B2 The Daily of Geopolitical Europe. News. Files. Reflections. Reports

Blog AnalysisEU Defense (Doctrine)

13 indicators for a successful or failed summit. Europeans in 2nd session?

Summit Defense Logo(BRUSSELS2) The weeks have passed. Ambition has waned. And the stakes of the European "Defence" summit on December 19 have become stunted. Because "defence" is no longer just one subject among others at the summit and it was necessary to make room for equally serious subjects such as the banking union or the economic and monetary union.

2h30 meeting

The schedule of the meeting thus only gives 2h30 to the three elements discussed: CSDP (common security and defense policy), Capabilities and Industry. This leaves the 28 barely enough time to go around the table and hold a (rapid) discussion on one or two subjects, before endorsing the conclusions... We can certainly be delighted that the day of this CSDP summit. It's not really a novelty. It's more of a comeback « after a long hibernation ». The last time the "Chiefs" addressed the question of defence, it was in 2008. Since the establishment of the structures resulting from the Lisbon Treaty: nothing! « Previously, the subject of CSDP was on the agenda of almost all summits » a regular at European Councils confided to me recently.

Divergent thrusts

Contradictions are also revealed. The absence of a decisive push in favor of Defense Europe leaves a doubt on the real will of the States to develop this theme beyond rhetorical questions. All are preoccupied with threats. But they are not the same. And we are careful not to list them. A truly "strategic" debate would have been to focus on these "threats" even if it means revealing the East-South dichotomy. The first draft conclusions that circulated - dissected in the club - are interesting, of a very good technical level. But they are not on the scale of a meeting of Heads of State. Rather, they sound like excellent conclusions from a Council of Ministers. To get a clearer idea, we can put forward a dozen indicators that will make it possible to gauge the progress of the future summit: a success, a failure or a simple step. When the summit will be passed, it will suffice to count the number of indicators turned green. And you can give a "grade" to this vertex.

Institutional progress?

This may seem less important today. Many officials say that we must stop "doing institutional" and "doing content". A laudable position no doubt but which hides less avowed goals. Because it is a fact, hardly underlined, almost none of the provisions provided for by the Treaty of Lisbon on European defense have been either put in place or applied. These include: the "regular" review of threats at the level of Heads of State and Government, the start-up fund (of operations), the solidarity clause, the possibilities of using enhanced cooperation, groups of avant-garde, permanent structured cooperation... Everything is left fallow. It is rare to see a field make the case of so little progress. We would be in an area where the competence of the European Court of Justice would be affirmed, we would be in a flagrant case of deficiency! We can therefore give some reasonable indicators:

1. Le seed fund (provided for by the Treaty) must be...launched. François Hollande's idea of ​​a Participation Fund could be based on this basis or another. Read
2. The discussion on the solidarity clause which is dawdling, must be accelerated, with a deadline.
3. Using vanguard groups must be promoted. Not just in theory. The ideal would be for countries to commit to one or two projects within this framework. The permanent enhanced cooperation, if not triggered, must be the subject of an implementation commitment. This device, even a little outdated, can be refreshed. It has a big advantage, it allows several people to move forward in a structured way. Defense is thus the only sector of European policy which allows such advances... and where there are none.

Operational advances

4. The question of battle groups should be seriously considered. These combined arms tactical groups (GTIA) - which constitute the rapid reaction force of the European Union - have never been used since their establishment in 2007! A reform has indeed been adopted providing for more modularity and flexibility. But it doesn't really tackle the problem: why can't the European rapid reaction force be sent? Why did we give up sending him to the Central African Republic today? This question covers in fact two aspects: political (everyone decides, the veto of only one is enough to block) and financial (only the States of permanence pay). How to resolve this hiatus? Specific commitments must be prepared.

5. the framework of civilian CSDP missions must be reformed: appropriate rules for public procurement and financing must be adapted. It is no longer possible, as today, to apply the rules designed for a European field, in a regulated and commercial framework, to a situation in a conflictual African country where the notion of the rule of law is wavering and European requirements outdated. A mandate from the Heads to the Commission and to the High Representative must be set, with a very short deadline: a few weeks. We must avoid in the future that a mission located in a hot, quasi-desert country, inherits vehicles designed for use in the Balkans, with snow tires!

Capacity and industrial advances

6. Start a major capacity project would have been ambitious. It will be observed that certain projects mentioned before (heavy helicopter, jumbo jet, etc.) have disappeared from radar screens. The Europeans rely on the Russians and Americans to provide them with this type of material. Failing this, it will be necessary at least to have the launch ofone or two structuring projects (drones, tankers). The question is not so much the industrial reconciliation as the reconciliation of the specifications.

7. Talking about industrial base are words without a purchase reconciliation. On the next major equipment, it is necessary that several countries have a more concerted, better coordinated, even common approach first of the specifications, then of the acquisitions.

8. Personalized financial incentives for cooperation must be put in place. Whether they go through an allocation of research budgets (Horizon) or the benefit of certain structural funds, dedicated to certain so-called dual projects, or in the form of an exemption from VAT (which already exists for NATO projects) or taking into account the Opex budgets in the calculation of the deficit (an idea that is quite unrealizable a priori), it will be necessary to put in place, to work quickly on these incentives, without which European cooperation will remain an empty word.

Principles

9. La community preference. It's a "big" word at European level. But to speak of a defense industrial base (EDBIT), of the European defense industry, without this approach, looks like a decoy. Because the American industry, present in all segments, ensuring the NATO standard, and having a large domestic market, will almost always offer the best value for money, in purely accounting terms. The price to pay, we know it even if few want to admit it, is total dependence vis-à-vis political lines. The use of certain materials is regularly limited by these constraints. For example, American drones have seen their use limited in certain countries where the Americans did not want to see the Europeans "land"... Ditto in terms of satellite location or the provision of intelligence.

10. L'strategic autonomy. This notion is less practical than the previous one. But it must infuse and disseminate a whole policy. Otherwise talking about Europe of Defense is actually useless. This leads in particular to thinking about supply strategies.

A return of Defense to common concerns

11. Common threat analysis et White Book. Apparently, this subject is not on the agenda of the Summit. But the Member States must commit to meeting again to analyze the threats. The ideal would be to launch a White Paper on European security - supported at arm's length by the European Parliament - is very interesting. In the name of "pragmastime" and the "theoretical" aspect of this approach, several national and European officials refute it. This exercise would however have an interest: to open the debate, to bring it to the public square, to oblige us to look certain truths in the face and to fix a doctrine (or several).

12. Appointment clause. The European Council must undertake to return to the subject quickly (by 2015 - after the elections and the renewal of the European institutions) and review the subject regularly: an annual rhythm is preferable to keep the subject constant under the political magnifying glass

13. Roadmap. The various projects must be accompanied by a precise timetable. Without an appointment date, there is no commitment » as the veterans of European councils remind us. A certain number of issues (maritime, borders, etc.) also deserve to be clarified.

You can do your calculation (or if necessary add one or two indicators). And, at the end of the summit, you can thus give the final note. In the current state, and according to all our indications, the (provisional) grade awarded by B2 fluctuates around 7-8 / 20. Either "passing exam in 2nd session". And we could add in the margin of the bulletin: "le net effort made in recent months remains insufficient to make up for the chronic lack of work during the previous months".

Read also:

Nicolas Gros Verheyde

Chief editor of the B2 site. Graduated in European law from the University of Paris I Pantheon Sorbonne and listener to the 65th session of the IHEDN (Institut des Hautes Etudes de la Défense Nationale. Journalist since 1989, founded B2 - Bruxelles2 in 2008. EU/NATO correspondent in Brussels for Sud-Ouest (previously West-France and France-Soir).

s2Member®