Iranian nuclear: the five reasons for the success of European diplomacy
(B2) The agreement reached in Vienna between the international community and Iran after 21 months of fierce negotiations on July 14, 2015 is a success for European diplomacy. It must be underlined in these times when it is common to "basher" Europe. It is a success both in substance and in form.
The letters of nobility of European diplomacy
European diplomacy, on July 14, in Vienna, at the Palais Coburg, won its letters of nobility. In this negotiation - contrary to what had happened in Greece a few days before, which revealed all the selfishness and villainy of each - each of the partners came out of the negotiation feeling that they had won for their own interests and also a little for humanity. It is a (fortunately) historic negotiation where the agreement with Greece was a (shamefully) historic agreement.
1. The European philosophy: negotiation
The most visible element is the presence of Federica Mogherini, the High Representative of the EU, announcing: “There is an agreement! ". But it is not the most important. It was the European philosophy of negotiation and the dual approach that prevailed over a position of isolation and military strike, which were for a time the option considered, seriously, on the other side of the Atlantic as in certain countries of the Middle East (Israel in particular but not only). Europe has always campaigned for a dialogue with Iran. This dialogue has undergone ups (in 2003-2004 and 2013-2015) and downs (in between!) and has not always been easy. But it succeeded in succeeding, with a certain slowness, but an effectiveness undoubtedly superior to the cycle intervention-reaction-security vacuum which marked the international intervention in a neighboring country, Iraq.
2. The dual approach
A dialogue that was not imbued with naivety, however. The other key element of the European position is indeed the dual approach: negotiation on the one hand, sanctions on the other. The European Union has not only transposed the sanctions imposed at international level by the UN Security Council, it has imposed - together with the Americans - autonomous sanctions. Sanctions which were reinforced from 2010-2012 and produced a notable effect on the Iranian economy and Iranian power. This dual approach paid off in a way.
3. The middle ground at the international level
Europe has ensured its position as an intermediary between the main international partners - Russians and Chinese on the one hand, Americans on the other - by trying to find the right balance between a certain (geographical) proximity with Iran and respect for other balances in the region (Saudi Arabia, Israel, Turkey). The format found E3 / EU + 3 (or P5 + 1 in the Anglo-Saxon denomination) is the one that allowed the agreement. The role of European diplomacy has been to maintain the cohesion of this improbable team, through the crises. Despite the tensions over Iraq in 2003 or over Ukraine in 2014, this bond has never been broken. And if shades were expressed - notable shades - they never went as far as the crack or break of this background. This format - and this intermediate position of Europe - deserves to be taken up and adapted for other current crises (Syria, Yemen). Because it's a winning format.
4. A strong community-intergovernmental alloy
Incidentally, we can point out to aesthetes of the European 'thing' that the European negotiating team was also in the 'golden mean'. Neither entirely intergovernmental nor entirely community-based. There too, it is the good alloy. There cannot be a strong position at the international level without the presence within a European delegation of the 'big countries' - because they have a permanent seat on the Security Council... and have nuclear weapons (France, United Kingdom) or because they occupy a key position economically on the subject (Germany in this case, but it could be another country in other cases). But there can be no permanence, no strength in negotiation, without a team dedicated to this, neutral to the national interests at stake, in the person of the High Representative of the EU and European diplomats. It is this combination that has been successful, allowing certain countries (France in this case) to push the 'cork' a little further in their demands on the Iranians while remaining within the common framework.
5. The notable role of 3 high representatives
In the end, it was the very person of the High Representative of the EU who ensured the link, the binder, the persistence of the spirit of dialogue, even at the worst times between the Iranians, and between the different members of the E3+ 3. Each with his character, his interpersonal skills, his faults (and his qualities) ensured the persistence during these 12 years of negotiation with Iran of this dual European approach, without really deviating from the trajectory. This too is noteworthy: Europe has not deviated from its doctrine. Javier Solana first, always available by phone for his Iranian contacts; Then Cathy Ashton, who had been able to win the trust and esteem of several of the negotiators around the table, in particular the Russian Sergei Lavrov, who was not very inclined to friendly outbursts, and Federica Mogherini, who was able to conclude the negotiation until the final note of the signatures on this joint agreement. There was a trifecta that the Iranian negotiator, Mohammad Javad Zarif - who was present in 2004 during the first agreement with the Europeans alongside Hassan Rohani, now President of the Iranian Republic - insisted on recalling .
(Nicolas Gros-Verheyde)
On the agreement and the negotiations with Iran, read also on the Club
