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EU Defense (Doctrine)free opinion

Go beyond the policy of small steps. For a truly assumed European defense

(B2) Eurodéfense, an association that brings together many personalities campaigning in favor of European defense autonomy, believes that Europe must change gear, move up a gear, really affirm a European defense policy, assume it and tackle issues that have been unresolved for years.

In this forum, signed by several senior officers, whose names B2 readers will certainly recognize, various principles are laid down, of which, as an observer, we can share many of the findings.

A Europe of defence, the poor relation of European construction

The enthusiastic era of the founding fathers, in the aftermath of the war, laid the foundations of the European Union. If economic Europe has become a reality, even imperfect, defense Europe has experienced several failures. The treaty establishing the European Defense Community in 1950 was never ratified. The Western European Union, from 1954 to 2011, remained an empty shell. It was not until 1999, after the Franco-British summit in Saint Malo, that the bases of a defense policy at European level were laid, with the first fruits in 2003, when two military operations were launched under the banner starry blue.

Positive results but on a laboratory scale

The Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP), armed arm of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), was born. It has given more than positive results, unfortunately insufficiently known. In 15 years, nearly 80 men have been successfully engaged in European Union operations. On 000 March, we celebrated 30 years of operational CSDP, with the anniversary of the launch of the first operation, Concordia, in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM). However, on a European scale and in view of the needs, this is not much. We remain at a level of commitment of limited scope, which can be described as "laboratory level". Moreover, top-of-the-range actions, envisaged among the types of missions elaborated in Petersberg in 15, have only very rarely been carried out. These missions, whose objective is to restore peace, include robust modes of action, including the use of force. Continuing like this will not be enough. Worse, the model will burn out.

A more dangerous world... or just a different one

Needs have evolved in the face of a more dangerous world. It is becoming difficult to dissociate external action and internal security in the fight against terrorism. A European defense worthy of the name must guarantee the security of its citizens wherever they are, protect its infrastructures and defend its interests everywhere in the world. It must be able to rely on a “European defense industrial and technological base” (EDITS) which is capable of guaranteeing European strategic autonomy, in particular the use of materials without constraint coming from outside Europe. This EDIB is unfortunately insufficient today, in particular because of the reduced scope of the CSDP, many areas of capability not being covered by it. There is a real inconsistency here.

The necessary complementarity even for small countries

Few States have the capacity to meet all defense needs on their own. Complementarity at European level is essential. Even France, which, in theory, has the means to ensure its strategic autonomy, regularly calls on external support to fill its gaps, mainly in the fields of intelligence and strategic transport.

The limits of the policy of small steps

The policy of small steps has shown its limits, despite recent concrete advances such as the European Defense Fund, the annual process of coordinated review of national defense plans and permanent structured cooperation. We must raise the level of ambition unnecessarily censored during the creation of the CSDP and move up a gear. A global and collective approach to the security of Europe by the European countries is now essential, an approach which encompasses the internal and external aspects, and which is shared if possible by all the Member States of the EU and failing that by the greatest number.

Review NATO-EU complementarity

This implies in particular a reflection on the complementarity between NATO and the EU. The current distribution of roles between a NATO guarantor of collective security and a CSDP focused exclusively on external action is clearly no longer relevant: it does not allow Europeans to exercise their defense responsibilities collectively, in despite the proactive steps taken recently by them to strengthen their cooperation. Even the flagship measure of complementarity between the two organisations, the so-called Berlin Plus agreement, signed in 2003, which gave the Union access to NATO command resources, is no longer effective, in particular because of the different Turkish-Cypriot.

Assume a European defense

It is time to engage in a truly assumed European defence. A simple rereading of European documents - the Lisbon Treaty of 2007, the European Internal Security Strategy 2015-2020, the Global Strategy for EU Foreign and Security Policy of 2016 - provides enough elements to bring out a such defense. The ability to act across the entire spectrum of operations, from humanitarian assistance to high-intensity engagement, includes, along with projection operations, solidarity and mutual assistance operations in the European theatre. The latter, which are part of collective defence, are carried out in line with the commitments made within the Atlantic Alliance by the States which are members of it. Moreover, the texts authorize an original level of flexibility: Article 44 of the Treaty of Lisbon gives European authorities the possibility of delegating the conduct of an operation to a group of Member States. And the Permanent Structured Cooperation, recently decided upon, is the appropriate support for the development of new capacities.

Rebalancing the Atlantic Pact

A complete, assertive, active and operational European defense policy can then be put in place. Thanks to more strategically autonomous Europeans, its first consequence should be an evolution of the transatlantic link which, taking into account history and our common values, will have to be renovated. Rebalanced and assumed, the new Atlantic pact should enable Europe to become a reliable, credible and listened-to partner. It remains to define the paths allowing this evolution.

Review national decision-making processes and pooled funding

To do this, it will be necessary to confront the subjects of discord or blockage between Europeans, rather than ignoring them, for fear of destroying a hypothetical balance obtained by dint of concessions. The rules of engagement and the legal specificities, in particular for the use of force, will have to be harmonised. National decision-making processes will in some cases require the definition of short loops, allowing for emergency response, such as in humanitarian disasters. It will be necessary to work on the budgetary contributions of the States for the operations, to make them fairer and to reinforce the importance of the European Defense Fund.

Have a clear policy towards citizens

The following principles would guide the process. First, European citizens must receive simple and understandable answers to their security and defense needs. Today, if, according to the Eurobarometer of autumn 2017, three-quarters of them continue to favor the Europe of Defense, they do not have a clear idea of ​​​​its achievement, both the speeches on the roles shared between the Atlantic Alliance, the CSDP and national defense are complex and indigestible. When our leaders are resolutely committed to sovereign European defence, they will be able to provide such answers.

Taking into account the differences and the sovereignty of States

The principle of subsidiarity and complementarity with the States must be preserved. Subsidiarity is essential, the field of defense remaining the responsibility of the States and European sovereignty can only be exercised thanks to the contributions of the latter in seasoned troops and equipment. If the threats and the risks are perceived with a different degree of intensity according to the States, they must lead to the complementarity of the actions, based on the specific know-how of each one. For example, some countries have a developed culture of projection, such as France or Spain, authorizing intervention in Africa in particular. Others, like Germany or Poland, are more oriented towards collective defence. This does not prevent each of them from participating in missions, but with different degrees of commitment. The solidarity and mutual assistance clauses between States, particularly in the event of a terrorist attack, as described in the Lisbon Treaty, must not remain a dead letter; they must be assumed.

Really have strategic autonomy

It is in this capacity that this defense will gain in sovereignty. The initiatives launched by the President of the Republic in his speech at the Sorbonne in September 2017, such as the development of a capacity for autonomous action, will allow continuity between States and Europe, like that between external and internal missions. The strategic autonomy of a defense with broader contours could then be supported within the same perimeter by an EDIB with complete and autonomous research and development capabilities. It will then be a matter of winning the battle for industrial standards. Last principle, this Europe of sovereign defense will have to multiply partnerships, in particular with its immediate neighbours. It will renew the transatlantic link, rebalanced thanks to a better sharing of the burden.

A necessary European white paper

For all this, a White Paper, of which EuroDéfense-France is a firm supporter, is necessary, with the establishment of an ambitious roadmap. Thus, the defense of a “sovereign, united, democratic Europe” to use the terms of the President of the Republic can be built.

Members of the board of the EuroDéfense-France association: Patrick Bellouard (President of EuroDéfense-France, IGA 2S), Maurice de Langlois (General 2S, former IRSEM Research Director), Jean-Didier Blanchet (former CEO of Air France), Jean-Charles Boulat (Director of EU Affairs and NATO from the Naval Group industrial group), François Bresson (General 2S, former director of the Institute for Advanced National Defense Studies-IHEDN), Patrick de Rousiers (General of the Air Force 2S, former chairman of the military committee of the European Union), Michel Desmoulin (Honorary President of the Union of Associations of Auditors of the IHEDN), Jacques Favin-Lévêque (General 2S, former General Delegate of the Land and Air-Land Defense and Security Industries Group) , Patrick Hébrard (2S Wing Vice-Admiral), Jean-Loup Kuhn-Delforge (former Ambassador), François Laumonier (former Ambassador), Jean-Paul Palomeros (2S Air Force General, former Chief of Staff of the Air Force, former Allied Commander NATO Transformation), Jean-Paul Perruche (General 2S, former Director General of the European Union General Staff), Claude Roche (former Director of Defense Strategy at EADS, Vice-President of the Air and space), Philippe Roger (IGA 2S), Cyrille Schott (former director of the National Institute for Advanced Studies in Security and Justice) and Denis Verret (president, DV Conseil).

The statements above engage only their authors. The headings are editorial. This opinion was also published in the French daily The gallery

Photo credit: EUNAVFOR Med / Sophia - German sailor

Nicolas Gros Verheyde

Chief editor of the B2 site. Graduated in European law from the University of Paris I Pantheon Sorbonne and listener to the 65th session of the IHEDN (Institut des Hautes Etudes de la Défense Nationale. Journalist since 1989, founded B2 - Bruxelles2 in 2008. EU/NATO correspondent in Brussels for Sud-Ouest (previously West-France and France-Soir).

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