Stratfor sees the Russian at the gates of Kiev!
(BRUSSELS2) Stratfor, engaged in a small wargame in March on the possibilities of a more advanced Russian military incursion into Ukraine. A great amalgam of proven information and others that look more like rumors as the American private "intelligence" company itself points out.
Scenario 1. Limited incursions and territorial continuity of separatist territory
The first scenarios examined are the most limited of them all. “ In this paradigm, Russia has conducted small incursions along its entire shared border with Ukraine with the aim of threatening various key objectives in the region and, in doing so, spreading Ukrainian combat power as much as possible. . From a Russian military perspective, this is efficient and effective, but it would not achieve additional political or security objectives that are not already underway. However, such a move would likely be used in conjunction with any future military actions by Russia or pro-Russian separatists. » Another limited option according to Stratfor strategists “ is a small extension of current separatist lines to the north, incorporating the rest of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts to make the territory more autonomous. This offensive would mainly consist of the direct engagement of Ukrainian forces who are concentrated along the separatist-held zone. »
Scenario 2: The Bridge to Crimea
One of the options the most commonly run would lead Russia to follow the southern coast of Ukraine to connect Crimea with separatist positions in eastern Ukraine ». In this scenario, Strafor “ assumed that the planners would conduct the offensive in a broad enough front to ensure Crimea's primary water supply from the Dnieper. This aquatic feature is significant, as much of Russia's defensive line would be tied to a defensible point in the region: namely, the Dnieper River. It would then be necessary reach a land bridge and secure power lines in Crimea. In conducting such an offensive, the initial push would move forces quickly across Ukraine towards the city of Kherson and Nova Kakhovka on the Dnieper River, where they would set up defensive positions. One potential constraint for this scenario is the fact that supply lines would have to be extended quite a distance along a thin, difficult to defend, strip of land. »

3rd scenario: conquest of the coasts and junction with Transnistria
The other scenario considered “ involves seizing the entire southern coast of Ukraine to connect Russia and its security forces in the breakaway region of Transnistria. The logic would be to cripple Kiev by cutting it off from the Black Sea, thus securing all Russian interests in this region in a continuous arc. This would require a complicated and dangerous transition operation over a large river, with an extended and vulnerable logistics train. » In this scenario, " defensive positions can only be anchored on the Dnieper River. This would require a larger number of forces to hold the ground, without the luxury of a geographic barrier. The port city of Odessa would need to be captured next, which would be a huge dent in the Ukrainian economy. »

« Both scenarios that extend along the coast have serious shortcomings, leaving Russia's force in very exposed places. An extensive frontage on relatively flat land, bisected by riparian features, is far from ideal. There are options for Russia to go beyond. However, this would involve taking the southern half of Eastern Ukraine in an overall attempt to commit less combat power. However, this still leaves a massively exposed Russian flank and removes the security bonus of the Dnieper. A significant part of the defense lines would not be anchored on the Dnieper River. Instead, it would be stretched along the Kharkiv-Dnepropetrovsk axis, controlling these two cities as well as Zhaporizhia. »
Scenario 4: Taking Kiev
The last scenario considered by Stratfor “ could remedy these problems. In short, Russia could seize all of eastern Ukraine at the Dnieper, controlling all major crossing points, and using the river's major obstacle as the defensive front line. Yet taking this entire area would require a significant amount of mobile forces in eastern Ukraine. The resulting occupation would also require a massive counterinsurgency campaign, including operations in the Kiev regions, as well as the cities of Kharkiv, Dnepropetrovsk and others, where a high level of resistance could be expected. »
These scenarios do not take enough account of the method used by the Russians in Ukraine: the conquest of spirits.
In almost all of the Russian-speaking part, the Kiev authorities have a bad reputation (thieves, Nazis, etc.) and the Russians just have to maintain a bad atmosphere there (protests by civilians, attacks on government symbols with molotov cocktails, high-dose propaganda ) to paralyze Ukrainian possibilities of action without violent recourse (Maidan upside down). As a result, the government forces find themselves increasingly in a hostile zone, until the moment when an action by the nice green men or the separatists can quickly neutralize them and show themselves as liberators.
It is striking to note that this method designed and applied by Westerners has been forgotten, while on the contrary, the Russians have integrated the lesson very well and apply it perfectly.