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Political and defence Europe (by Nicolas Gros-Verheyde)

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The Berlin Plus agreement hit in the heart by Brexit

One of the main activities of the operation...: the presentation of medals. (Credit: EUFOR Althea)
Medal ceremony at EUFOR Althea (Credit: EUFOR Althea)

(BRUSSELS2) In the early 2000s, the European Union had concluded an agreement with NATO to be able to use, during its operations, the headquarters of the Atlantic Alliance (the SHAPE located in Mons). This agreement, known as Berlin Plus (*), today has a little lead in the wing... And Brexit could finish it off.

A chord used in the 2000s...

This operational device was used in the Balkans only twice: in 2003, with the replacement of the NATO operation (Allied Harmony) in Macedonia/FYROM and, in 2004, when the Europeans took over the succession of the SFOR, NATO's stabilization force in Bosnia and Herzegovina, by setting up their operation EUFOR Althea. Since then, in fact, it has not really been used simply because it is no longer necessary and is no longer really suitable.

An agreement that is no longer quite suitable for 4 reasons

A difference in operations

Firstly, the European Union no longer conducts large ground stabilization operations like in the Balkans, over a long period. Rather, it conducts operations with a short duration and a “small” land footprint or maritime operations. In other words, the NATO HQ is a little "heavy" for this type of operation.

De facto autonomy

Secondly, to carry out its various military operations, the European Union — and its Member States — prefer to use the headquarters made available by the latter: this was the case for the EUFOR operation in Chad in 2008 (it was the Mont Valérien near Paris), this was the case for the EUNAVFOR anti-piracy maritime operation (Atalanta whose HQ is still in London - Northwood) and it is still the case for the EUNAVFOR maritime operation off the Libya (Sophia) for the fight against migrants and control of the arms embargo (whose headquarters is in Rome). And if tomorrow, it acquires an autonomous HQ, it will have even less need for the NATO HQ.

A difference in political logic

Thirdly, which is the main problem, the NATO system obeys another logic and another political organization. There is a break in the political and military chain of command which is unthinkable in a Member State and just as much in an international organization. Imagine Operation Barkhane in Mali led by the British HQ in Northwood. And the British Prime Minister decides directly to appoint the soldier he wants as his head or to withdraw him. It is downright unthinkable.

A strongly differentiated composition

Fourthly, even if the European Union and NATO are quite close, closer than the appearance suggests, the logic and the organization of the two organizations are different. They do not have the same 'shareholders' (the same Member States). When it is said that NATO and the EU have "almost" the same members. All the difference is in the 'almost'. On the EU side, there are six "neutral" or "non-aligned" states which would have a hard time becoming members of NATO (except Sweden). On the NATO side, there is a 'large' piece - United States, Canada - these two countries are not destined to become members of the EU - and Turkey - whose candidacy is rejected... Greek calends. Let us add to the surplus that there is a member — the United States — which spends almost three times more of the defense budget than all the others put together. This gives a supremacy which is naturally reflected in the choices of the organization. This does not exist at European level. Finally, a NATO member state (Turkey) has a (frozen) military 'dispute' with an EU member state (Cyprus). In short, there is quite an 'almost' difference!

An experience born over the years

Finally, almost 15 years ago, when the European Union had no experience of a stabilization mission, and on operations where it succeeded NATO operations, there was a "real" operational and political logic that it has recourse to NATO assets. Today, the NATO HQ for conducting NATO operations is rather unsuitable, and to be honest a little "heavy" to handle for European Union operations.

A 'little' political problem: Brexit

It was normally D-Saceur who was the Operation Commander for European operations using NATO HQ. The D-Saceur being traditionally a European, and a Briton, this satisfied everyone or almost. With Brexit, things take a different turn. Having a commander of a nationality other than a member of the European Union for a European operation is a problem. Of course, the official answer: we don't yet know all the consequences of Brexit and the United Kingdom is still a member of the European Union... That's for the gallery...

Exit a British commander for a European operation?

In the corridors, the question really arises. B2 interviewed a few diplomats and soldiers familiar with the matter. And the answer is clear: This will have to change! responds a diplomat. " There are many other soldiers than the British in the Alliance replies the soldier, in a rather...diplomatic twist in the end to achieve the same result. Exit the British commander of a European Union operation. With Operation Althea coming to an end... (with barely 600 soldiers available on the spot... counting the Turks!), within one or two years, the question of its renewal will really arise (the British no no longer there to defend its existence).

A Warsaw + or a Berlin + 2

The Berlin Plus agreements had an asset... What is at stake today is not to mummify them by trying to keep them a semblance of life when they no longer have any interest. It is to revive them. Because that is what is essential: to find an organizational modality where the European Union can benefit from the military planning and organization of the Alliance (which it does not have the means). And vice versa... The paradox is that in Warsaw, it is a Warsaw + agreement that is taking shape: it is the Alliance that is now asking to be able to benefit from the 'civilian' assets of the Union in particular against hybrid threats or in terms of cyber-attack or cyber security.

(Nicolas Gros-Verheyde)

(*) NB: there are several aspects and several agreements of Berlin Plus. The following comment concerns only the operational component. The other aspects such as secure information exchange (signed on March 14, 2003) or the integration of defense plans are not affected.

Read our file The Berlin Accords More

Nicolas Gros Verheyde

Chief editor of the B2 site. Graduated in European law from the University of Paris I Pantheon Sorbonne and listener to the 65th session of the IHEDN (Institut des Hautes Etudes de la Défense Nationale. Journalist since 1989, founded B2 - Bruxelles2 in 2008. EU/NATO correspondent in Brussels for Sud-Ouest (previously West-France and France-Soir).

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