European defence. A turning point, an awareness? (To analyse)
(B2) Defense Europe is about to begin its transformation. Until now, we were mainly talking about operations that were going to forge a spirit of common solidarity and gradually lead to a European defense awareness, to a desire to act together, through a kind of political voluntarism. Ambitious objectives had been defined - a bit excessive perhaps - with the idea of mobilizing up to 60.000 men to go and maintain peace somewhere in the world (1). This voluntarism shattered with the economic and financial crisis at the end of the 2000s. Today Europe has decided to change its tune. It is relying more on a policy of industrial consolidation to preserve its strategic autonomy and has decided to unblock, point by point, what is blocking or threatening its operational capacities.
We must not rely on the rather conventional language of the conclusions that the European Council will adopt on Thursday. Without being emphatic or lyrical, the 28 Heads of State and Government, meeting at the Summit (including the United Kingdom), could thus approve a real change of priority, a small revolution which could in some way begin.
Towards a shared defense policy, despite everything
Realism is, indeed, in order today. This return to reality has a double trigger. Firstly, Defense Europe is not intended to replace the role of States nor to constitute an alternative to NATO. Second, states — even the most powerful — can no longer face all the challenges alone. Everyone today is well aware of this double dilemma.
The Scarecrow of the European Army
What is sought is not really the creation of a European army — used by some as a vision, by others as a scarecrow —. Ultimately, what is about to be put in place is rather a shared policy, with a convergence of certain actions. This policy is far from being a monolithic conception, a single model like the Euro, but rather a set of cooperations, accompanied by a series of community instruments, of a financial nature. The objective being to tighten the links in à la carte arrangements (two, three or four, or 28).
Solitary or/and united?
This shared policy is not, and will not be, a long calm river. The situations between European countries are so different, geographically, historically, economically, or simply psychologically, that they cannot be erased by a simple "paper" agreement. States are ultimately quite “lonely” in their conception of defence. And solidarity is not a reflex. The economic crisis born from 2007-2008 proved it. During its first phase, it rather led to a withdrawal into oneself, a broad propensity to selfishness, to preserving one's national industries, one's own interests, rather than a broader intention of cooperation. As much as possible, each has sketched out projects, more or less elaborate, with neighboring countries. A second phase seems to be taking shape, concomitant with a more profound political crisis that started in 2014-2015, with a desire that goes beyond a few cooperative frameworks but aims at greater integration.
Successions of cooperation rather than a single cooperation
Evidenced by the operation of the air transport command EATC between six European countries, the structural links between London and Paris on nuclear research (agreements of Lancaster House) and the integration of MBDA — which distributed the costs of these industrial units on either side of the Channel — and exchanges between staffs, the strengthening of cooperation between the Benelux countries (navy, air, special forces ) as between the former Czechoslovaks (air, training) while Germany weaves with several countries the integration of units: land and logistics ship with the Netherlands, submarines with the Poles, Super Hercules with France , etc. This evolution is not spontaneous... The economic crisis which drained the budgets, and the engagements in Iraq and in Afghanistan which exhausted some armies, do not explain this evolution.
An evolution under the weight of threats
A violent sword of Damocles above the Europeans
In two years, Europe has been traversed by three successive, serious crises, far from being resolved: the Russian-Ukrainian conflict and the tensions in the East - which sound like a tragic resurgence of a dark period of European history —, the migrant/refugee crisis and the tensions at the South-East and South borders — a real trauma for many European countries which have so far not been confronted with this type of crisis —, and a new wave of terrorism which is hitting the West from Europe.
A belt of instability in the first and second line
The two major "border" civil conflicts in the south - Syrian (Iraqi) and Libyan - and the two or three African areas of instability (Horn of Africa, Sahel, Nigeria) sound offshore like so many threats. This conjunction has a political effect: whatever the crisis, no state today feels safe... or capable of coping alone.. The triggering in November 2015 by France of article 42.7 (mutual assistance clause) probably did not have the hoped-for effect of triggering a wave of short-term commitments. On the other hand, it undeniably marked the end of a certain inconstancy and forced medium-term political reflection.
All available means
All the vectors are this time necessary to ensure a response to these crises: reconnaissance aviation but also fighter (for aerial surveillance in the Baltic and in almost all of Europe as well as for the bombardments in Iraq) as well as transport, maritime means (in the Baltic or the Mediterranean, even the Black Sea) and submarines (for intelligence), land elements and special forces (in the Sahel in particular), intelligence (against terrorism), satellites and radio surveillance -electronics, cyber (on which the future is now being played out), means of strategic communication, etc. A range of means that cannot be available to a single State (or very exceptionally).
Two political traumas
Added to this, the British stall with the Brexit (even if they haven't left yet, the British seem rather to want to save the furniture for a possible participation), and lastly the trumpet call from Trump (2). So many additional signals encouraging Europeans to work a little more together from now on. They thus no longer hesitate to shatter the few principles that have so far paralyzed any evolution.
Taboos are shattered
1. Provide Europe with an industrial policy
In this panorama, it is no longer CSDP missions and operations that are the alpha and omega of European defense today. The operational is no longer popular. Today, Europe is betting more on capacity and industrial consolidation, with the implementation of a real industrial policy: funding for research (under the Community budget!), possibilities of loans for the defense (if the European Investment Bank is willing to remove this exception), financial engineering for capabilities developed jointly. All with the possibility of an exception to the stability pact for defense investments, and a certain benevolence from the European competition authority with regard to industrial mergers in the sector. Which is a real little revolution!
2. Building strategic autonomy
The idea is to build European champions capable of assuming the strategic autonomy of Europe, of giving a little vigor to what is for the moment only an economic cluster. For some, it's just a matter of shared interests; for others, it's about having a deterrent force. Whatever the reasons, when we look back - if only two or three years ago - when it was totally taboo to talk about any military use for Galileo (the European GPS) (3), we see the importance of progress: community budget, strategic autonomy, industrial policy... so many big words before, impossible to pronounce, except at the end of a well-watered banquet of 'missionaries' of European defense 😉
3. Realism in operations
The operational dynamic has not disappeared. But she wants to be more pragmatic. It is a question of unblocking, point by point, all blockages and points of rigidity. The major objectives defined in Helsinki have been shelved: too unrealistic (4). The principle of battlegroups — all together or never — will be shattered in favor of a more modular approach (5). We will seek to have more solidarity, with a greater dose of joint financing of operations (today 10% or 15%). The prior authorizations that block any rapid departure in external operations could be relaxed (6). A mini command structure for non-executive military missions and a stronger support structure for civilian missions will be put in place. To some, this might seem inglorious and ambitious. It's probably better than big statements without a more effective future.
4. NATO-EU reconciliation
NATO and the European Union are in the process of reconciling. There is now open talk of information exchanges between the different structures, of the implementation of similar policies on both sides (in particular on Russian disinformation). The two organizations are today placed on an equal footing with a distribution of tasks. There can no longer be a question of an adult organization and an adolescent organization, which would not have the right to operate at the military level but rather a division of tasks. NATO's karma is territorial defense and today this mission is not purely formal. The European Union, for its part, ensures the civilian aspect of this defence, internal security (with the European corps of border guards and coast guards). On the other hand, any EU military operation or mission under the CSDP (civilian or military) cannot be deployed inside the territory of its Member States (prohibition of the Treaties obliges). Talking about duplication is therefore a decoy...
5. The end of a certain duplication idea
NATO has on its side its military technicality which it can put in place for the benefit of its allies (Coalition in Iraq or Europeans in the Mediterranean). The EU has for it the plasticity of its organization (nice word to indicate that it is a bit 'messy') which allows it to adapt to particularly complex situations where the military tool is only one ( small) aspect of the solution. It has thus taken the lead in maritime operations – which are very global – and in (small) army training missions in Africa (due to the EU's precedence and financial power on the continent). While NATO has for it - in addition to territorial defense - its planning tool, the Shape, quite heavy but powerful, perfectly adapted to operations of higher intensity or over a long period of time (7).
(Nicolas Gros-Verheyde)
Read also:
- Sea Guardian: a limited-scale operation – exclusive
- Financing the defense industry. A taboo is broken
- Don't touch my Shape! The false argument of duplication
- The United States of Europe, an outdated idea. Defense, an idea for the future (Juncker)
- European defence: what we can do…together
(1) The Member States had defined a " overall goal » to can " deploy quickly » and " to support " forces “capable of carrying out all the Petersberg missions (...), including the most demanding of them ", in operations that may " reach 50.000 to 60.000 men”, the equivalent of an army corps and up to 15 brigades. Read our fact sheet: the Helsinki summit an ambitious military objective
(2) It doesn't matter what Trump ultimately decides. The simple fact of having raised more than a doubt about the transatlantic link will force the wisest supporters of this link to provide at least a small spare wheel... just in case. Betting everything on the transatlantic link is proving risky today.
(3) Jacques Barrot, the former European Commissioner for Transport, always indicated with a gesture on his mouth. " We know there will be a possible military use ... but, hush, don't say it. And I won't say it because it would be used against this project. »
(4) NATO made the same turn, setting up a more realistic force, the VTJF of 2500 people rather than an NRF, which found no application.
(5) Much smarter approach than the principle of all together or never which produced only one answer: "never".
(6) The Czech Republic is thus preparing an amendment to its constitution to allow the commitment of troops for a short period (60 days) by the government alone with simple information from Parliament (and not authorization).
(7) Since the end of NATO's major operation in Afghanistan, its external operational load plan has been reduced. The Alliance has one big operation going — KFOR in Kosovo — and a few missions — training in Iraq, maritime in the Mediterranean.”Sea Guardian" (support to EUNAVFOR) and information exchange activity in the Aegean Sea (support to Frontex)
