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Belgium prefers the American F-35 to its European competitors. A kick in defense Europe?

(B2) Historically, the choice of a fighter plane by a government has been made on apparently technical criteria – the capacity of the plane – but above all on very political criteria. The possible choice (1) of the Belgian government of the F-35 is an illustration of this rule. Is it justified? Is this a bad move for European defense?

F-35s lined up at US Eglin Air Force Base in Florida (Photo credit: MOD Netherlands - Sergeant-Majoor Peter van Bastelaar, Frank Crebas)

Objective reasons in favor of this choice

Belgium had several 'objective' reasons for choosing the American F-35 plane at the expense of the European Eurofighter plane or the French Rafale: 1° to deepen a greater integration of its air force with that of the Netherlands; 2° to continue a close cooperation with several European countries which share to have the American plane in common (Italy, Denmark, Norway, United Kingdom); 3° to prove to Washington that Belgium remains a faithful ally; 4° to fulfill the technical obligation to be able to carry the nuclear bombs (stored on the Belgian air base of Kleine Brogel). Finally, the French Rafale put himself out of the race on his own, withdrawing at the last moment from the competition and preferring to propose a general partnership, but without giving the main elements of their offer, in particular the price of the plane (2) . On the political level, this choice makes it possible not to yield to French pressure, which for one of the heavyweights of the coalition in power - the N-VA of the Flemish autonomists -, is logical (3). It should be noted that Europe has never included European preference as a guideline for its purchases... and neither has France. We cannot therefore blame Belgium for a choice that other countries have made in the past.

A real problem for European Defense

However, this decision has major drawbacks: in addition to being costly, it sends a rather negative political signal on European defence. However, if there is indeed a major strategic autonomy issue, it is in fighter aviation. Both by its military dimension, its lifespan (40-50 years), its cost and its emblematic appearance. Belgium will of course then be able to sign other contracts, for example on land armament (the Scorpion with France). But these will not represent the same strategic, political and economic value. Secondly, the situation on the eve of 2020 is no longer that of the early 2000s or even 2010. The situation has changed: on the one hand, the United States has no longer registered itself as competitors of Europe, but as adversaries of several European political choices (multilateralism, sanctions on the UN, position on the Middle East). Increasing dependence vis-à-vis Washington over a long period is a real political choice and a bad shot by Brussels against European Defence. We can then have beautiful declarations of love for the Europe of defence. The message of this decision is clear: it is better to cooperate with the Americans than between Europeans.

A choice of manned aircraft at the expense of drones

A final question may arise. Was ordering so many planes (34 aircraft) necessary to ensure Belgian air safety? Wouldn't Brussels have done better to devote part of the sum to having a large fleet of drones? A major shortcoming at the European level of operations. By positioning itself on this plan, Belgium could have marked a real change in the modern battlefield, and imposed itself as a key player in European or NATO operations, all for a limited (human) risk. It is a pity that this question has not given rise to as much debate in the flat country as that of the choice of the model of the plane which has seen fierce political contests take place.

(Nicolas Gros-Verheyde)

Read also: In Belgium, the Rafale saga caught in the crossfire

(1) Belgian Prime Minister Charles Michel this Tuesday morning before the Chamber of Deputies (in the Interior Committee) denied any formal decision-making, despite numerous clues, reported by the Belga agency, from his entourage , indicating that the decision was made in favor of the F-35 if not taken. We seem to be playing on words above all.

(2) This is what the Prime Minister affirmed this morning in the Chamber: " the French did not submit an offer, but simply a proposal, which we then examined. That said, I have no means of forcing them to communicate to us information that they refuse to transmit to us. I am thinking in particular of the price of their planes »

(3) The Agusta-Dassault affair, described as the 'scandal of the century' by Prime Minister Charles Michel in the debate in the Chamber this morning is also a heavy antecedent at the expense of the French industrialist. An aspect often little commented on in France, in particular who has their eyes riveted on the national prism of the decision: Rafale against F-35.

Nicolas Gros Verheyde

Chief editor of the B2 site. Graduated in European law from the University of Paris I Pantheon Sorbonne and listener to the 65th session of the IHEDN (Institut des Hautes Etudes de la Défense Nationale. Journalist since 1989, founded B2 - Bruxelles2 in 2008. EU/NATO correspondent in Brussels for Sud-Ouest (previously West-France and France-Soir).

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