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Westerners, those diplomatic onlookers in one of the most serious post-war crises (B. Badie)

Bertrand Badie at a conference organized by the French Embassy in Oman (Credit: French Ministry of Foreign Affairs)

(B2) Faced with the dramatic situation in Aleppo, we have chosen to give the floor to Bertrand Badie, professor of political science at Sciences Po-USPC. He analyzes - much better than we could have done - the total debacle of Western diplomacy (European and American) making "the old powers (...) powerless spectators, diplomatic onlookers of one of the most acute crises of the scene post-war international. And it's not over. The current situation harbors yet other dangers.

Humanly, the sufferings of the population of Aleppo cover all other considerations. Politically, the Western rout is such an overpowering event. The old powers were once in turn the police, the administrators and the arbiters of a region where, from 1919, they considered themselves at home.

They find themselves today in the rank of helpless spectators, diplomatic onlookers of one of the most acute crises of the post-war international scene. Worse still, unable to act, they are partly responsible, more or less consciously, for the drama. Meetings at the Quai d'Orsay, parliamentary missions, good rhetorical feelings: everything is good to serve as a cache-misere. But the debacle is there: we will have to manage it...

A bad start and diplomatic naivety

Perhaps it is first necessary to understand it. Agree that the starting point was absurd: brandish, hand on heart, that we would never speak to the incriminated dictator again. Good or bad on an ethical level, the posture was a matter of extreme diplomatic naivety. It made any negotiation impossible, since it ruled it out in advance and brandished the result even before the debate began.

Along with the certainty that Bashar al-Assad would only last a few weeks, she became hostage to a risky bet worthy of second-hand gamers or lawngoers. The choice was even unrealistic since we knew that the Western armies would not lead any coalition capable of supporting an insurrection whose identity or regional support was uncertain. He became downright arrogant when he was perceived, rightly or wrongly, as the extension of a "transformational" diplomacy, that is to say aimed at guiding regime change where it is decided.

The failure of transformational diplomacy

This diplomacy has failed everywhere while nevertheless making the reputation of the West: it has collapsed in Afghanistan, in Iraq, in Libya; it has turned out to be deadly and a source of ever more serious new problems. Worse still, it aroused the suspicion of many to impose itself as a godsend among the most cynical. The radical Islamists have fed on it abundantly, the emerging powers with a fussy sovereigntism have worried about it to the point of moving away from the diplomacy of the old world, while Putin's Russia has found the cabbage of its new diplomacy: to protect itself from an interventionism that it had not seen coming in Libya and to present itself as the guarantor of the established powers, where so many authoritarian regimes are trembling for their survival.

Interfering to impose another power never succeeds

The equation is however simple: intervening in the other to warm up a faltering power is possible, sometimes gratifying in the short term. Interfering to impose another power never succeeds: no foreign van is big enough to transport a replacement regime. Western powers have been able to save dictators in Gabon, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Chad and elsewhere: they have been less fortunate when it comes to setting up alternative formulas.

Moscow or Tehran needed too much to demonstrate to the West that it was losing control in this area to facilitate a smooth political transition in Syria. They need too much to demonstrate that Western diplomacy has definitively lost this claim of yesteryear to lend itself to open consultation on the evolution of the regime in Damascus.

The dangerous choice of revolts that suit

The future is actually not bright for anyone. Strengthened by its military success, the Russian-Iranian-Assadian coalition has not finished the job, far from it. A few hours after François Hollande was delighted with the "retreats" of Daesh, it advanced victoriously towards Palmyra, while the battle of Mosul seems to be bogged down. The actions carried out towards Raqqa are the result of an "Arab-Kurdish" coalition which risks provoking the ire of Ankara and putting Russia in the face of ambiguous Western support.

Faced with such uncertainties, the handicaps outweigh the advantages. The western game is terribly poor. The powers that orchestrate it have no allies in the region, faced with an uncontrollable Turkey and a most complex Saudi Arabia. They no longer have any levers, so much do the distrust of some and the incredulity of others weaken them. Supporting certain dictatorships and choosing the revolts that suit them, they do not know how to build a diplomacy that is really in touch with regional social realities; trapped by their failures, they have trouble reaching the negotiating tables, with the exception of the United States, which Russia partially recycles to serve as a stooge...

The impasses of some, the happiness of others

Russia, for its part, has eaten its white bread: it has been able to show its strength, which it dreamed of to get back into the game. It must now show that this strength is convertible into political capacity. But it is no longer enough to make Assad a new Husak or a Gomulka after 1956. This time is over and this resistance of social dynamics risks playing into the game of the third thief embodied by the most radical Islamist entrepreneurs. . "This is why your daughter is mute" and how the impasses of some make others happy: it's time to think about it...

Bertrand Badie

University Professor at Sciences-Po (Paris Institute of Political Studies) and associate teacher-researcher at the Center for International Studies and Research (CERI).

Article first published in the Journal du Dimanche, reproduced with permission of its author. Titles and intertitles are from the editorial staff

Nicolas Gros Verheyde

Chief editor of the B2 site. Graduated in European law from the University of Paris I Pantheon Sorbonne and listener to the 65th session of the IHEDN (Institut des Hautes Etudes de la Défense Nationale. Journalist since 1989, founded B2 - Bruxelles2 in 2008. EU/NATO correspondent in Brussels for Sud-Ouest (previously West-France and France-Soir).

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