Ban Ki Moon's five options for the Central African Republic
(BRUSSELS2) The members of the Security Council will examine on November 25 the five options proposed to it by the Secretary General of the United Nations for the intervention of the international community in the Central African Republic.
A failed state
Ban ki Moon paints a bleak picture of the situation. The government " does not have the means to cope to threats. " The situation calls for a coherent, integrated and multidimensional response to address the root causes of the conflict and its current manifestations » he underlines. For the Permanent Representative of France to the United Nations, Gérard Araud, there is urgency. " There is no more state authority, there are only militias who make a law for themselves. So we have to react. »
Shared feeling on the American side, for John Kerry, the American Secretary of State who issued a press release. « Nous n'avons no evidence that CAR's transitional government has the capacity or political will to end the violence, particularly abuses committed by elements of the Seleka rebel alliance that are affiliated with the government ».
Pregenocidal situation
The French Minister of Foreign Affairs, Laurent Fabius, even speaks, on France2, of a country “ on the brink of genocide ". The American State Department confirms, according to AFP, a "pre-genocidal" situation in the country, given over to generalized insecurity. The terrible word is pronounced. But according to some specialists consulted by B2, even if the situation is catastrophic, and the violence numerous, it is not yet characteristic of the term "genocide" which is very precise and immediately calls to mind what happened in Rwanda almost 20 years ago.
Ban Ki Moon's Five Options
1st option. Bilateral and multilateral support
This option consists of supporting “ the African Union and troop- or police-contributing countries With " logistical support, allowances paid to contingents and reimbursement of equipment " but also " complementary essential equipment and enablers ". The role of the UN would be "limited": " it would mobilize bilateral and multilateral assistance, assist MISCA in the area of planning and ensure coordination with Member States and the African Union ". It could also provide the African Union with technical assistance for the establishment of a trust fund administered by the latter.
Advantage. “Immediate” support for “ remedy the problems detected, in particular with regard to the survival systems (supply of food, water and fuel) ».
Inconvenience. To have real weight, funds and logistical support must be sent “ very quickly » and be coordinated for « avoid duplicates ". " The aid announced so far may not be sufficient to finance all of MISCA's expenses for one year.. " Moreover, " there is also no guarantee of the amount of future contributions, unless donors commit to long-term contributions ».
Note: This option is already a reality. The European Union has effectively announced a " significant financial assistance to the African Union through its African Peace Facility. France and the United States have also pledged to provide direct support to countries contributing troops to MISCA”. Financial and technical assistance from African Union member states remains quite “limited”.
2nd option. UN support funded by trust fund
The UN would directly provide logistical support in addition to the bilateral and multilateral support envisaged in the first option”, who are " necessary to remedy certain other shortcomings ". This is a complementary option to the first. Through this trust fund administered by the UN, this option would allow “ the provision of equipment and the establishment of mission support capacities, in particular technical assistance aimed at facilitating the installation of MISCA's headquarters, strengthening its command and control structures and its administrative structures , improving the IT infrastructure and providing the necessary training ».
Disadvantages: « This option would not cover recurrent or fixed costs for the provision of materials (fuel, rations, water) or essential life support services (medical assistance) under voluntary contributions. ". As in the first option, there would be no guarantee of the amount of future contributions, unless donors commit to long-term contributions ».
3rd option. Limited UN support for contributions from Member States
This possibility focuses on very “precise” tasks, “ crucial for the proper functioning of MISCA: strategic air transport for the deployment and rotation of contingents; medical support for evacuation and treatment in level III health facilities outside the Central African Republic; installation and maintenance of strategic means of communication between MISCA and the headquarters of the African Union, ECCAS and BINUCA; geographic information systems in the form of dedicated products and applications; detachment of BINUCA military and civilian personnel with very specialized skills or knowledge, particularly in the field of information analysis and logistics activitiess. »
Advantage. « Financed by quotas, this option would allow for more predictable and sustainable support than in the first two options, but only for the specific and essential tasks identified. »
Inconvenience. This option only solves part of the problems. It is a complement to the option of bilateral and multilateral support, which would support “ broader logistical support and direct cash payments to cover deployment-related expenses (e.g. allowances paid to contingents and reimbursement of contingent-owned equipment)”.
4th option. Full UN support, funded by contributions from Member States
This option considers full logistical support » by the creation of a “ United Nations support mission such as that established for the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) ", with " mission support equipment and services normally provided to a United Nations peacekeeping operation of the same size ". Its funding would fall on Member States.
Benefits. MISCA would have “ significant logistical means” like the supply chain already in place, " to provide life support services (rations, fuel and potable water), reduce the mission support footprint, minimize environmental effects and receive support from shared service providers (e.g., global and regional support centers) (…) and the UN medical services ". As for the speed of action, the funds should be “ made available on the day of the adoption of a Security Council resolution on the matter »
Disadvantages. It's about a " size company "and additional support (use of commercial transport or reinforcement of military personnel) may be necessary" if MISCA did not have the means to deal with the threats hanging over the main supply routes and if the communication network was not robust enough ». Direct cash payments (allowances paid to contingents and reimbursement of contingent-owned equipment) are not included in mission funding. The solution would be funding under bilateral and multilateral arrangements or through voluntary contributions ».
Important detail, the text specifies that " the transformation of the mission into a United Nations peacekeeping operation " will be " facilitated » by quickly making funds available.
5th option. A United Nations peacekeeping operation: 6 to 9000 men.
This option is conditioned by the " conditions on the ground”. A peacekeeping operation, under the mandate of “Chapter VII” of the United Nations Charter. would help prepare the ground for the establishment of transparent, accountable, effective and resilient institutions, guarantors of the rule of law ».
The operation would include a “ military strength of approximately 6000 soldiers” which could be raised to 9000 “if the security conditions deteriorate further and the context becomes less favourable, so that the mission can defend itself and protect the towns against armed groups”. She " would be authorized to use any means necessary » to fight against armed groups. With a specific focus on security, the report provides for the strengthening of national law enforcement services (police and others) by “ the United Nations police component, made up of approximately 1 personnel »
Given the scale of the mission, coordination is necessary with the countries and organizations already present on the ground (France, African Union, Sudan-Chad-Central African tripartite force). In addition, the mission would not count with the support of the African Union and ECCAS, which have “ indicated their support (…) but not in the near future ».
This mission would notably have the following objectives: the protection of civilians, assistance with the political process and the establishment of essential elements for the transition, such as the reestablishment of State authority, assistance with organization and holding of elections, (…) disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants, and repatriation of foreign elements, reform of the security sector, support for the police and judicial institutions and prisons, mine action, control of arms and ammunition trafficking and management of weapons stocks, the establishment of conditions conducive to the provision of humanitarian assistance, etc.
Benefits. The mission would absorb BINUCA to “ fulfill its coordination functions of the humanitarian and development agencies of the United Nations ". Already present on the ground, its action will be a continuation of the previous one.
Disadvantages. The full operationality of the mission will be limited by the poor state of roads and infrastructure. She will have difficulty in acquire the key assets, enablers, force multipliers and modern technology required ».
The report insists on the political conditions necessary for the implementation of this mission: “ a political framework for the transition to remain in place and for the transitional government to show that it is committed to it and to take concrete measures to implement it ". At the security level, the Transitional Government should do “ immediately the distinction between the forces which officially constitute the security apparatus of the State and those which act outside the legality » and set « clear guidelines for the restoration of security and the institutions guaranteeing the rule of law throughout the country".
Download the CSR of the Secretary General of the United Nations
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- In the Central African Republic, significant urgency, discreet lobbying, sustained action
- Central African Republic: Europe ready to support MISCA
- Call by the EU to avoid the use of force in the Central African Republic and for dialogue
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