Iraq. The 3rd Gulf War (in coalition) starts with a bang. 5 minute brainstorm?

(BRUSSELS2) The drums of military intervention are rolling. The words click. Terrorism, Destabilization, Danger. For the fifth time in 20 years, an international coalition is set up to intervene in the world in the face of "terrorism" - including twice already in the same country (Iraq 1991, Afghanistan 2001, Iraq 2003, Libya 2011). Rather surprisingly, we give ourselves very little time for explanations, preferring to give free rein to emotion. The public execution of a few hostages thus alleviating all the questions. And yet there are...

The axis of evil has changed sides

The enemy is now designated. It is no longer Al Qaeda or the Taliban, this time it is no longer Saddam or Gaddafi, the Afghan Taliban who are targeted, the enemy is Daesh, the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (EIIL, ISIL or ISIS depending on the name). Everyone talks to each other today, almost openly (which is a change), and exchanges information: Americans and Iranians, French and Algerians, Arabs from the Gulf among themselves. Syrian leader Bashar al-Assad is no longer hated, he is no longer the enemy to be defeated. Iran is becoming a more than worthy ally, a partner. As for Putin's Russia, it is silent, victorious in its initial posture: supporting the regimes in place. And the axis of evil has changed sides. One terrorist hunts the other. But everyone remains in place, except for a few "despots", who have waltzed, but in their place a breeding ground of hatred and widespread instability have settled. What lesson can we draw from past experience? How to succeed in curbing the already existing hotbeds of instability? How to avoid creating to create others? Who will be the "enemy" of tomorrow: in 2015, 2016, 2020?

A coalition in "improvisation" mode

Imperceptibly, Western intervention has moved from humanitarian support, then military equipment to Kurdish and Iraqi forces, to a real armed commitment led by a coalition, all the contours of which are still unclear. We learn of each other's rallies day by day, sometimes at the very moment of a bombardment. This rather shapeless coalition brings together in a very unfortunate and, to be honest, dangerous way, what emerges from universal action - humanitarian action - and what emerges from forceful action. does not yet have an appointed commander-in-chief, even if it is clear that it is the American general staff based in Qatar which coordinates the whole. It does not yet have a name, although at the national level, each country has given a code name (Chammal for France). No organization has taken over to oversee this coalition, which could thus remain and following the best practices like in 2003. Is mixing the humanitarian with the military a good thing?

A strategy difficult to perceive

The war will last several months, several years, warned the chiefs of staff. But for what purpose? The vagueness reigns. Everyone has only one word in their mouth: "neutralize", "eradicate" Daesh. But it's a bit of a short strategy. We have seen how this strategy "against" a designated enemy played tricks in Afghanistan. "Eradicate" means "put down". However, it is not a question of a group of about twenty desperados whom it is a question of reducing to silence. But several thousand soldiers (between 20 and 25.000 according to estimates), with equipment, financing and organization. An organization that manages to attract behind it not only local populations but also "European immigrants". People who had nothing to do until today with the fighting between Sunnis and Shiites but need to regain a pride that they have lost or have not had. Again, we do not count these "European fighters" (and not foreigners as they are often called for ease) on the fingers of one hand but by the hundreds. The risk of a re-importation of the conflict, during it or at the end of the conflict, is not a theoretical view. Will the police reinforcement be enough?

A funny war

Fighting Daesh with air raids appears to be the simplest, easiest part of the operation, I would almost say the happiest, in any case the least costly politically. The real battle will be elsewhere. This is a big difference with the main commitments. During the previous interventions (Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya...), after the first days, a relative indifference followed. Only the soldiers, their families and a few sensitized people felt concerned. Today with the presence of European fighters, in number, it is the opposite. The greatest danger of this advance of Daesh (alias Islamic State) as of the military intervention will be in the rear. A slope that is all the more difficult for our societies, for our democracies, to take on as they will have to fight on several fronts: both to preserve their sense of freedom and discussion, so as not to give in to fear and intolerance, and also to fight against possible "troublemakers".

Stop the factory of terrorists

The effort should not, in fact, focus so much on the war offensive as on the reconquest of minds and bodies within our societies. If an effort of understanding, a more advanced sense of integration, a change of gear and discourse is not obtained, the "factory of terrorists" will continue to exercise its activity. And the aftermath of this intervention will be darker than non-intervention. Above all, we will have to restore meaning and pride to some European citizens who do not recognize themselves (or no longer enough) in their country of origin (France, Belgium, etc.) and prefer to give their blood and their energy in other lands. If we do not begin to understand what Islam is today, to give it a more modern meaning, to give it their full place in the public debate, and not to despise it, to only bring it out in the event of a problem, we are headed for a very difficult future.

(Nicolas Gros-Verheyde)

NB: the count of the "Gulf wars" obeys different analyses. The Iran-Iraq War is sometimes seen as the first Gulf War. I only mention here the "wars" carried out in international coalition at the rate of one every 1 years or so (10, 1991 and 2003)