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How was the decision made on EUNAVFOR Med? Who funds? Who controls? etc

Atlantic patrol planes on reconnaissance flights (credit: Italian Marina)
Atlantic patrol planes on reconnaissance flights (credit: Italian Marina)

(BRUSSELS2) The EUNAVFOR Med operation, like all European Union operations set up under the EU's peacekeeping policy (the CSDP or common security and defense policy) obeys rules precise details that it is worth recalling on the eve of the launch of the operation to combat illegal trafficking off the coast of the Mediterranean (EUNAVFOR Med).

Who decides on an operation?

Decision-making at European level is always ensured at political level by the ministers or by the ambassadors who have received instructions from the capitals. In general, given the sensitivity of the subject, these instructions are "in direct contact" with the decision-making body for military operations in their country (Defence, Foreign Affairs, Prime Minister or Head of Government).

How do we decide?

The decision on a military operation is taken unanimously at European level. In general, there is no vote. The decision is made by consensus. But if a member state issues a formal reservation or if it opposes it, the discussion continues until an agreement is reached. It is (very) rare to vote on this kind of decision which involves the sovereignty of States.

Do we decide at 28?

No. Denmark has a military opt-out. He does not participate in decision-making, is not required to participate in the solidarity financing mechanism and cannot even be associated with it in any way whatsoever. Which is quite paradoxical. Because its northern neighbour, Norway, which is not a member of the European Union, could be .

Who participates in the operation?

Once the decision has been taken, the Member States are free to take part in the operation, or not. They decide, sovereignly, to send the available means - or to withdraw them - if necessary, on simple decision of expediency. From where conferences of generations of force to provide the necessary means. The difficulty in this type of operation is to find, among what all the Member States offer, all the necessary and complementary elements for setting up the operation. It looks a bit like a rubiscube when it comes to finding the necessary means, those proposed by the Member States, and above all maintaining these capacities over time. So there's no need to have 7 boats when you just need 3. And there's no need to have 10 planes right away, where it's better to have 3 or 4 permanently in the air for the next 6 months.

Who pays ? How much does the operation cost?

Each participating State bears the cost of the forces and personnel sent there. This is the principle in all the military operations of the EU (as of NATO). This is why it is very difficult to obtain the overall cost of a military operation, apart from the common costs, each State having a different method of calculation. Only a small part of the costs of the operation is insured jointly. This mechanism, known as Athena, generally takes the costs of the command system, certain expenses of the operation and force HQ (logistics, communications, etc.), within the framework of an envelope defined in advance. For EUNAVFOR Med, it is 11,82 million euros the first year. All Member States (except Denmark) contribute to these common costs, according to a distribution key set according to gross domestic product (GDP).

Why an operation HQ in Rome and not in Brussels?

The European Union does not have its own headquarters to conduct military operations. The Member States have always refused to activate it (mainly because of the British veto). The operations of the European Union are therefore carried out from an operations headquarters, dedicated to this, and activated especially for the occasion. Europe has six registered headquarters: in France (Paris-Mont Valérien), in the United Kingdom (London-Northwood), in Germany (Potsdam), in Italy (Rome), in Greece (Larissa) as well as the Shape of NATO (in Mons Belgium). Two are active today: in addition to Rome (EUNAVFOR Med), Northwood is monitoring the EUNAVFOR Atalanta anti-piracy operation. One has just been closed: Larissa who was following the EUFOR operation in CAR (Central Africa).

Is this the EU's first naval operation?

No. In 2008, the European Union launched an anti-piracy operation (EUNAVFOR Atalanta) in the Gulf of Aden and off Somalia, which has grown over the years (covering almost the entire Indian Ocean ) and has made it possible (along with a whole series of other devices) to reduce piracy to almost nothing. The Europeans had also set up - under the guise of WEU - a naval operation to ensure the application of the arms embargo decided against Yugoslavia.

Is this a major operation?

Yes indeed, if we except for smaller missions (training EUTM Mali and EUTM Somalia, and the operation in CAR limited to Bangui, EUFOR RCA), it was indeed almost 7 years since the European Union had not launched a large-scale military operation (since 2008 and the establishment of the EUFOR operation in Chad and CAR with nearly 4000 men and the establishment of the EU anti-piracy operation in the 'Indian Ocean).

Is it a risky operation? Is success guaranteed?

This operation involves serious political risks and even a stalemate. And success is far from assured. Everyone knows it. There are still unknowns about the United Nations resolution or the agreement of the Libyan authorities. And, despite an apparent unanimity, the Member States do not quite share the same point of view on the continuation of the operation after phase 1. We cannot speak of division but of divergence of appreciation. Because going to seize traffickers' ships near the Libyan coast (phase 2b) and neutralize them (phase 3), even with the consent of the Libyan authorities, presents a real military and political risk.

Are the criticisms justified?

Some criticisms are well-founded, based on solid arguments, or signify a real political position. The many unknowns that mark the future of this mission are indeed worrying. But it is often characteristic of a crisis management operation that it does not unfold like a "long calm river". But others betray a certain bad faith. They can be grouped into two categories. Some (NGOs) criticize the military side of the operation because they want to have only a search and rescue function for migrant boats. Through the criticism of EUNAVFOR Med, it is in fact the asylum and immigration policy of the EU that they are criticizing. Others mock the peremptory side of the operation, its risk of ineffectiveness. In certain circles, political or military, it is often fashionable to take Europe into one's field of fire. Just for fun...

In 2008, the failure of the operation deployed in eastern Chad near Sudan was thus predicted. A year later even those who had criticized were silent. And everyone recognizes that this operation was useful to stabilize the country (even if it favored the power in place). In 2008, the same process, the maritime anti-piracy operation (EUNAVFOR Atalanta) was criticized as infeasible, limited or duplicating other operations. Today it is touted as a success story, even by the British Tories (who cannot be suspected of being Euroenthusiasts ;-). The training mission of the Somali army (EUTM Somalia), which involved few military risks but many political risks, is no exception to the same phenomenon. Not all operations were successful. There have been "real" operation failures (EUAVSEC in South Sudan, EUFOR Libya stillborn, EUBAM in Libya, etc.). Read : A certain reorganization of the missions and operations of the CSDP … as of NATO?

(Nicolas Gros-Verheyde)

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Nicolas Gros Verheyde

Chief editor of the B2 site. Graduated in European law from the University of Paris I Pantheon Sorbonne and listener to the 65th session of the IHEDN (Institut des Hautes Etudes de la Défense Nationale. Journalist since 1989, founded B2 - Bruxelles2 in 2008. EU/NATO correspondent in Brussels for Sud-Ouest (previously West-France and France-Soir).

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