JSF / F-35: an ambitious program but more expensive than expected…

(BRUXELLES2) This is not new, new generation combat aircraft are expensive. This is particularly the case for the future F 35 Lightning II, or JSF (Joint Strike Fighter), replacing the fighters of many Euro-Atlantic armies in the coming decades. The project is not new, nor are its fluctuations and other erroneous estimates (see the article from a year ago already: JSF / F35: a skyrocketing price, a breathtaking Canadian report).

Two official reports have just confirmed this, in quick succession: the JSF program costs more than initially announced while technical shortcomings persist, which also leads to delays in production. The two reports come respectively from the Auditor General for Canada and Government Accountability Office for the United States, two audit bodies attached to parliaments and politically independent.

These two reports are quite critical of a program that seemed attractive following the announcement that had been made: "Producing the most versatile and technologically advanced aircraft, while being the least Dear". If it has an undeniable interest in theory, this program is not so "affordable" as that. Demonstration...

An ambitious program to say the least!

The F 35: a unique aircraft adapted to the 3 armies

The idea behind the JSF project is simple but extremely ambitious: to produce a multi-role combat aircraft that can replace the fighter aircraft of many national armies, whether in their Air, Land or Sea components. Thus, three variants of the F 35 are (were) planned with a dual perspective of cost rationalization (still and always...) and optimization of efficiency (particularly in terms of interoperability), it is indeed a single model of base, adapted to the specific needs of the 3 components, which must be built.

A plane built in cooperation ... very directede

Begun in the late 1990s, this project is "The largest development and procurement program in the history of the United States Department of Defense", recognizes the Canadian report. Comprising design, development, manufacture and sustainment in service until 2051, it is led by the United States with the participation of eight other partners: Australia, Canada, Denmark, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Turkey and the United Kingdom. It aims to produce more than 3000 aircraft, the overwhelming majority of which is destined for the United States (about 2400), which is the only one to have ordered the three models. .

Rising prices, technical shortcomings and production delays: a triptych that goes wrong

An underestimated real cost

The F 35's ex-factory cost was grossly understated initially and has been steadily increased ever since. It has almost doubled in less than 10 years: from US$49,9 million in October 2001 to US$84,9 million in December 2009. And it should continue to do so, according to American and Canadian reports, although with an increase less strong in the years to come, thanks to short-term program restructuring. 

More importantly, it is the real cost - that is, that which includes the complete life cycle of the aircraft - which has been underestimated. According to the Canadian report, which recalls that the calculation of this cost is "a complex task", several factors "have not been taken into account": replacement aircraft (the army must indeed expect to lose some of its aircraft), future software upgrades but also armaments... Factors to which are added all the uncertainties linked to any forecast (price of kerosene, exchange rate, etc.) Finally, Last but not least, the National Defense (Ministry of Defense of Canada) has based its estimates on a life cycle of 20 years while that of the F 35 is estimated at 36 years (or 8000 flight hours)...

All these additional costs could force the ministries of defense of the partner countries to make cuts in other areas, "from other portions of its capital or operational budgets".

The "decisions made to date, and those to come, will have repercussions that will be felt over the next 40 years"says the Canadian report. Rather gross "errors" ... made knowingly, apparently. The Canadian auditor thus affirms that " the [National Defence] representatives knew that the costs were likely to increase but they did not inform the parliamentarians ". The industrial benefits of this program are, in fact, the overriding factor for the Canadian government (and probably others). And National Defense did not want to "show" an overly expensive program.

Technical problems greater than expected, which lead to delays in delivery

Both reports mention technical problems that are delaying the progress of the JSF program. The test phase has thus been extended until 2018 (instead of 2012 as initially announced), when only the "full speed" production phase can begin. The deadline has already been pushed back three times (in 2003, 2007, 2010). Among the technical problems, the American report specifies that it is particularly the "software", "communication" and other logistical systems that are more complex and take longer to test than expected. According to this same report, the JSF program is characterized by too high a degree of competition, which leads to a more complicated process and above all, overlaps and duplication between the development, test and production phases. Moreover, he agrees with the Canadian report on another point: starting to manufacture the planes before the test phase is fully completed presents both technical risks and additional costs, since they must then be modified according to the results of the tests. In response to these various problems, the governments of the partner countries have considerably reduced their orders, at least in the short term. For example, the United States reduced its orders by 400, from 2866 to 2457 aircraft.

Download reports in B2 documents (*)