Kurds burst into Parliament. A problem ?
(BRUSSELS2) A few hundred Kurds burst into the corridors of the European Parliament on Tuesday (7 October), the very day of the last hearing of European commissioners.
Overwhelming the few security guards who were at the entrance, they went upstairs. A joyous melee took them to the Voxbox, on the 3rd floor, the Gordian knot of all the corridors of the European Parliament, where everyone passes to go from one room to another... or to leave. Result, a great panic for the security services who blocked all the entrances, closed all the internal doors but seemed a little helpless, faced with this irruption. MEPs - from the left - especially have been called to the rescue to come and parley. Very quickly, an emissary from President Schulz came to tell the demonstrators that a delegation could be received. This helped to defuse the occupation.
We can of course wonder about the security of the European Parliament. The dozens of (private) security guards deployed could do nothing, neither to prevent the irruption of these demonstrators, nor to prevent it. To tell the truth, they seemed quite unprepared for this event (*). Fortunately, the intentions of the demonstrators were peaceful. We dare not imagine what could have happened if they had been armed.
On the other hand, we must not fall into total paranoia. And we must, in a way, salute the fact that Parliament is precisely not a bunker but remains a house of democracy where everyone can express themselves. In the end, the Kurds who had been camping for several days in almost general indifference were able to mark their existence and their fight in this way. They succeeded, there, a nice media stunt. Irony of history. Most of them claim to Abdullah Ocalan, leader of the PKK, a party registered on the list of anti-terrorist organizations of the European Union! Certainly a nice propaganda coup for the PKK.
(*) Without elaborating on security, we can make a few remarks on the security of the Parliament, which is done "old-fashioned": control of badges (scrupulous), bags (a little less), electronic airlock (when beeps, half the time you pass anyway), etc. Little prevention. Almost no one in front of the building, 2 or 10 meters away, to act as a sensor, or as a lookout or observation post. To this, add a high turnover of personnel (which means that they are unable to recognize the regulars of others) and an atmosphere of chiourmes guards, on the mode "efficiency is measured by the arrogance of the guard" (more he growls, the more we must be afraid). Basically... a short-sighted control...
