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What lessons can be drawn from the military strikes on Syria? Getting out of the Syrian trap

(B2) Americans, French and British show biceps in Syria. What is the rationale for this action? Is it legit? Did it have a military or geopolitical effect? Can it have an influence on the conflict? Why does Bashar insist on using chemical weapons? Why did the Russians let the strikes pass? Many questions... some answers

A legal or legitimate strike?

Is Bashar's regime responsible?

Yes. The Damascus regime pledged in 2013 to dismantle its entire chemical arsenal, under the supervision of UN and OPCW inspectors. It violated this commitment on several occasions, by replenishing its stocks, by not declaring certain research centers and, finally, by using chemical weapons in the field. He has also repeatedly violated the Geneva conventions on the law of war, such as the United Nations Charter.

Did Bashar regularly use the chemical attack?

Yes. The regime in Damascus has used chemical weapons regularly since the beginning. He sometimes boasted about it. More often he hid from it. Each time he tried to hide these facts, an international investigation proved the opposite. The succession of facts is eloquent (read our file No. 59. Chemical attacks in Syria, red lines and small strikes). The rebels have also used this weapon - this was the case with Daesh -. The facts in this case could be quickly established. In this case, in Ghouta, the regime was alone in a position to carry out this strike. And it all points to diet. But no 'physical' evidence exists of his involvement. We are more in what lawyers could call a serious bundle of concordant indices. This undermines the 'legality' of the attack.

Why strike in the event of the use of chemical weapons and not another war crime?

There are two reasons. First of all, chemical weapons are weapons of mass destruction, prohibited by international law. They are said to be the weapon of the poor because they require few technical means. Their danger is not only the number of human casualties it can cause, but the contamination of the weapon on other terrains. Then there is a pragmatic reason. Damascus regime strikes regularly target hospitals, ambulances, bakeries, supply centers, civilians. War crimes... even crimes against humanity, just as condemnable. But they were never considered by the Allies as a 'red line' or as an attack on their national interests. This would have forced them to intervene daily in the conflict. Finally, there is the notion of political display: the Allies have displayed a 'red line' on chemical weapons. If they allow this weapon to be used daily, their word is devalued on the international scene.

Is the strike authorized by the United Nations?

No. This is an argument used by Jean-Yves Le Drian. But it is not entirely accurate. Admittedly, resolution 2118 of September 27, 2013 provides for the dismantling of chemical weapons. And its paragraph 21 provides for the possible use of force in the event of a violation of this resolution. But this application did not seem automatic. A new Security Council resolution is needed to intervene under Chapter VII. " In the event of non-compliance with this resolution, including the unauthorized transfer or use of chemical weapons by anyone in the Syrian Arab Republic, it will impose measures under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations ". The Secretary General of the UN, the Portuguese Antonio Guterres was quite explicit on this point. " The Security Council is primarily responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security. (cf. communicated April 14). As for invoking self-defence, another ground for intervention, there is no criterion for invoking this element, even if the “interests of national security” aspect is invoked.

Can we compare with the situation that prevailed in Iraq in 2003?

No. On Syria, we find ourselves in another scenario. In 2003, the assertion of the existence of weapons of mass destruction came only from the Americans and the British, without independent verification. A good part of the international community (starting with France and Germany, but also Sweden, Austria or Turkey) had serious doubts about these elements. In the case of Syria, most of the facts have been carefully checked not only by different services of several countries, but by an international verification mechanism (the joint investigation mechanism composed of experts of different nationalities from the United Nations and of the OPCW). However, it had to interrupt its work on November 16, 2017... A Russian veto (anxious to protect the Syrian regime) was put on its renewal. Comparing the two situations is therefore quite simply an ideological prejudice. All European countries, for example, are unanimous in attributing responsibility to the Syrian regime, which is relatively rare when we know the differences in sensitivity on the need to negotiate, or not, with Bashar's regime (1).

Bashar's regime and the chemical weapon

Why Bashar uses chemical weapons when he is in a position of strength?

Bashar's regime uses chemical weapons, by saving forces, either to finish "cleaning up" an area, and to liquidate the last pockets of resistance, at a lower human cost; either as a weapon of terror, a signal that it is now time to evacuate or to negotiate the evacuation. He wants to end quickly with the rebel pockets, to move on to another sequence, more political (a little under the pressure of his allies who also want to end this conflict).

What is the military advantage of this weapon?

We can summarize the attraction of chemical weapons for Bashar's regime (as for the other participants in the Syrian war) by a maximum effect for a minimum cost (human and financial).

First, the use of chemical weapons allows an area to be cleared, with minimum commitment of forces and maximum effect. The gas infiltrating everywhere, it is particularly effective in urban areas, " allowing to dislodge enemy combatants sheltered in dwellings, in order to engage the urban combat under more advantageous conditions ", as explained by a notes of the French army.

Secondly, it is a weapon of terror, which strikes combatants and civilians, women and children indiscriminately; the effect is to sow panic among combatants and civilians alike. It is clearly a question of emptying the zone or forcing the survivors to negotiate.

Third, with a single, relatively limited sequence of shots, he disrupts the back. It 'saturates' the relief and care structures which are overwhelmed with the injured, and is forced to abandon the usual traumatic activity. Clearly, combatants who are victims of conventional weapons will not receive priority treatment.

Isn't that provocative vis-à-vis the international community?

Bashar's regime did not care about international respectability from the start. He has his own logic which is to win the fight against what he calls 'terrorist' groups (some really are) and secure his grip on his civilian population. That has no price. Statistically, over the entire Syrian war, the chemical weapons used cause a relatively "minimal" number of deaths compared to conventional weapons (less than 1% of victims).

The effect of the strike: military or political

What is the nature of the strike of the three allies?

The strike remains of the order of the political doxa. It is not strong enough to be a deterrent to the Syrian regime, nor intense enough to destroy all of its capabilities. This is why the American-Franco-British coalition speaks of a “limited” and “proportionate” strike. Which is correct. But it is sufficiently marked (a hundred missiles fired), and strong (by three allies), not to be considered negligible. We can mention that it is supported by most European countries (even if it is sometimes lip service), as well as by most countries in the region, directly or indirectly involved in the conflict, countries as different as Turkey, Israel, Saudi Arabia or Qatar).

Was the strike a military success?

From a military technical point of view, no doubt. The strikes were carried out, masterfully, coordinated, both by air and sea (read: The American-French-British coalition strikes four Syrian sites (V3)), even making it possible to test new weapons, without losses on the Allied side (we still have to see the balance sheet on the Syrian civilian side). From a geopolitical point of view, we can also consider that there is a small success (see below). In terms of effect on the course of the conflict, we can say that it is rather a sword cut in the water (see below).

Will this attack deteriorate the conditions of use of chemical weapons?

It's all about appreciation. Even supposing that all the targets had indeed been destroyed and that the equipment indicated were still present on the spot, the real effect of the strike should be put into perspective. Setting up a chlorine weapon, a commonly used product, is relatively easy. That of sarin gas is more complex, because it requires being able to obtain certain products and techniques and conservation. But it is within the reach of a regime like Syria. If there is deterioration, it can therefore only be temporary, the time needed to replenish stocks.

Will the strike be effective on the war in Syria?

No. A regime as bloody as that of Bashar is not within a few hundred deaths. It has already been hit several times without really suffering any disasters. He has already used chemical weapons on several occasions, despite threats, despite a strike. He can reuse it.

In the absence of a military effect, what is the geopolitical objective of this strike?

The Allies are trying to regain a foothold in a conflict that largely escapes them. They are not really present either militarily or diplomatically. On the ground, their military commitment is limited to the fight against Daesh. To reverse the advances of the Syrian regime, supported by its Russian, Iranian and Lebanese allies, would require a military investment, none of which seems to have either the intention or the means (in terms of human losses) to engage more deeply in the conflict. At the diplomatic level, all initiatives are blocked by the Russians. Making a strike is a way of telling not only Assad, but especially his allies, that there is still a determination to see certain limits to the conflict operate. Finally, it should not be neglected (even if it is not the primary objective), this strike makes it possible to close ranks between the Allies, in particular between Americans (and French) and Turks, who thus find themselves on the same side, and no longer face to face.

The effect of the strike on Bashar's allies?

How is this a signal to Russia?

It is a question of getting out of the trap set by Russia for the West, of being able to say to Moscow that if its diplomacy continues to block all the points of the negotiation (on the political transition, on the chemical investigation, on the simple condemnation of the regime...), Westerners will not hesitate to resort to other means, to circumvent the Russian blockage. On this level, the first round is won. The message was also well received in the Kremlin which, after all, reacted with a certain moderation. The second remains to be won: getting the Russians to give the green light to the deployment of a new fact-finding mission.

Is this also a signal to Bashar's other allies?

We can say that at least for Washington. US President Donald Trump continues to point the finger at the Iranian regime, particularly for its ballistic and nuclear program and its role in the region (in Syria but also in Yemen). The United States is thus sending a subliminal message to Tehran. Don't go too far...

Why do we say that the Russians are in a strong position?

The Russians are acting on all three fronts. On the one hand, they provide equipment and operational support for the actions of the Syrian regime. On the other hand, they act on the political level in a trio with Iran and Turkey (which supports the rebels in the regime) by trying to establish areas of deconfliction, with their own timetable for negotiations, outside international time. Finally, they protect their ally by putting a systematic veto on any alternative initiative of the alternative community, be it the investigation mechanism, the diplomatic condemnation of the Syrian regime, and even less an action under the chapter VII. They thus trapped the Euro-Atlantic allies in a politico-military trap.

Were the Russians informed of the strike?

Yes. The Russians were informed if not of the exact content of the strikes, at least of their existence, their intensity and the moment, on the one hand by their own means of listening. The Allied preparations were made discreetly, but not secretly (the movements of the ships in particular were easily perceptible by the Russians who have their surveillance device in the region). On the other hand, by the allies themselves, as officially confirmed by the French Minister for the Armed Forces, Florence Parly. The phone worked between Western and Russian capitals. The Allies were also very careful not to target the Russians (2), to prevent them from being involved. This is called the deconfliction mechanism.

Why didn't the Russians want to intervene?

Three reasons main ones (which are not contradictory):

1° Militarily, it is a question of not exposing its anti-missile shield to the possibility of failure and of retaining its deterrent power (if the Russians had asserted the contrary, wanting at all costs to protect Syrian territory and that several missiles had nevertheless passed, it would have been a military defeat);

2° It is a question of having the fine role, from the international point of view, of being able to counter-attack at the level of international bodies, by adorning oneself with all the possible arguments of international law (violation of sovereignty, do not add war on war);

3° Geopolitically, it is a question of reminding the Syrian ally that, without Russian protection, it is more exposed. A subliminal way of reminding Bashar that he shouldn't go too far.

Are we not in a role-playing game between Western Allies and Russians?

Yes. The Allies strike. This allows them to show that they still have some resources and that a red line remains a red line that should not be crossed. They can then play the political score. The Russians let it pass and then protest vigorously, but ultimately measured. On the ground, they will continue to support the Syrian regime militarily. We are in a classic game, now internationally, of block against block.

The effect on war

Is there a risk of escalation?

This risk cannot be dismissed out of hand. It exists, even if it is measured. To see the Russian reaction, for the moment quite measured, we can say that the risk of escalation is limited. But the Syrian power has its own resources, which it could use.

Does the war have a winner?

For now yes. Bashar, Moscow and Tehran are clearly on their way to winning their bet. Some fine strategists had bet on Russian exhaustion: Russia no longer had the means for a war, it was going to be exhausted in a few months, the regime was cornered, and the war had a cost for Iran, they said. they. It has not happened. These experts have underestimated the ability of the adversary to endure losses, to be prepared to commit financially... something Westerners are unwilling to do, either because they don't want to or because they can't do either.

What is the current toll of the war in Syria?

Bloody. All weapons combined, and all forces combined (legitimate forces, rebel forces, terrorist groups), we are on an average figure of nearly 200 deaths per day since the beginning of the conflict (rather an increase compared to the beginning of the conflict), with an overall death toll of more than half a million deaths over the seven years of the war (511.000 dead in mid-March according to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights), not counting the wounded (more than one million), refugees (more than 5 million people have left Syria) and displaced people (6 million have migrated inside the country)... out of a population of 20 million.

How to end the conflict?

It has to be said clearly. Unless you want to outbid in supporting the arms of a few rebel groups, which is beyond the reach of Westerners, there is only the second solution: to convince the rebel groups to surrender their arms, to negotiate for them a certain way out, at the need through exile, to end the conflict as quickly as possible, to sign armistices, to arrive at the second phase, pacification, reconstruction. It is a very difficult reality to say, almost paradoxical. We can only defeat the Bashar regime through peace...

(Nicolas Gros-Verheyde)

(1) NB: we can add that today sit at the UN or in European diplomacy, certain diplomats involved in the revelation of the facts of 2003 (for example the head of the Swedish delegation Olof Skoog who was the political adviser to Hans Blix, the head of the UN mission). Surely, if these had any doubts, they would be expressed by their governments. This is not the case.

(2) Unlike the strike carried out in northern Syria by the US military. Read : Who is the Wagner group, Putin's privates who act in Syria?

Photo: Launch of a tomawakh missile by an American ship of the 5th fleet (credit: US Navy - Matthew Daniels)

Nicolas Gros Verheyde

Chief editor of the B2 site. Graduated in European law from the University of Paris I Pantheon Sorbonne and listener to the 65th session of the IHEDN (Institut des Hautes Etudes de la Défense Nationale. Journalist since 1989, founded B2 - Bruxelles2 in 2008. EU/NATO correspondent in Brussels for Sud-Ouest (previously West-France and France-Soir).

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