most. Being a hero of multilateralism does not mean hiding behind support for a UN special envoy. This position, too often held by the European Union today (5), appears in fact to be the 'height of cowardice'. The European Union, strong in its differences, must play its full role in the world, really tackle certain crises head-on and be ready to assume its risks.

(Nicolas Gros-Verheyde)

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other devices

The Treaty provides for a specific mechanism in foreign policy: constructive abstention. A State shows its disagreement, but does not prevent the adoption of a common position or strategy. It can also take the form of a declaration which is normally attached to the minutes of discussion. This is a possible practice that could be developed. Nothing would prevent mentioning this declaration, at the bottom of the common position, in a clear, transparent, even public way. A small footnote, in a joint statement, mentioning that such and such a country has a particular 'problem' with such and such a paragraph of the position.

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1. The old divisions between 'colonialist' and anti-colonialist countries, between 'interventionist' and 'non-interventionist', 'trader' or 'militarist' countries often resurface.
2. Cyprus - Turkey, Baltic countries - Russia, Spain - Morocco, etc.
3. The close relations between Ireland and the USA, or between Malta and Libya, etc.
4. The neutrality or non-alignment of certain countries (Austria, Ireland, etc.) for example.
5. Syria, Libya, Yemen, Burma... there are many examples