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Fight against illegal immigration trafficking: the “Atalanta” inspiration

(credit: Eunavfor Atalanta)
(credit: Eunavfor Atalanta)

(BRUXELLES2 - exclusive) His name is on everyone's lips today. The European operation against piracy in the Indian Ocean (EUNAVFOR Atalanta) has become a benchmark for a possible maritime operation in the Mediterranean against human traffickers (read about the Club: What to do for Libya? Europeans grope and debate). But for those who have followed the evolution of this operation, we can remember how providing it with robust means was not simple and quick and the result of a compromise.

A rise in power of "offensive" modes

If the destruction of ships was not part of the objectives of operation Atalanta in its initial foundation, it was more designed in 2008 as an operation to protect WFP ships or merchant ships, it very quickly became obvious to disrupt piracy which was becoming more and more active. Little by little, the modus operandi of EUNAVFOR Atalanta was strengthened: in the spring of 2010, in particular with the adoption of more offensive methods of action, aimed both at disorganizing "pirate bases" and at destroying as many ships as possible (see : 18 months after the start of the operation, Atalanta in offensive mode) and enhanced intelligence and surveillance capabilities; in the spring of 2012 then, by conceptualizing the possibility of action on land.

The destruction of ships

The destruction of mother ships or skiffs captured by European forces. After the arrest of pirates or suspects, naval forces (European, NATO, or national...) found themselves faced with empty ships. Either the ship was a "big" boat, a trawler or a dhow that had been captured and reused for piracy purposes, in which case it was generally returned to its owners (the captain and his sailors), accompanied if necessary port. Either the vessel was a smaller vessel, a large whaler, or skiffs, they were usually seized. And the solution then depended on several factors. Either the suspects could not be prosecuted and were put back on board one of the skiffs or the "mother ship", if necessary. Either the ships were kept as evidence, for a possible trial. Or they were destroyed on the spot.

A measure that is as much logistical (avoiding boarding the ship), maritime safety (avoiding having ghost ships on the ocean) as strictly speaking safety (avoiding the reuse of the ship). The tactic used by Atalanta like the other forces present, to seize a maximum of mother ships (and not the simple skiffs) was one of the vectors of the success of the operation. But it was somehow quite easy. These ships did not fly any flag (and by default, that of Somalia). They were empty once the pirates were arrested or fled. No collateral risk was therefore to be feared.

Interventions on land

To carry out operations on land, on the other hand, it was more difficult and longer. And the authorization could only be obtained in April 2012 with the primary objective of destroying logistics depots, "pirate bases" (Read also: Atalanta targets pirates on land: all the explanations (well almost 🙂  Actions which also had a deterrent objective for pirates and their support on land with a message of the type "we can reach you everywhere". This possibility was used only once, in May 2012, on a beach in Somalia, in an action carried out by the Spanish navy, according to our information (Read: First offensive action of EU anti-piracy forces on the Somali coast). It was apparently enough to convince some local leaders that helping the pirates was more dangerous than fighting them.

Reconnaissance and intelligence resources

The Atalanta operation has also been provided with solid reconnaissance resources, with several maritime patrol aircraft, based at different points in the Indian Ocean (essentially Djibouti and Seychelles), making it possible to cover the area regularly. On an ad hoc basis, an Awacs aircraft, for strategic area surveillance, was also required. And, at the tactical level, some (Dutch) ships in particular have used maritime drones. The ships deployed, as well as their helicopters, also collected information, in particular during the "friendly approaches" of ships of all kinds circulating in the area. The interrogation of arrested pirates was also a very important source of information. To this was added all the information transmitted by the many merchant ships that cruised in the area and transmitted information to the MSCHOA, the maritime information center, set up at the military HQ in Northwood, as well as the various and varied information collected in neighboring countries (in Kenya or Djibouti) in particular by the "competent service " (as the saying goes ;-). A map of the different ships used by the pirates as different "bands" and their modus operandi could thus be drawn up, in a fairly detailed way.

It is this triple action: intelligence, destruction at sea, destruction on land that could serve as a model for a possible CSDP operation against human traffickers in the Mediterranean.

(Nicolas Gros-Verheyde)

Nicolas Gros Verheyde

Chief editor of the B2 site. Graduated in European law from the University of Paris I Pantheon Sorbonne and listener to the 65th session of the IHEDN (Institut des Hautes Etudes de la Défense Nationale. Journalist since 1989, founded B2 - Bruxelles2 in 2008. EU/NATO correspondent in Brussels for Sud-Ouest (previously West-France and France-Soir).

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