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Reviewing the concept of battlegroups: a necessity

shooting exercise in Ivory Coast (credit: EMA / DICOD / B2 Archives)
Is a battlegroup able to do anything other than exercises? (credit: EMA / DICOD / B2 Archives)

(BRUSSELS2) The concept of battle groups is good but it is outdated today. Inspired by the Rwandan genocide and the Yugoslav civil conflict, it is profiled for a robust action, of interposition, of the type of that carried out by the European Union in Congo in 2003 (operation Artémis) or more recently by France in Mali. The kind of actions that repels Europeans today.

An exercise toy, impossible to put into practice

Conceived in the 2000s, on the basis of a rare common Franco-German-British paper (and of the twelve other members of the Union), the sending of European troops no longer arouses – in reality – such a consensus. You don't have to hide the truth. In fact, since their establishment more than ten years ago in 2005, the battle groups (or GT1500 battlegroups) are only used to carry out joint exercises and improve (a little) European interoperability (1). That's not really their goal. Trigger a battle group requires, in fact, to bring together a set of conditions, such a political and financial effort, that it is almost " undeployable " (read : Are these very expensive battlegroups unusable?).

Reviewing the system is imperative, starting with clearing the main blocking points:

1° Political authorization: you must obtain either a prior political commitment to deploy these groups, in a number of precisely identified crises during the year (see box), or an emergency authorization mechanism (within 48 hours) . The final commitment decision depends on the countries on call and on the High Representative.

2° Prior financing must also have been previously identified and released to finance this common commitment. It is not 'fair' for a common commitment to be funded by only a few.

3° Modular elements. Deploying 2500 men/women is not always necessary. The organization into autonomous units, which can operate autonomously, be integrated into an operation or be incorporated into a more complex structure if necessary, would be more useful and easier to implement. Several modules could thus be put on alert, on the most requested "niche slots" in an external operation (medical unit, helicopter unit, drone unit, maritime support, C2 Command, cyber unit, transmission unit, protection force, etc. ). Each country could thus take care for a more or less long period, or even quasi-permanently, by undertaking to make its means available as soon as the High Representative of the Union asks it (with certain reservations if necessary, or caveats, displayed in advance).

The advantage of this type of solution is that it is adapted to the fragmentation of armies in Europe — many small armies with limited capabilities — and makes it possible to encourage countries to invest in these niche capabilities. It is less financially burdensome — the additional costs are less significant than setting up a battlegroup for a few months —. It can also be useful for other operations (NATO, UN). It is part of a longer-term, structuring effort, which can, if necessary, be integrated into the other mechanisms provided for by the European Union (European semester, permanent structured cooperation, enhanced cooperation, avant-garde group, article 44, etc.) and be supported financially (European Defense Agency, research budget, etc.).

(Nicolas Gros-Verheyde)


The predictability of engagement. If the principle of a crisis is to be sudden, there are a number of warning signs and slow signs. It is quite possible, a few months in advance, to have a predictable commitment. For example: logistical or combat support to African countries to fight against Boko Haram? a security mission for ceasefire observers in Syria? a civil conflict in the Congo, or in the other countries of the Great Lakes? a stabilization mission in one of the Balkan countries (Macedonia/Fyrom for example, hypothetical but not impossible) or in Central Asia? an interposition mission in the event of a slippage in the peace process in Colombia? ... Many hypotheses can be drawn up. And, opposite, we can profile, in advance, responses with quantified commitments from certain Member States.


(1) An argument often heard in European circles which can arouse a certain irony - as a connoisseur of the file recently confided: “ It's a bit like excusing firefighters for not regularly intervening on deadly forest fires, saying: "Yes, but hey, they trained well today, putting out a hot air balloon fire"... 😉

Read our complete memo sheet! The GT 1500 or battlegroups, a great idea never put into practice (sheet)

Nicolas Gros Verheyde

Chief editor of the B2 site. Graduated in European law from the University of Paris I Pantheon Sorbonne and listener to the 65th session of the IHEDN (Institut des Hautes Etudes de la Défense Nationale. Journalist since 1989, founded B2 - Bruxelles2 in 2008. EU/NATO correspondent in Brussels for Sud-Ouest (previously West-France and France-Soir).

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