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The Russians are hitting Syria. A very political strike. A butterfly effect?

StrikeRussian@Rus150930
Airstrike carried out by the Russian air force in Syria on September 30 - images: Russian Ministry of Defense

(B2) All it took was a small decree and a few planes. The Russians matched the action to the word. And, from now on, in Syria, as in the whole of the Middle East, we will have to reckon with them.

French-style"

« Based on the item 102.1 (d) the Russian Constitution, Vladimir Putin submitted a proposal to Federation Council to ask him toauthorize the use of the contingent Armed Forces Russian de outside the country, on the basis of principles and standards of generally recognized international law says the Kremlin press release, issued Wednesday (September 30) morning. Permission granted immediately. The sequel didn't drag out. In an organizational scheme quite similar to that existing in France, the head of state, who is the supreme commander of the armed forces, ordered to begin " the air operation to target targets of ISIL terrorists on Syrian territory ».

Eight targets destroyed

And in the afternoon, the Russian Ministry of Defense announced that it had carried out several strikes on targets of the " depots of weapons and ammunition, fuels, communication centers, military equipment of ISIS terrorists ". An announcement made on Twitter, on facebook, on youtube , etc. thus using all modern social media channels, in a rather rare exercise for the Russian army in military 'transparency' (or propaganda), quite similar in fact to that practiced by the Israeli or British army. We will learn a little later that this raid carried out by the Russian aviation group based in Syria hit " 8 ISIS targets, (...) located in a mountainous area ", who have been " completely destroyed ».

The contested target

Both Americans and French immediately expressed doubts about the intended target, arguing that it concerned more moderate groups hostile to Bashar el Assad than the organization of the Islamic State (ISIL / ISIS). It's hard to tell right from wrong. Be that as it may, John Kerry, the American Secretary of State, very quickly indicated, on Wednesday evening, before the UN Security Council and then before the press that he had " concerns (as to) the nature of the objectives, the type of targets targeted by the Russians. There is " need for clarity ». The organization of the Islamic State (ISIL) should obviously be targeted ». But, in a way just as obvious, that's not what's happening ».

A very political strike

In a game where the propaganda is intense on both sides, the essential is not really there. Because this Russian strike has, above all, a political objective. It allows Russia to recover its stripes of strength with whom it is necessary to reckon and discuss in Syria, not just because it has a seat on the Security Council of the United Nations but because it is there militarily and that its intervention cannot be discussed from a legal point of view.

Some legal basis

From the point of view of international law, the Russian position seems, in any case, quite justified... whatever the intended target. Because the Russian military intervenes at the request of the legal government of Syria (Bashar el Assad). It may not be very moral but it is unstoppable! What Westerners who act on the margins of international legality cannot claim. Incidentally, Russia has established itself as an obligatory partner for the regime in Damascus, just as much as Iran.

And a certain continuity in support for Bashar

This intervention also has a certain logic in continuity. Unequivocally supporting Bashar's regime, Moscow notably blocked any attempt at a UN Security Council resolution against the regime. The Russian government has, since the beginning of the crisis, predicted that Westerners were mistaken in believing that the democratic Syrian opposition would prevail. The former ambassador to NATO, Dimitri Rogozine, now Deputy Prime Minister, warned during a last press briefing in Brussels (in January 2012!) that the Europeans were wrong. You'll see - he said then, arguing about Russia's good Russian knowledge of the region. " Those you support are terrorists who will turn against you » he warned, in essence, in a speech without nuances, which clashed in 2012 and seems almost reasonable today... Referring to the intervention in Libya, very close, he also warned, bluntly: never again!

The Butterfly Effect of Typing

From now on, indeed, we will have to coordinate closely between the military, between Russians and Americans, and the rest of the coalition, to avoid any risk of "collision". And in an unstoppable and cynical way, this coordination will be done with Bashar's regime, the Russians ensuring the "missing point" of the coordination between the coalition and the Damascus regime.

Close US-Russian coordination

John Kerry, the US Secretary of State, recognized this yesterday in New York, during a joint press conference held in New York with Serguei Lavrov, the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, at the end of the Council meeting. of security. " We have agreed on the imperative as soon as possible — maybe even tomorrow — to have a military-to-military deconfliction discussion, meetings, conferences — whatever can be done as soon as possible. Because we agree on the urgency of this deconfliction” (*).

A zone of indirect deconfliction with Bashar's regime

Point confirmed by his Russian counterpart. « The first instruction for us is to ensure that the American soldiers, the coalition led by the United States on the one hand and the soldiers of the Russian Federation which is now engaged in certain operations in Syria, at the request of the Government Syrian, get in touch and establish communication channels to avoid unintended incidents” a clarified Lavrov. « And we agreed that the military should get in touch with each other very soon. " The Russian minister, moreover, letting go that this decision ensured " follow-up to what our presidents agreed to when they met here on September 28 (implying: the Americans were perfectly aware).

Not really a friend, but already a partner

A few hours before another fundamental meeting, on Ukraine, in Paris, in Normandy format, the discussion will change direction. Russia is still not really a "friend" but it is more of a "partner". There is a reversal of priorities within the European Union today. Between the Russian risk in Ukraine and the risk of the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq, the major European countries and the United States have chosen: it is the southern front on which it is important to concentrate for the moment.

Consequences at European level

Choosing between competing and cooperating

Within the European Union, there are signs of a notable development. While all minds have been turned since the end of 2013 towards the East - forgetting the South - the geopolitical reality has come to remind us that between two risks, it is necessary to choose the lesser. The European doctrine of saying that the eastern front and the southern front have the same value and must arouse the same political commitment is no longer tenable today. Quite simply because the two risks are not of the same intensity.

Two risks in the East and in the South which are no longer of the same intensity

In the East, there is a rebellion supported by Russia, and contained in a certain geographical sphere, quite limited after all, which has no intention or means of overflowing its combat zone (without the support from Moscow). In the south, there is a rebellion, which extends over the territory of two States, has a notable war chest and much more numerous troops and which has a will to control several territories even to strike the European territory. It's not exactly the same thing.

...and can no longer be fought in the same way

Then, because the Europeans do not have the means to hold two fronts at the same time. Finally, because we cannot designate Russia on the one hand as a horrible enemy that must be fought and, on the other, bow to it to obtain if not its cooperation, at least its benevolent neutrality, on Libya, the Syria, the Sahel, etc.

A geopolitical reversal within the EU

For most Eastern European countries that have not seen the Syrian threat as the political symbolism of the wave of refugees, this reversal has much more fundamental geopolitical consequences on their neighborhood than they could estimate it at first. They do not take part in any arena for discussion and resolution of the main ongoing conflicts. In Ukraine, it's in E2+2 format (Germany, France, Russia and Ukraine). On Iran, it is in E3+3 format (Germany, France, United Kingdom, China, Russia and United States). On Syria, we could adopt a similar format. In the Middle East, it's the Quartet. etc

A political and military offside of Eastern European countries

By blocking any sharing of solidarity in the reception of refugees, often aggressively and with often "borderline" arguments, they have put themselves out of play politically but above all morally. By only participating with fingertips in operations in the Sahel as in Iraq, they are out of the game militarily. They will therefore find it very difficult — barring a new (major) Russian offensive in the East — to reimpose the "Eastern Front" priority on the agenda. What they had managed to do for several months. The Russian strike on Syria, like its consequences, first between Washington and Moscow, then internationally, has reduced their importance to nothing.

Kaczyński, how many divisions?

It will be necessary to examine in the first months whether this fact is simply cyclical or structural. But it seems certain that their position, acquired since 2004 and 2007 and the two successive enlargements towards Eastern Europe, is about to end. Ask the question: the East "how many divisions?" », it is already almost answering it. The Eastern countries are, in fact, returning to their normal low water level, neither more nor less: that of small countries, not really having a diplomatic and military surface, to weigh durably, without support (either European Union, or the United States), which weighs barely 20% of the European decision-making system (2). And even if Kaczyński's PiS (Law & Justice), which intends to govern Poland tomorrow if it wins the elections (3) supports the opposite, and intends to restore as it says "the lighthouse" of Poland, this this may not shed much light...

(Nicolas Gros-Verheyde)

(1) US State Department transcript translated by us

(2) According to the double majority system, this weight should decrease slowly but constantly over the next ten years, given the stagnation or even the constant decrease in the population of these countries, while the population of the other European countries (Western, north and south) is growing more dynamically (internally or/and due to immigration).

(3) Legislative elections are scheduled for October 25. The PiS has already won the presidential elections with Andrzej Duda

Nicolas Gros Verheyde

Chief editor of the B2 site. Graduated in European law from the University of Paris I Pantheon Sorbonne and listener to the 65th session of the IHEDN (Institut des Hautes Etudes de la Défense Nationale. Journalist since 1989, founded B2 - Bruxelles2 in 2008. EU/NATO correspondent in Brussels for Sud-Ouest (previously West-France and France-Soir).

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