Faced with the threat of the Islamic State, a minute of silence and then what?

(BRUSSELS2) The exceptional meeting of the 28 interior ministers this Thursday (24 March) first had a symbolic objective: to express condolences to the Belgian people and reaffirm European unity after the double terrorist attack perpetrated on Tuesday 22 March in Brussels.

A necessary symbolism

This symbolism can sometimes seem superficial. It is important in political matters, because it shows a united Europe, even if there are differences of appreciation, and above all present. We certainly remember the political mess after the January 2015 attacks in Paris, during the Latvian presidency (read: Anti-terrorism. A European ignition delay).

Six months wasted!

The impression of a lack of political responsiveness had been politically harmful at the time, to say the least. It has very concretely delayed any awareness, the start of work and the necessary acceleration. Because then, between April 2015 and November 2015, European attention and political will were diverted from the “terrorism” question to focus on other aspects, in particular the refugee and migrant crisis. Clearly, six months were lost in this way, which should be made up for now.

Few new commitments... and a probable delay

But Thursday's meeting showed it. If the symbolism is there, in terms of concrete commitments, there is unfortunately nothing very new in itself. We accelerate a little here and there, especially on the PNR. We are expecting a proposal (on borders), concrete measures (on fingerprints), a code of conduct (for the internet)... All of this by June 2016. Which is still three months from now. But nothing more. To tell the truth, it is even a little light given the scale of the new threats which clearly play with borders and attack several European countries head-on at the same time...

A network more organized than it looks

Despite an amateur impression that may sometimes seem to exist, the "network" set up by the organization of the Islamic State in Europe (ISIL / Daesh) is indeed clearly based on a para-military organization, with "forward" units, "logistics" units, command structures, places of retreat which juggle with borders, which may resemble in certain respects the one set up by the Algerian GIA in the 1990s.

An enemy who seeks to divide more than to claim

This "enemy" has no political demands traditionally expressed by a terrorist movement (recognition of a State, overthrow of power...). But he has a very clear desire to sow terror, to divide, to attack the civilian population of several Member States.

French-speaking countries at the heart of the target, until when?

For the moment, only the French-speaking countries (France and Belgium) have been more clearly targeted (apart from an action in Denmark). It is not excluded that it will be different in the future: that Germany or Italy or even the United Kingdom, Austria or Hungary are targeted. The presence of Abdelslam's Franco-Brussels unit between Germany, Austria and Hungary should also clearly worry these countries. There are dormant logistic cells, or at least support points that deserve an interest.

A Europe of tolerance

The double attack from Brussels did not specifically target Belgium, despite appearances, but beyond the European organization. It is Europe with its peaceful, democratic, social and religious mix that is targeted. The attacks on Monday in Bamako (attempt) and Tuesday in Brussels (two deadly suicidal attacks) demonstrated this (read our editorial: We wanted to target Europe!). By responding weakly and slowly to this threat, the Europeans are exposing themselves to the following response taking them by surprise once again.

Shift up a gear

It is not a question of reinventing the wheel, or of setting up new institutions, but of starting to think about a new dimensioning of the European police and judicial response, as was done in their time in terms of "ordinary" crime " the Dutroux affair, or terrorist temporality, the attacks of September 2001 (New York) and especially of March 2004 and July 2005 (Madrid / London). Europeans must move up a gear.

Design an interoperable device

We can dream of a European intelligence agency. But that remains, for the moment, a chimera. It would take time. And that would only very partially solve the problem. We have to rethink the whole system, design a device, rather than a community, interoperable, ranging from common threat analysis and prevention units, to joint investigation teams, to joint special forces interventions. This requires very quickly multiplying joint training, bridges, resolving all the "small" procedural questions, etc. It is also essential to develop a common risk analysis.

A European intelligence agency

Some - like Guy Verhofstadt (1) - recommend a European intelligence agency. An idea deemed unfeasible by some specialists in the matter such as MEP Arnaud Danjean, who believes that it would take years for a limited result. An opinion that we share: there is no need to carry out large institutional projects that produce little on arrival.

Some Member States, generally the "big" countries that invest in intelligence, are also opposed to this proposal. But on the side of the "small countries" (Austria, Belgium, etc.), which often do not have significant means or a general range of observation, this idea often comes up.

Rather than a sterile opposition between two conceptions, each defensible, a possible solution could be foreseen. It would consist in designing an agency, not European but multinational, on a voluntary basis, between several countries which would combine their forces, their resources, and exchange intelligence.

Between Belgium, Austria, Finland or Greece, it can be estimated that there is both a common will, possible economies of scale and sources of information diversified enough to be complementary and useful. This solution would make it possible in a certain way to have another "big" intelligence agency which could thus usefully supplement that provided by France, the United Kingdom, Germany, or even have original intelligence leads and thus exchange them in an "informal" way.

Thinking about a binational trial

It will also be necessary to ask the question of setting up common procedures allowing a judicial investigation as well as a criminal trial to cover the facts committed in two (or even three) countries. This implies revolutionizing a little our ways of thinking and judicial organization. Is Abdelslam today more guilty in France for having been the "team leader" of several suicide bombers before retracting himself or for having been the accomplice or the "instigator" of the perpetrators of the Brussels attacks? It's a real question. And choosing the place of the trial today would already be answering the final question: what is he guilty of? With a risk of legal scramble... and in the end of a lighter sentence than expected. The lack of Europe on this file is clearly detrimental to the investigation. We must start this work immediately.

Strengthen links in emergency relief structures

We must not forget either the dimension of the post-attack. That is to say the medical response and emergency relief, such as civil protection (anti-explosives or anti-bacteriological). In Paris as in Brussels, the emergency relief response systems were at the limit of their possibilities, with intervention times longer than what would be expected in such circumstances. We must rethink the emergency response system, to make it again interoperable. Especially for "small" countries that do not have inexhaustible resources.

Ability to deal with unconventional threats

If a third attack had taken place in Liège or Antwerp, it is not certain that the Belgian structure would have been able to respond on its own. If a threat of a non-conventional type (bacteriological, chemical, etc.) emerges, it is not really certain that all the services in Europe can deal with it, etc. It would therefore be useful to think about an operational reserve that can be mobilized in a few hours and not a few days. Can we use, in this case, military structures familiar with this type of question (like the European battlegroup that has not been used until now)? This deserves at least some thought.

Plan a possible neutralization of the heart of European power

The question of European power must also be raised. What fallback structure exists if the "Schuman roundabout", the nerve center of the European system, is reached? A question that can only be theoretical today after the attack at Maelbeck station close to the headquarters of the European institutions. There is a whole emergency planning that today seems rather incipient or even in its infancy. It is all of this that must be urgently undertaken in order to have a more successful system by the end of the year. If not at the next attack, you can take up the statement made this week, modify two paragraphs, two dates... and we will be off again for another minute of silence, the compassion phase, the "we knew it well" phase, and the "disintegration".

(Nicolas Gros-Verheyde)

Read also (in July 2004!) Europe behind on crime

(1) For the former Belgian Prime Minister, this is not a last minute fad. More than 10 years ago, in the aftermath of the attacks in Madrid in March 2004, he was already defending this creation.

Update on the European Intelligence Agency