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Political and defence Europe (by Nicolas Gros-Verheyde)

Blog AnalysisEU Defense (Doctrine)

[Analysis] These very expensive battlegroups, really unusable?

(credit: MOD Sweden: Nordic Battlegroup)
(credit: MOD Sweden: Nordic Battlegroup)

(BRUSSELS2) The Union's rapid reaction force – the famous Battlegroups or Tactical Groups – are still in the garage. And they risk staying there – unless there is very clearly stated political will. Because several opportunities have been lost in the past. I counted 4. And the current battlegroup schedule, although it appears to be somewhat full, in reality has many holes when we take into account economic, political and operational contingencies.

One last miss...

The last missed opportunity was in the Rep. Central African Republic (CAR). Everything was designed for an action by one of the European Union's tactical groups: the pre-genocidal crisis situation, a possibility of intervention well-framed geographically (Bangui or West of the CAR), a commitment limited in time, the commitment of the African Union on the one hand, of the UN on the other, a favorable international consensus. And everyone (High Representative and Member States) contributed to this opportunity being lost… (read:  Send these "damn" battlegroups in the Central African Republic, you do not think about it! et Battlegroup for the Central African Republic? How Cathy said stop!)

Three other opportunities lost in six years

This is not the first time that such an opportunity has been missed. In the past, three times, a need was felt for rapid intervention, the country or the UN was requesting it, and the idea of ​​sending a battlegroup was put on the table, or less considered once. moment, before finally being abandoned.

1° In 2008, in Congo, says Alain Le Roy, former head of peacekeepers at the UN and current secretary general of the European Diplomatic Service. “ When I was in the UN Peacekeeping Department, I requested European aid for the Congo, a battlegroup was seriously considered. But we didn't get it." (also read: Will the Franco-German Battle Group go to the Congo? et The EU is studying four options for the Congo).

2° On Libya, also in 2011, we had also seriously considered the possibility of bringing in a battlegroup to ensure the evacuation of European and foreign nationals, the "Nordic battlegroup" was ready. But the question of costs had strongly hampered the deployment " (read : Eufor Libya: the Nordic Battlegroup “ready to go”.

3° In Mali, also in 2013, “ there was a moment when he was thinking of sending a battlegroup”. But there apparently it was the French who were not very keen on having multinationals. And the nations on call were not "hot as nails" to use an appropriate expression... (read: mali. A certain failure of the concept of battlegroups).

Squad review: A schedule with very big holes

If you look at one of the schedules that are broadcast, make no mistake, half of the slots that are filled will not be used. No one will dare to really say this within the European Union. I have tested it several times. They will give you big eyes with an "Oh" like a startled virgin, before telling you, with a sigh: well, you are "exaggerating a bit..." or "I wouldn't say quite that", most often supported by a long silence accompanied by a wry smile that says more than all the speeches.

Those who are there for the figuration

In fact, if you see a battlegroup, marked "British" (on call in the first half of 1), you are almost certain that it will not leave, by ideological principle: a Briton rarely participates in a European operation, unless it is maritime and, preferably, commanded by a British admiral (London will then speak of a multinational operation under British command!). The same goes for a battlegroup " Helbroc » (on call in the second half of 2), ordered by Greece with Romania or Bulgaria (*), but for other reasons (budgetary).

Those who will leave with difficulty

The battlegroups under Italian command (respectively 1st and 2nd half of 2017) or Spanish, are not better off in terms of budget, and should not be able to "delay" for economic reasons, except for reasons of national interest. This blockage could even reach France. In the current configuration of over-mobilization of troops (internal, Iraq, Mali, etc.), there is no point in asking the General Staff to deploy a GTIA of 1500 men on an external operation. I don't know where we would take them » an officer explained to me. Except, again, for a reason or a theater of national interest, deemed a high priority by Paris.

Those who would have gone well... but

In fact, there remain three theoretically operational battlegroups: the nordic battlegroup (on-call this first half of 1). But we feel that in Stockholm especially, the heart is no longer really there. “ The atmosphere is not the same as it was a few years ago “, a Nordic expert told me. Several reasons: the change in political atmosphere, the Swedes were very disappointed by the lack of response given by the Europeans to their desire for commitment during their last tenure (in 2011). Finally, it is expensive. “We invested a lot of money in these battlegroups, it's very expensive. And this is causing controversy. We ask ourselves the question in Sweden to know if it is really necessary and about their real usefulness recently summed up a Green MEP, Bodil Ceballos.

Those who could perhaps possibly leave, if…

The surprise could, in fact, come from the German-Austro-Dutch battlegroup (on duty in the 2nd half of 2016), theoretically operational, with a German desire to distinguish itself in terms of foreign policy (national as well as European), but it is difficult to see in what geopolitical configuration it could do so. There remains the Visegrad battlegroup (led by the Poles). But, there too, it is difficult to see them engaging in "pure" African terrain without solid support from another country. Although a surprise is always possible. During the last operations in Chad (EUFOR Chad RCA) in 2008 and in Central Africa recently (EUFOR RCA), the forces from Eastern countries provided the necessary bond for the launch of the mission!

In short, I had written in the past that the EU rapid reaction force was slow reacting, today I would rather say that it runs on LPG, the gas being frozen, we have to find the engine for it reliquefy before it leaves again…

(Nicolas Gros-Verheyde)

Read also:

(*) This theoretically includes Ukrainians. But these “have, I think, other concerns than the CSDP today “confided, recently, with a very subtle irony, a high-ranking European.

Nicolas Gros Verheyde

Chief editor of the B2 site. Graduated in European law from the University of Paris I Pantheon Sorbonne and listener to the 65th session of the IHEDN (Institut des Hautes Etudes de la Défense Nationale. Journalist since 1989, founded B2 - Bruxelles2 in 2008. EU/NATO correspondent in Brussels for Sud-Ouest (previously West-France and France-Soir).