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Tango in Brussels. Why European defense is not moving forward...

Army drummers at IHEDN meetings © NGV / B2
Army drummers at IHEDN meetings © NGV / B2

(BRUXELLES2 to Paris) Where is Defense Europe headed? Is it worth the detour? How can she move on? It is around these questions that the " Tango in Brussels », the workshop of the 2nd Meetings of the IHEDN (*), dedicated to the Europe of defense on Saturday (April 2). Two distinguished guests officiated: Pierre Vimont, on one side, the first secretary general of the diplomatic service (1), and General Jean-Paul Perruche, on the other, the former chief of staff of the European Union (2).

Both, good connoisseurs of the field, have not done in the language of wood. It's not (anymore) their type. They painted, on the contrary, a portrait without make-up, but also without acrimony, of a Europe which has a struggling defense. A fairly fair portrait finally, which makes it possible to identify the causes of the problem rather than to question it.

A bar set too high

He is " probable that the ambitions set were too great, first explains Pierre Vimont. " One of the problems with defense and security is that the bar has been set very high. Failure to achieve these objectives has created disinterest and indifference. » « We find the state of mind of the Member States” in the work of “those who work in Brussels and have to set up the objectives. We realize that we are very far from the mark ».

States with absent subscribers in the event of a hard blow

According to the seasoned diplomat, in addition to being " harder to make decisions at 28 there is also a referral problem. Member States have no not all the same design of Defense Europe. There are two visions: between those who want hard power and the others, a majority, who have a softer view of soft power. A kind of low profile. "When the EU is called upon to act, " it is then more of a provider of humanitarian aid and development ". And when confronted with a high-intensity situation, many member states are missing out ».

Defense spending too low

With regard to the military effort, the observation is moreover " quite lamentable continues Pierre Vimont. The majority of states are not even at 1% defense spending of their GDP. We are a long way from the 2% set by NATO. It is " one of the reasons why it is difficult to mount a military or civil-military operation ". Sometimes, a State's refusal to commit itself obeys " low budget reasons more than a political motivation.

A “notch” on ambitions

The ambitions of the Union were very quickly limited by the real means available to it. Originally he was " planned to have a military strength of 50.000 to 60.000 men, which was very quickly reduced ". Then the Union created the GT1500 or battle groups to be able to intervene quickly in a crisis area. Gold, " the workforce is only 1500 men ". Which is little. But, above all, these intervention groups " have never been hired in a theater of operations.

"Scale model" missions

For Jean-Paul Perruche, the fact that a " large number of missions and operations have been launched (21 civilian missions and 11 military) since the beginning of the ESDP would tend to prove that Europe is a very active security player ". A fake! " The impact is still minor. Because commitment has rather weak effects ". In question, according to him: short duration (of missions), small numbers and absence of operations (with coercive power) ».

A disabled command and control system

Nor does the Union have a complete command and control structure like NATO, with a politico-strategic level, a military-strategic level, an operational and tactical level. " In the Union, only the politico-military level, represented by the European Union General Staff, is present. Everything else is not planned permanently ". However, " the system exists. The Union has the means to create an operational center if the Council so decides. But there are still differences of opinion between the Member States ».

Competence limited to the management of external crises

Another limit to the proper development of defense Europe comes from the will of States not to " impinge on NATO's areas of responsibility, including collective defence" emphasizes General Perruche. This is found in the treaties. " The competence which the Union has endowed itself with, the creation of the ESDP/CSDP, “is therefore limited to the management of crises outside the borders. This results in a partitioning between national interests and outside the European area »The Union has therefore deprived itself of taking an interest in this.

A better synergy of tools

The former Chief of Staff nevertheless notes that the creation of the European Diplomatic Service (EEAS) as the dual role of the High Representative (both Vice-President of the Commission and President of the Council of Foreign Ministers) allowed " a better synthesis and coordination of the means of the Union and a better synergy of the tools ". This double hat makes it possible not to focus only on the security aspects of a crisis but on the root causes, diplomatic as well as political », in particular through the global approach which combines military, civilian and development responses.

A more effective intelligence network 

The information provided by the 130 delegations and the Member States to the Union's intelligence analysis service (IntCen) also allowed " better monitoring of the potential emergence of crises ". Both the military staff and the civilian crisis management department (CPCC) are therefore better able to " anticipate and carefully plan a response to an upcoming crisis ».

A poorly integrated European defense

If the Union has well-ordered procedures, these remain however very cumbersome to implemente”. Despite " the clear ambition of an integrated Europe of defense present in the Treaty of Lisbon, coordinating 27 or 28 States (3) is not easy either when the foreign policies of the countries remain so different and so fluctuating in the face of the international situation.

(Lucas Millet)

Read also: The CSDP in the middle of the ford. The end of a cycle? in search of a new breath

(*) From IHEDN meetings rich and supplied of which B2 was a media partner

(1) French diplomat, born in 1949, graduate in political science, Pierre Vimont was notably ambassador, permanent representative to the EU from 1999 to 2002, director of the cabinet of several foreign ministers from 2002 to 2007 (De Villepin , Douste-Blazy) then French Ambassador to the United States before returning to Brussels to set up the SEAE. Read also: Pierre Vimont, a diplomat in no-chat

(2) French soldier, graduate of the IHEDN, General Perruche held the positions of commander of force staff no. 1, deputy to the command of the NATO Force in Kosovo (KFOR) and chief from the French military mission to the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) to NATO at SHAPE in Mons. He is president ofEurodefense.

(3) Denmark does not participate in the military aspect of defense policy. Read our fact sheet: Denmark and its opt-out. What does it cover

B2 Writing

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2 thoughts on “Tango in Brussels. Why European defense is not moving forward..."

  • A very franco-french view of the blockages of the CSDP which obscures the lack of interest, in particular of France (following the UK), to “allow” the EU the use of the military means required to fully implement its “comprehensive approach” . The case of the french intervention in Sahel (on the footsteps of its previous interventions in Côte d'Ivoir, and in parallel to the one in RCA) shows that France (meaning the “strategic epistemic community” of France to which Mr Vimont as well as Gen Perruche belong) thinks that Africa'n security affairs is not a matter to be left to the EU and that only France is entitled to adjudicate power and authority inside her “pre Carré” and defend it from outsiders, be they Chinese or American or algerians (such as AQIM).

  • jeans - Guy GIRAUD

    The question that remains unanswered is: why have the willing Member States not set in motion between themselves the “permanent structured cooperation” provided for by the Treaties (arts 42 and 46 TEU)? No prior condition is required (no minimum number of participants, for example) – a qualified majority within the Council suffices – and the methods of cooperation are left to the initiative of the participating States. Why France, in particular, does not seem to have at least tried to open this process? JGG

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