A little European-scale electoral tampering? French, British, Spanish on the mat (updated)
(BRUSSELS2, survey) Everyone should pay more attention to the work that is progressing discreetly in the European Parliament in Brussels. Objective: to determine the number of deputies elected country by country. We can already say that the big countries - France above all but also the United Kingdom or Spain - are paying the bill... Nb: the Afco commission (constitutional affairs) voted, on Tuesday 19 February, the draft report by 10 votes to 9.
A five-year reassessment
Before each election, the number of MEPs elected in each Member State is reassessed to take account of the latest demographic changes. Account must also be taken of the accession of new Member States. The next election 2014 should not fail in this tradition. The entry of Croatia which endows it with ten deputies just like the entry into force of the reduction to 96 deputies of the ceiling allocated to the largest country, obliges to make modifications to the current rule. Some countries will have more deputies, others less because their population has decreased. It is the rule. It is still necessary to know how to interpret this rule. For once, it is the European Parliament that has the key word, the right of initiative, to propose a new distribution of seats. We are at the draft report stage. The plenary debate is scheduled for March 13, with a single reading. The European Council will then have to decide unanimously.
Normally the evolution is done at the ratio of the population. Principle fixed by the Treaty. But strangely, the two rapporteur MEPs – the Italian Roberto Gualtieri (Democratic Party / S&D) and the Pole Rafael Trzaskowski (Civic Platform / EPP) – decided otherwise. With arguments - written in black and white in their draft report - which are worth their weight in coffee... - which can be summed up as follows: not to upset Germany, nor the small and medium-sized countries, for example, to ensure of a majority in Parliament, seem rather to be their concern.
The rule is set by the Treaty: proportional degression
Representation of citizens is ensured on a degressively proportional basis, with a minimum threshold of six members per Member State. No Member State shall be allocated more than ninety-six seats.
The European Council shall adopt unanimously, on the initiative of the European Parliament and with its approval, a decision determining the composition of the European Parliament, in accordance with the principles referred to in the first paragraph.
We can notice three elements: a minimum of 6 seats and a maximum of 96 seats. Without either being an obligation. Then the principle of proportional degression. That is to say, the number of citizens per seat of deputies decreases steadily as the population increases. In the state of the proposals made by the deputies, this rule is violated at least as far as France and the United Kingdom are concerned. There are no other words.
These principles are transposed in the previous decision of the European Parliament (known as Lamassoure/Severin). This one does not consider that the minima and maxima are obligatory but are desirable:
• “ The minimum and maximum figures set by the Treaty must be fully used to ensure that the range of seats in the European Parliament is as close as possible to the range of populations of the Member States ».
Then he sets two rules to apply the rule of proportionality:
• the more populous a Member State is, the more seats it is entitled to;
• the more populated a Member State is, the greater the number of inhabitants that each of its MEPs represents.
The application of the rule - version 1
To apply these principles, one must then decide on a mathematical method. During the last Convention, the European Parliament proposed the so-called "base+prop" or "Cambridge compromise" method. Six seats are allocated to all member states. And the remaining seats are distributed according to the principle of proportionality. This method represents the most "proportional" mechanism which respects the principle of degressive proportionality and it would considerably attenuate the critical position of the German Constitutional Court (especially if it is associated with a revision of the treaty abolishing the ceiling of 96 seats) » underline the rapporteurs.
According to this method, France would be allocated 9 more seats; the United Kingdom 7 seats just like Spain; Italy 5 seats. All other countries would lose seats except Poland (which would remain stable). This new distribution is brutal. But it reflects significant demographic changes.
TABLE N° 4: BASE+PROP – CAMBRIDGE COMPROMISE | ||||
Member States | Population* | Number of seats | Difference from 2009 | Population/number of seats ratio |
Germany | 81 751 602 | 96 | minus 3 | 851 579 |
France | 65 048 412 | 83 | plus 9 | 783 716 |
United Kingdom | 62 435 709 | 80 | plus 7 | 780 446 |
Italy | 60 626 442 | 78 | plus 5 | 777 262 |
Spain | 46 152 926 | 61 | plus 7 | 756 605 |
Poland | 38 200 037 | 51 | 749 020 | |
Romania | 21 413 815 | 31 | minus 2 | 690 768 |
Netherlands | 16 655 799 | 25 | minus 1 | 666 232 |
Greece | 11 309 885 | 19 | minus 3 | 595 257 |
Belgium | 10 951 665 | 18 | minus 4 | 608 426 |
Portugal | 10 636 979 | 18 | minus 4 | 590 943 |
République tchèque | 10 532 770 | 18 | minus 4 | 585 154 |
Hungary | 9 985 722 | 17 | minus 5 | 587 395 |
Sweden | 9 415 570 | 17 | minus 3 | 553 857 |
Austria | 8 404 252 | 16 | minus 3 | 525 266 |
Bulgaria | 7 504 868 | 15 | minus 3 | 500 325 |
Denmark | 5 560 628 | 12 | minus 1 | 463 386 |
Slovakia | 5 435 273 | 12 | minus 1 | 452 939 |
Finland | 5 375 276 | 12 | minus 1 | 447 940 |
Ireland | 4 480 858 | 11 | minus 1 | 407 351 |
Croatia | 4 412 137 | 11 | minus 1 | 401 103 |
Lithuania | 3 244 601 | 9 | minus 3 | 360 511 |
Slovenia | 2 229 641 | 8 | minus 1 | 278 705 |
Latvia | 2 050 189 | 8 | 256 274 | |
Estonia | 1 340 194 | 7 | plus 1 | 191 456 |
Cyprus | 804 435 | 6 | 134 073 | |
Luxembourg | 511 840 | 6 | 85 307 | |
Malta | 417 617 | 6 | 69 603 | |
TOTAL | 751 |
The application of the rule - version 2
However, the rapporteurs do not wish to repeat this formula. For very political reasons. Its application " would entail an extraordinary redistribution of seats, involving heavy losses for small and medium-sized Member States and huge increases for large Member States”. What's more, " without removing the ceiling of 96 seats, this method would be discriminatory for Germany vis-à-vis the other large Member States because it would greatly increase the population/number of seats ratio between France and Germany”. And they propose a so-called "pragmatic" approach. Along the way, they invent a new principle “ while respecting as far as possible the principle of degressive proportionality, the redistribution of seats could be done according to the principle "no one wins and no one loses more than one seat". They thus arrive at a result that is very different from the previous one according to a two-step calculation (of which I will spare you the complicated justification).
Member States | Population* | Number of seats (step 2) | Difference from 2009 | Ratio population/number of seats (step 2) | Difference between the 2 methods (B2) |
Germany | 81 843 743 | 96 | minus 3 | 852 539 | 0 |
France | 65 397 912 | 74 | 883 756 | -9 | |
United Kingdom | 62 989 550 | 73 | 862 871 | -7 | |
Italy | 60 820 764 | 73 | 833 161 | -5 | |
Spain | 46 196 276 | 54 | 855 487 | -7 | |
Poland | 38 538 447 | 51 | 755 656 | 0 | |
Romania | 21 355 849 | 32 | minus 1 | 667 370 | 1 |
Netherlands | 16 730 348 | 26 | 643 475 | 1 | |
Greece | 11 290 935 | 21 | minus 1 | 537 664 | 2 |
Belgium | 11 041 266 | 21 | minus 1 | 525 775 | 3 |
Portugal | 10 541 840 | 21 | minus 1 | 501 992 | 3 |
République tchèque | 10 505 445 | 21 | minus 1 | 500 259 | 3 |
Hungary | 9 957 731 | 21 | minus 1 | 474 178 | 4 |
Sweden | 9 482 855 | 19> 20 |
minus 1 | 499 098 | 2> 3 |
Austria | 8 443 018 | 19> 18 |
444 369 | 3> 2 |
|
Bulgaria | 7 327 224 | 17 | minus 1 | 431 013 | 2 |
Denmark | 5 580 516 | 13 | 429 270 | 1 | |
Slovakia | 5 404 322 | 13 | 415 717 | 1 | |
Finland | 5 401 267 | 13 | 415 482 | 1 | |
Ireland | 4 582 769 | 11 | minus 1 | 416 615 | 0 |
Croatia | 4 398 150 | 11 | minus 1 | 399 832 | 0 |
Lithuania | 3 007 758 | 11 | minus 1 | 273 433 | 2 |
Slovenia | 2 055 496 | 8 | 256 937 | 0 | |
Latvia | 2 041 763 | 8 | minus 1 | 255 220 | 0 |
Estonia | 1 339 662 | 6 | 223 277 | -1 | |
Cyprus | 862 011 | 6 | 143 669 | 0 | |
Luxembourg | 524 853 | 6 | 87 476 | 0 | |
Malta | 416 110 | 6 | 69 352 | 0 | |
TOTAL | 751 |
We thus notice a few incongruities in this table of rapporteurs (which I have put in blue): 1° An inexplicable leap in degression for Italy (inexplicable except to say that the rapporteur is Italian) which thus finds itself on a par with the United Kingdom while there is a clear population differential (more than 2 million). 2° An absence of degressivity for France; the French are thus the worst represented with 883.000 inhabitants for one deputy, ahead of Germany. 3° Another jump in degressivity (in the middle of the table), between Hungary and Sweden, we see a drop of 2 seats while the countries have an almost identical population NB: this "incongruity" was corrected during a vote in the AFCO committee on Tuesday 19 February, a seat was reallocated to Sweden, Austria compensating for this increase. ; 4° Finally (at the bottom of the table), Estonia has an equal vote with Cyprus even though it deserves one more seat.
To this table published by the rapporteurs, I have added a column giving the difference between the traditional method and the "pragmatic" method of the rapporteurs. The numbers speak for themselves. The big countries pay dearly for this method (except Germany which is at the ceiling): France loses 9 deputies, the United Kingdom and Spain (minus 7 deputies)! Italy, a little less (minus 5 deputies). The winners are recruited in the average countries: Hungary has a nice bonus of 4 seats; Portugal, Belgium, the Czech Republic and Austria have 3 more seats; Greece, Lithuania and Sweden benefit from 2 additional seats.
Comments : democratic representation takes a hit. It is no longer a question here of having a decreasing proportion as fixed by the European treaty. But to arrange these criteria according to small, very political arrangements. The rapporteurs acknowledge this: in the present circumstances and taking into account the current decision-making process in this area, the solution proposed is the most likely to achieve a majority in Parliament and unanimity in the Council while respecting as far as possible the principle of degressive proportionality ». Clearly, the electoral rule is not good, we are changing it. We are not very far from tampering with constituencies in the greatest art... This method is not only amoral, unfair, but also illegal and ultimately dangerous for democracy.
In my opinion, if this text is adopted, it will quite simply be contrary to the Treaties. The principle of degressive proportionality obviously implies that the ratio population / number of seats must be a strictly increasing function of the population. Otherwise the proportionality is not degressive.
The rapporteurs defended their project by arguing that… the AFCO committee had taken it too late to review the distribution of seats and that it is no longer possible to envisage a debate (necessarily long) allowing the application of the treaty principles.
Anyway, we are no longer about to turn around with this parliament, which has excelled in timidity.
One question, however: would this distribution of seats be illegal? Who could have it annulled before the CJEU?
we are within the framework of article 263 of the treaty. Action for annulment. Initiators: institutions and Member States. But also a natural or legal person if it is "directly" concerned. The whole question is to know how it is directly concerned. In my opinion, a political party or even an association of citizens of an "injured" country could bring an action...
Nicolas, thank you for this nice article. However, you are mistaken in this comment regarding the action for annulment. The conditions of admissibility of actions by individuals are interpreted in such a restrictive manner that neither citizens nor political parties (who are individuals within the meaning of 263 TFEU) could act in this context. Only the institutions and the Member States will be able to act (and the prospect of seeing an "injured" Member State act is not improbable.
Another downside is that it must still be determined whether the standard in question will constitute a challengeable act within the meaning of 263 TFEU. In order to decide on this question, it will first be necessary to see what its exact nature is.
Indeed. But I will not be so categorical. Concerning the standard, it is rather simple: a decision of the European Council which is referred to in the list of acts that can be challenged by Article 265. On the appeal of individuals, the path is narrower. But the Treaty of Lisbon (aka Constitution) has broadened the notion of appeal. The article speaks of possible action "against the regulatory acts that concern it directly and which do not include implementing measures". The whole question is whether the direct condition is possible. The additional condition of being targeted "individually" was removed in the Treaty of Lisbon (this one actually seemed prohibitive). Best regards