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Why does France feel alone? Why are Europeans so slow?

French Mirage 2000 on the airbase in Jordan armed for airstrikes on Syria (credit: DICOD / EMA)
French Mirage 2000 on the airbase in Jordan armed for airstrikes on Syria (credit: DICOD / EMA)

(B2) It has become a ritual... France goes to war, alone. She appeals to the Europeans, and is surprised that everyone does not follow, immediately, as a single man. A bit like in the days of Napoleon in a way... And here and there, comments that smack of “We are the best” (versus positive) or “the others are incapable” (versus negative) are flourishing. The Europeans, for their part, are surprised that France is leaving alone, so quickly, detecting a warlike tropism there. If there is indeed a clear French commitment, operational, robust, and a certain reluctance, a certain slowness of the Europeans to commit, this is based on a certain number of reasons which it is interesting to know.

  • NB: this article is part of a series of articles making it possible to draw a map of the external interventions of the Member States as well as their response to France's request for solidarity

First cause: the difference in political system

France is the only country in the European Union to have a decision-making system, at presidential level, with very little democratic participation in the army. A system inherited from the Kings, from Napoleon, from the revolutionary period, taken up and amplified under the Fifth Republic. A very effective device, because coupled with real military capabilities, autonomous for a good part, capable of reacting in a very short time, which is based on a device of military bases and pre-positioned forces in several areas of the world. But a system very specific to France. Nowhere else in Europe does anything quite like it exist today, with one exception: Russia. Everywhere else, including in the United Kingdom, so much celebrated in France as the eternal ally, there is an internal reflection, at the level of the government, even the need to obtain an agreement from the majority of the coalition and/or from the parliament . This is due to the regime itself and to the organization of the States.

1° They are not presidential regimes (for the most part) but parliamentary regimes. The Head of State (King or President) has only an honorary role. Everything is decided at government level.

2° Government consultation is needed. The Minister of Defense cannot take a decision on his own, or just refer it to his head of government. Hence certain waltzes of hesitation in the aftermath of the Paris attacks in several Member States which, under the influence of emotion (this also exists in politics) or personal will, let themselves go with promises... a little too fast.

3. In most cases, these governments represent a coalition of parties. It is not only a consultation, it is necessary a negotiation between the various partners of the coalition to define a governmental position.

4° A government decision must be presented, discussed if necessary, and endorsed in one way or another (debate followed by approval, presentation followed by a vote, bill approved by a vote, etc.) by parliamentary representation. This is also the case in the UK. A point that some commentators sometimes seem to forget.

Second series of causes: the structure and objective of the army

1° Many European countries have been marked by a fall in the budget of the armies to the limit of what is reasonable. Overall defense budgets, since the start of the financial crisis, have thus lost nearly €30 billion (roughly speaking the operational budget – excluding pensions – of France or Germany). A few have started to raise their budgets - mainly in northeastern Europe (Baltic countries, Poland, Sweden) - especially in the face of a possible Russian threat. Read also: Defense spending and the stability pact? Some flexibility

2° Very few European countries have as marked an “external operations” tropism as France and a reactive capability within 24 or 48 hours. Their army is more oriented towards territorial defense or multinational missions, in an extremely structured organization, NATO or UN type.

3° Several European countries, small and medium, have not really profiled their army in an offensive way. If we list the range of means available (fighter planes, tankers, high seas frigates) necessary for a targeted or massive bombardment action in Syria, we find only half a dozen countries (apart from France) : UK, Germany, Denmark, Italy, Spain, Belgium/Netherlands.

4° Finally, the acceptance of the “mortal risk” outside by populations and governments is not really shared. The number of countries prepared to bear a lasting risk over a certain period of time is quite limited: United Kingdom, Denmark, Spain, Belgium.

5° Almost no State can / therefore wants to carry out operations in “solo”, or coalition and following the best practices just with the support of the American ally. The one exception, the UK, is melting. European armies generally prefer operations where they are part of an organized system, prepared in advance, which is part of a long term, where they can only provide one or two rotations, or more. EUNAVFOR Atalanta-type operations against piracy where the risk is low and the organization can be planned are obviously their preference. And, if the operation is at higher risk, as in Afghanistan, European countries expect the United States to play the role of "super assistance" providing all the missing logistics, force protection or medical capabilities, or even the necessary equipment.

The third series of causes relates to the operation itself

If all the European countries are in solidarity with France on the act of "armed aggression" suffered on Friday, November 13, this does not mean that they share the analysis made in France - a "war" - like the rhetoric of war of the government. The method of the Paris attacks (planning, simultaneity, etc.) has changed the situation for many governments who share French concern. But that doesn't necessarily mean they're considering a military response.

1° Several countries have experienced waves of terrorist attacks, often of internal origin. This is particularly the case for Spain (ETA), Ireland (IRA), and to a lesser extent Italy, which have made a lasting impression on them. They know the "blood price" but also the need for multiple action, both security and political, which is part of the long term.

2° The last offensive military operations have not really demonstrated their political effectiveness, from a lasting point of view. They have rather aggravated than favored international stability. The most striking example is the operation in Libya in 2011. But it cannot be said that the ISAF operation in Afghanistan, which spanned more than 15 years — right after the response to the 2001 attacks — has really had an effect. It is the same for the operation in Iraq in 2003 which is a real catastrophe in terms of international balance.

3° Several countries were particularly marked by the operation in Iraq in 2003. An operation that required a significant commitment, long and costly (both human and financial), without result (neither operational, nor political or even in terms of economic benefits). This is particularly the case in the United Kingdom (a commission of inquiry is underway), in Spain (and in Italy to a lesser extent), and in most countries of Eastern Europe (Poland in head but also Bulgaria or Romania). And few seem ready to resume the adventure.

4° Commitment to Sahel, led on the initiative of France, but now joined by the United Nations seems paradoxically more within reach of Europeans. Because he has demonstrated a certain efficiency with multiple commitments. There has been a kind of maturation in relation to the French intervention, feared at the start by certain European leaders as the expression of a new neocolonialism.

5° Finally, what does France really want in terms of means, support, political or military action? This question has not been resolved, like many other fundamental questions.

Fundamental questions remain unanswered

The sudden, brutal French commitment deserves serious consideration for a certain number of European countries. It poses a whole series of philosophical, political, military questions, which do not really have a clear answer today.

1° Is it a war? The French response qualifying the anti-terrorist operation as a war is shared today by almost no other state in Europe. All the ministers, from Finland to Spain, via Germany, Italy or Poland, all insisted on this point. The notion of "war against terrorism" is also too reminiscent of the 2001-2003 Bush period, which did not leave an excellent memory.

2° Eradicate Daesh? The rhetoric developed by François Hollande and Manuel Valls on the organization of the Islamic State - also seems a little short to many allies and deserves to be discussed and elaborated a little. Well Named. Nobody seriously believes in it, at least with the only result of the bombs, on the contrary. It will require ground intervention. In Iraq, it is not the Kurds who will carry it out alone. The Iraqi army, that remains to be proven. On the Syrian side, the formation of a moderate opposition alternative has so far failed. Relying on Bashar's forces (the Russian solution) seems more realistic but very difficult to justify in this conflict.

3° The aims of the war are not defined. What is the final objective, the desired effect (what is called in military terms the "End state") of this intervention? How will the operation develop over time? How much resources do you really have to put in to win, then to hold the ground? How long will it last? How to get out of the operation then? How then to restore peace on the territory?

4° Even supposing that this objective is achieved, what do we put in its place? How do we rebuild the Iraqi state, the Syrian state, what future for the Kurds?

5° Last question — and not the least —: what are we doing on the “inner theatre”? What are we going to do with the thousands of European fighters who left to fight or who have already returned (not to mention the Russians, Tunisians, Moroccans, Balkan and other nationalities)? Putting them in prison as demanded by some politicians seems absurd. A heresy when we see that time in prison has often led to ... radicalization and the spread of terrorism. There is certainly a prevention program for this phenomenon that must be undertaken. And this requires a certain questioning of ways of thinking and acting on the economy, the social mechanics of integration, ... There is also a vast DDR-type program (demobilization, disarmament, reintegration), to be carried out as was done with child soldiers in Africa. And that deserves some thought. Going to destroy Daesh without tackling the causes, even on European soil, is ineffective.

In the end, a certain European “slowness” could, perhaps, make it possible to take the time for reflection and to answer these series of questions which do not really call for obvious and simple answers.

(Nicolas Gros-Verheyde)

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Nicolas Gros Verheyde

Chief editor of the B2 site. Graduated in European law from the University of Paris I Pantheon Sorbonne and listener to the 65th session of the IHEDN (Institut des Hautes Etudes de la Défense Nationale. Journalist since 1989, founded B2 - Bruxelles2 in 2008. EU/NATO correspondent in Brussels for Sud-Ouest (previously West-France and France-Soir).

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