(B2) The war in Iraq in 2003 was not really based on good intelligence and did not lead to the regime change hoped for. Tony Blair, the former British Prime Minister (Labour) acknowledged this in an interview on CNN airs Sunday (October 25).
« I apologize that the intelligence we received was wrong because, even though he (Saddam) used chemical weapons extensively against his own people, against others, the program (weapons of mass destruction) didn't exist in the way that we thought ". NB: Evidence all the same nearly 12 years after the outbreak of the American-British offensive.
Tony Blair also issues an apology — which is newer — for “ errors in planning and, certainly, our error in our understanding of what would happen once you removed the diet ". NB: A confession which refers to the intensive preparation of this offensive, carried out since the beginning of 2002, and officially confirmed by the memo from Colin Powell and does not occur entirely by chance since an investigation is still in progress on the responsibilities in the outbreak of this war. The "Chilcot commission" set up in 2009 has still not delivered its report (1).
The 2003 war one of the causes of the birth of ISIS / Daesh
The former British Prime Minister also acknowledges lip service that this intervention in the war in Iraq played in the rise of the organization of the Islamic State (Daesh). " I think there are elements of truth in this answering the journalist's question, adding however to clear himself. " Of course, you can't say that those of us who eliminated Saddam in 2003 bear any responsibility for the situation in 2015.. (...) But it is also important to realize, first, that the Arab Spring that began in 2011 could also have had an impact on Iraq today, and second, that ISIS gained its prominence from a base in Syria and not in Iraq ».
Iraq 2003, Libya 2011, Syria 2012, three policies, three failures?
Tony Blair also admits that Western intervention techniques in the Middle East and North Africa are all failing. " We tried intervention with ground troops in Iraq. We tried intervention without putting troops down in Libya. And we tried not to intervene at all but to demand regime change in Syria. It's not clear to me that even though our policy didn't work (in Iraq in 2003), the following policies worked better ».
(1) Headed by Sir John Chilcot, this commission (Iraq Inquiry) should have published his report normally in 2010 or 2011... But for various reasons, it has been postponed several times, a "national scandal" do we not hesitate to say across the Channel (see the attorney Morris in the Mirror in 2014)