In the Central African Republic, reinforcements, quickly. A challenge for Europe

7th January 2014 Nicolas Gros Verheyde

People fleeing the village of Gbakota arrive at a camp after walking 50 km through the jungle - at Bossangoa in the Ouham region. © ICRC: Boris Hegerodeur

(BRUSSELS2) The stabilization of the Central African Republic is proving to be a real challenge. We can consider that the words of certain observers titling on the "quagmire threatens Operation Sangaris" are pessimistic.

The recent military operations — Harmattan in Libya, Serval in Mali or previously Eufor Tchad — had not escaped what appears to be an avatar of the information cycle: first enthusiasm (more or less measured), then the rising reservations and the criticism that arises after one or two months of operation on the air of "it's not moving forward", "we're getting bogged down", failure awaits, etc. It must be recognized that, this time, the point is not (entirely) false. From all the information coming from the field, it appears that the French forces are indeed faced with a serious dilemma. Too few forces, faced with a complex and changing situation.

1. The situation is difficult. It is not just a question of maintaining a safe environment (the typical "Safe and Secure Environment" of a peacekeeping operation) but of intervening and restoring security, protecting the population, ensuring protecting humanitarian structures, disarming combatants, etc. All this in a delicate atmosphere where the feeling of revenge can predominate. And the central government is, to say the least, unstable. The continuation of certain massacres is more than worrying. And it is reminiscent of the tragic events 20 years ago in Rwanda (*).

2. The number of staff hired is "limited": 1800 soldiers to hold a city of about 1,2 million inhabitants, or even a country, is insufficient, even for seasoned troops.

3. African support, who could be available, like the Chadians, are themselves considered by part of the population as non-neutral and are therefore unavailable, at least in part.

4. The mandate of Operation Sangaris and Misca is very wide. Such a large spectrum is useful in operational terms, allowing the force to adapt to all situations. At the same time, it turns out to be a trap. The explanation of the nature of the operation thus turns out to be very vague both in the eyes of Western public opinion and on the spot (*).

5. See a "French operation", carried out for winding "French interests", is a very quick shortcut. If the Central African Republic does not occupy a hyper strategic place in the region, any additional destabilization can only aggravate certain tensions. Any failure of Operation Sangaris could thus be harmful to the very spirit of the obligation to "protect" enshrined in the international fundamentals.

6. Will Europe be able to take up the challenge? The European Union's hesitation to engage is understandable. But they are based on a false interpretation of this commitment. If Europe does not invest in the Central African Republic — other than through the classic humanitarian channels and the check given to the African Union — which, in my view, is not part of a security strategy — it would commit a breach of its values when all the conditions for European intervention (objective of peace, African involvement, multilateral mandate) are met. She would also be making a political mistake. In the eyes of part of the European population as of other countries of the world (powers or not), it would thus confirm one more step in its strategic downgrading. Securing a place of choice in the various international negotiations in progress will not be easy, especially since we find in these international negotiations countries accustomed to the use of force or to "showing their teeth".

Paper to follow on the Club: The first options for an operation in the CAR (exclusive)

(*) One cannot help thinking of Operation Turquoise, carried out in Rwanda in the summer of 1994. The context - like the meaning of the operation - is totally different. It would therefore be useless to put an overlay on it. But we hear the same words and the same justifications. At the time, the government spokesman (a certain Nicolas Sarkozy) said: " It is a humanitarian operation, carried out in a limited time, with the objective of saving all those whom we can save from the massacres. We are well aware that this operation is difficult, complex and risky. But it is to France's credit to organize a humanitarian operation. An argument used today by French officials. And the same to continue then: The question we should ask ourselves, why are we the only ones? apart from a few of our African friends, to have sent men and logistics equipment. (...) It is urgent that everyone gets started so that the fighting stops, so that the help that the means in men, in materials can arrive ».