[Summer Series] Hillary's Mails. Libya 2011. The notable role of Egypt
(B2) Egypt made a concrete commitment in Libya in 2011, much more than the official version suggests, by reading the various email exchanges that Hillary Clinton received when she was in office at the US Secretary of State.
The engagement of Egyptian special forces (with the French and British)
A source " extremely sensitive “explains in an email from March 2011” the rebels receive direct assistance and training from a small number of Egyptian special forces units, while French and British special operations troops work from bases in Egypt along the Libyan border. These troops are responsible for controlling the transfer of weapons and supplies to the rebels. »
The successes of the rebels at the beginning of 2011, an Egyptian success too?
« Since the early days of the Libyan crisis, Egyptians have behind the scenes supported the forces of the rebellion. thus indicates a diplomatic source. « Egyptian special forces troops serve alongside rebels in eastern Libya ». " Senior Egyptian officer privately claims his troops are responsible for many of the rebels' military successes' we confirm to Hillary Clinton.
A desire for discretion
But discretion is required because Cairo does not want to appear too linked to Western forces. Egyptian diplomacy intends to emphasize " the need to defend the Libyans against the Gaddafi regime. But at the same time to distance itself from an intervention led by the former European colonial powers”.
Multiple and ambiguous interests
Egypt's interests are indeed multiple: 1° geopolitics — The defection of Libyan leader Mr. Gaddafi and “ the political division of Libya would give Egypt the opportunity to fill the void in the East” and confer on it the status of a regional power — ; 2° security — avoid a massive influx of refugees and contain the jihadist threat that appears as the conflict continues —; 3° economical — “Around 1,5 million Egyptians live and work in Libya and remit to Egypt up to $254 million”.
(JB with NGV)